Introduction
The state is a major focal point of
study in the fields of comparative political science and international
relations. Specialists in international
relations view states as primary actors on the global stage, and comparativists
often use them as case studies to prove the existence of correlation and
causation between different variables.
Among the lay person, the state is a powerful force that regulates their
lives, takes income from their salary, and demands loyalty. One would think that academics would have a
clear conceptualization of the term given its great importance. However, there are major disagreements over the
definition, origin, autonomy, capacity, and future of states among political
scientists.[1] Since Max Weber attempted to define it in his
seminal work The Theory of Social and Economic Organization in 1948,
many academics have spent their careers trying to get a handle on the concept. [2] In this paper, we will look at the major
debates over the state among political scientists over the last half century
and how the discussion has evolved. Over
time, the discussion has become more nuanced as political scientists have built
on the works of their predecessors.
Defining the State
The
first task a comparativist must do before analyzing states is to define them
first so they can know what to compare and contrast; this is much more
difficult than at first glance. Max
Weber loosely defines the state as a set of interconnected institutions that
have a monopoly of force over a given territory and have autonomy from the rest
of society.[3] Their tasks ideally include raising armies,
enforcing laws, collecting taxes, printing money and providing public
goods. Weber also distinguished modern states from “traditional”
forms of political organization—such as tribes, city-states, and empires. For Weber, the state was a Western European
product dating to the commercial, scientific, and industrial revolutions of the
last half millennium. Unlike an empire,
a state has the capacity to directly intervene in the lives of the average
citizen over large distances through an autonomous bureaucracy. Many political scientists continue to hold
similar definitions of the state.
Charles Tilly famously compared the state to a glorified protection
racket, defining it as a set of institutions whose main tasks are to make war
with outside competitors, suppress internal rivals, protect clients from
competitors, and to extract resources from the population to engage in the
first three objectives.[4]
A political scientist that studies the
state from Weber and Tilly’s perspective would focus on the ability of
institutions to keep security, tax the public, wage war, and perform other
functions for the public good.
This
view of the state, however, is fraught with many problems. Social scientists who lived before and after
Weber’s time would disagree with this top-down analysis of government. As much as society is influenced by the
state, many would argue that the reverse is also true. Sociologists like the late nineteenth century
intellectual Emile Durkheim and present-day political scientists such as Joel
Midgal and Atul Kohli have argued that states are the product of competition
and cooperation between various social forces.[5] In other words, to understand the state, we should
also understand the country’s social classes; the organizations that exist outside
the control of the government; and the culture of the citizens that live within
the borders of the state. This
understanding of the state presupposes its lack of autonomy from the rest of
society and emphasizes the role of the nation in shaping the state’s
institutions, values, and long term objectives. From this point of view, the people in
control of the government are the product of the country’s culture and they
derive their legitimacy, or right to rule, from that same culture. Therefore, we have to move beyond studying
government institutions and their leaders to understand the state.
We
face additional problems with Weber’s definition when trying to fit many
non-Western European states into its parameters. For one, a large number of states like
Lebanon and the Central African Republic clearly do not posses sovereignty, or a
monopoly on violence, within their borders.
For a great variety of historical, geographical, and economic reasons, many
governments lack the ability to enforce laws, raise large armies, tax their
citizens, or build an infrastructure. This
is especially true in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, where arid climates and thin
populations have made the task of state building a relatively difficult affair.[6] To be fair to Weber, independent states were
limited mainly to the West during his lifetime.
Shortly after his death, nations in Africa and Asia gained their
independence from Western Europe, leading to the creation of a great diversity
of new political entities that stretch our definition of a state.[7] Non-western states are not only a product of European
influence but the unique historical and political trajectories of the countries
in which they rule over. Do we simply
label many of them as failing or failed states if they don’t meet Weber’s definition,
or do we have to change our understanding of the concept all together?
In
the last few decades, political scientists have tried to develop more
sophisticated definitions of states that include a role for both the
institutions that make them up as well as the influence of society on
government. It is important to note
that the grand majority of political scientists over the last half century,
including Weber, are not dogmatic on this issue and are aware of the complex
interactions between government and society.
Even Weber recognized the importance of legitimacy in enhancing the
capacity of states to govern.
The Origins of the State
Another
criticism of Weber‘s analysis of the state is his views on its historical
origin. Much like other social
scientists from the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century, Weber believed
that states and modernity in general were a product of Western
culture—specifically the Protestant Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the
Industrial Revolution. Furthermore, he
viewed the development of the state as a major break from “traditional” forms
of government. Carl Marx, in his work
on dialectical materialism, also shared this simplistic view of history
although from a materialistic perspective.[8] From the agricultural revolution until the
eve of industrialization, Marx believed that this history witnessed a class
struggle between land owners and peasants that produced feudalism or a
decentralized government where kings relied on land lords to collect taxes from
the peasantry and provide military support for the monarchy. According to Marxists, this struggle did not
change until the emergence of a capitalist class as a result of the commercial
and industrial revolutions in Western Europe.
The revolution of the bourgeoisie
in France in 1789 ushered in a new age where the capitalist class that
controlled the means of production in factories, in alliance with a modern
state, dominated the proletariat or the working classes that had moved from the
farms to the cities to work in the industrial sector. Although Weber sees modernity as a product of
cultural change and Marx views it in materialistic terms, what they both have
in common is that they promoted overly simplistic linear histories where the
West dominates the narrative. The modern state is seen as a product of either
Western material or cultural innovations.
Since
the 1970’s and the birth of many new states across the developing world,
historians and political scientists have challenged this parochial and
simplistic narrative. Hendrick Spruyt,
in his book The Sovereign State and its Competitors, clearly shows that
there was no linear transition from feudal, or decentralized, political systems
to the modern state in Western Europe.[9] For one, the term feudalism is fraught with
many problems as many regions of Europe experienced varying degrees of
decentralization throughout the Early Middle Ages (500-1000 C.E.) and High
Middle Ages (1000 C.E.-1300 C.E.). To
make matters more complicated, kings and lords were not the only political
players in Western Europe during this time period; the Catholic Church and the
Holy Roman Emperor each exerted varying degrees of power and influence over the
peoples of Western and Central Europe as well.
In addition, as the commercial revolution began to transform European
society beginning in the High Middle Ages, the state was not the only political
entity that began to emerge over the centuries; city-states in Northern Italy
and city-leagues on the Baltic Coast were also important political players well
into the seventeenth century. Even when
states began to dominate over their political rivals by the middle of the
seventeenth century, governments in France, Spain, England, and the Netherlands
differed drastically in terms of their political accountability, the rule of
law, and the social contract between citizens and their government. The development of states in Western Europe
was anything but linear and homogeneous.
Furthermore,
many political scientists even question the notion that states have their full
origins within Western Europe. Francis
Fukuyama, in his book “The Origins of Political Order,” identifies various
aspects of the state—like political autonomy and the rule of law—as having
existed in several non-European civilizations prior to the emergence of
modernity in the West.[10]
For example, under the rule of the Han
Dynasty in China (221 B.C.E. to 207 C.E.), an examination system was
established to make the bureaucracy more meritocratic; furthermore, by choosing
government employees based on their qualifications instead of connections, the state
was able to become more autonomous from the corrupting influence of powerful
Chinese families. We also find examples
of political autonomy and rule of law in the Middle East in the pre-modern era. During the height of the Abbasid Caliphate in
the ninth century, government positions were often staffed by slave soldiers
from Central Asia to give the bureaucracy autonomy from the rest of
society. Also, Islamic norms and customs
limited the power of Caliphs and Sultans, who were not above the rule of law. Fukuyama does not imply that Europe borrowed
its political norms from the Islamic World or China; political autonomy and the
rule of law are shown to have developed independently in Europe. However, it is important to understand that pre-modern
political developments in the developing world affected how different cultures
interacted with Western European notions of the state over the last two
centuries. In other words, the states
we see today throughout the developing world are not merely the products of
Western cultural or material innovations as implied by Weber and Marx but a
combination of local and European norms.
Lastly,
states throughout the world were greatly affected by when and where they became
independent.[11] For example, Joel Midgal argues that countries
in Eastern Europe and the Middle East that came into being after World War I
were forced to build powerful states because of the relatively violent nature
of international relations where governments manipulated the internal rivalries
of their neighbors and threats of invasion were far more imminent.[12] However, states that became independent
after World War II faced far less of a need to build strong and effective
states with the capacity to govern as the world of the Cold War and the United
Nations did not present the same threats to state sovereignty as the interwar
period. According to Midgal, without the
threats of outside invasion, states didn’t need to build large national
coalitions. Instead, they could buy off
a small part of the population with rents and exclude the rest from governance
like what Saddam Hussein did with the Sunni in his hometown of Takrit or what
Hafez al-Assad did with the Alawi in Syria.
Therefore, it is important to
study the historical context in which each state came into being, and we should
not assume that a universal European model was exported uniformly throughout
the developing world.
Indeed, as the number of states has
increased over the last century, explaining the historical origins of the
concept has become much more complicated.
We can no longer rely on a linear, Western dominated narrative to
understand the historical development of the state.
Autonomy and Capacity
Another
major debate over states is whether or not they have the capacity to transform
society and foster economic development.
Throughout the last half century, this debate has shifted back and forth
as proponents of autonomous states have engaged in a tug of war with those who
see society as the prominent actor in politics.[13]
When political science first emerged as a distinctive field during the end of
Weber’s lifetime after World War II, lawyers interested in constitutions and
law codes initially dominated the field, which meant states played a prominent
role in their works. However, due to the
behavioral revolution of the 1960’s, as well as the fear of communism and
authoritarian states in the West during the height of the Cold War, political
scientists shifted their focus to structuralism and cultural studies. The works of anthropologists and
psychologists began to play a larger role in the field. The focus than shifted back to the state by
the 1980’s as a number of newly independent countries emerged in the previous
decade and as strong states in East Asia were playing a large role in fostering
economic miracles within their countries.
Now, there is a vibrant debate over the capacity of states to create
real change within society.
In the book Bringing the State Back In,
written in 1985, a group of political scientists led by Peter Evans, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol wrote a variety of articles arguing for the
prominent role states play in shaping society.[14] Naturally, the authors of the book focused
on countries where states played a positive role in creating economic
development and shaping new institutions that transformed peoples’ lives. Articles were written on topics like Keynesian
economic reforms in the United States and Western Europe from the 1930’s to the
1960’s, and the role of developmental states in East Asia in creating economic
growth throughout the last half century.[15] One article discusses the important role
states play in determining the nature of trade with other nations. Taxes collected on foreign imports are an
easy way for states to raise revenue, and selective tariffs can promote
industrial deepening if implemented properly.
Some articles also showed how institutions can create different patterns
of social organization. The structure
of electoral systems, legislatures, and the degree of political centralization
can have an impact on the organization of political parties, civic
institutions, businesses, and labor unions.
According to these authors, states play a large role in shaping society.
In
response to Bringing the State Back In, another group of political
scientists wrote a series of articles in 1994 in the book State Power and
Social Forces, arguing that state capacity is limited by the society in
which they rule over.[16] Naturally, these authors focused on cases
where states failed to implement reforms successfully because of resistance
among a variety of social forces. These
are some of the topics that were covered: the failure of communist reforms in
China to create class consciousness or economic growth; the inability of
Brazil’s military to create an autonomous state in the 1970’s; the failure of
democratically elected governments in India from the 1960’s to the 1980’s to
enact economic reforms; the failure of political leaders in Africa to build
autonomous states following independence; and the struggles of the Ottoman
Empire to enact political reforms in the middle of the nineteenth century. In each case, strong societies often resisted
reforms and forced the state to renege on their initial plans. Even authoritarian states that seemed incredibly
powerful on the outside like Mao Ze Dong’s Communist government in China were
shown to be much weaker than expected with a closer analysis. Authoritarian states often build support for
the regime through side payments to various social groups; although populist
policies provide the state with political support, it hampers the ability of
the regime to make political reforms in the future or prevent the corruption of
the bureaucracy, which becomes staffed with loyal but unqualified clients. Thus, state capacity to govern becomes
limited.
In a much more scathing critique of
states, James Scott’s Seeing Like a State shows how reform-minded
authoritarian governments ruling over a nation with a weak civil society can be
a recipe for disaster.[17] According to Scott, states oversimplify
reality when writing new laws for the purposes of collecting taxes, keeping
security, building an infrastructure, managing the environment, and regulating
the economy; however, as long as states remain flexible in how they enforce those
laws and keep the lines of communication open between society and the
government, major problems can be avoided.
Unfortunately, when states try to transform society without any input
from the people in which they rule, the results can be catastrophic as was the
case with the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union under the
rule of Joseph Stalin; the forced settlement of tribes into villages in
Tanzania during the 1970’s; or attempts to build high modernist cities like Brazil’s
capital Brazzaville during the 1960’s. The
main conclusion is that political and economic reform is not a top-down
process; states and society must cooperate with each other to make reasonable
changes take place.
It needs to be noted that proponents
of the autonomous state and supporters of strong societies are rarely dogmatic. The authors of the works above didn’t choose
their particular case studies because they are unaware of the other side’s
viewpoints or because of selection bias.
They were merely making the point that either states or societies are
capable of being strong, autonomous actors.
Conclusion: The Future of States
Finally,
there is an extensive debate over the future of states. As the world has become more globalized over
the last half century, many political scientists have argued that international
institutions like the European Union and the United Nations may grow in
strength as countries lose more of their sovereignty.[18] Furthermore, states may become more
decentralized as provincial governments gain greater control over local affairs
through the process of devolution. Culture
is changing as well. We may be moving
towards a Post-Modern era where people begin to identify less with their
national identities, seeing themselves more as individuals on the one hand and
as part of a greater collective known as humanity on the other. Like
other forms of political organization, states and nations will one day
disappear; the question is whether or not this will happen sooner rather than
later.
Whatever
perspective we may hold on the origins, nature, and distant future of states,
it is safe to say that they still play an important role in shaping our lives
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. For this reason, it is important that we
continue to debate the nature of the state and refine our definition of the concept.
Work Cited Page
1. Eisenstadt, S.N. “Comparative Analysis of State Formation in
Historical Contexts,” International Social Science Journal, 32 (4):
624-54.
2. Evans, Peter, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing
the State Back In. Press Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 1985.
3. Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman
Times to the French Revolution. Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux: New York, 2011.
4. Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa. Princeton University Press: New Jersey,
2000.
5. Marx, Carl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Modern Library: New York, 1906.
6. Midgal, Joel. “Researching the State,” Comparative
Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, Edited by Mark I. Lichbach,
and Alan S. Zuckerman. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 2009, pgs 162-192.
7. Midgal, Joel, Atul Kohli, and
Vivienne Shue, ed. State Power and
Social Forces. Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, 1994.
8. Midgal, Joel. Strong Societies and Weak States. Princeton University Press: Princeton,
1988.
9. Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes
to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed.
Yale University Press: New York, 1998.
10. Spruyt, Hendrik. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1991.
11. Tilly, Charles. “War Making and State Making as Organized
Crime,” Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1985, pgs 169-91.
12. Waldner, David. State Building and Late Development. Cornell University Press: New York, 1999.
13. Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization. Oxford University
Press: New York, 1947.
14. Woo-Cumings, Meredith. The Developmental State. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1999.
[1]
Midgal, Joel. “Researching the State,” Comparative
Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, Edited by Mark I. Lichbach,
and Alan S. Zuckerman. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 2009, pgs 162-192.
[2]
Weber, Max.
The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Oxford University Press: New York, 1947.
[3]
Weber, Ibid.
[4]
Tilly, Charles.
“War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” Bringing the State
Back In, edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda
Skocpol. Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, 1985, pgs 169-91.
[5] Midgal, Joel. Strong
Societies and Weak States. Princeton
University Press: Princeton, 1988; and Midgal, Joel, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne
Shue, ed. State Power and Social
Forces. Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, 1994.
[6] Herbst, Jeffrey.
States and Power in Africa.
Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 2000.
[7]
Midgal, Joel. “Researching the State,”
Ibid.
[8]
Marx, Carl. Capital: A Critique of
Political Economy. Modern Library:
New York, 1906.
[9] Spruyt, Hendrik. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1991.
[10] Fukuyama, Francis.
The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French
Revolution. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux:
New York, 2011.
[11] Eisenstadt, S.N.
“Comparative Analysis of State Formation in Historical Contexts,”
International Social Science Journal, 32 (4): 624-54.
[12] Midgal, Joel.
“Researching the State,” Ibid.
[13] Midgal, Ibid.
[14] Evans, Peter, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda
Skocpol, eds. Bringing the State Back
In. Press Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, 1985.
[15] See Waldner, David.
State Building and Late Development. Cornell University Press: New York, 1999, and
Woo-Cumings, Meredith. The
Developmental State. Cornell
University Press: Ithaca, 1999.
[16] Midgal, Joel, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, ed. State Power and Social Forces. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1994.
[17] Scott, James C.
Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed. Yale
University Press: New York, 1998.
[18] Midgal, Joel.
“Researching the State,” Ibid.
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