Continuity and Change in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring

Scholars need to be careful about how they study change and continuity following the Arab Uprisings in 2011.  They must resist the urge to make the same mistake that was made during the third wave of democratization in the 1980’s and 1990’s when many in the academic community anticipated a democratic transition to take place in the Middle East in the same way that it had occurred in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa.[1]  Political scientists in the 1990’s were focusing too heavily on trying to find signs that the Middle East was on the verge of democratization and not focusing on why authoritarian regimes remained in power.[2]  By the 2000’s, prominent scholars like Oliver Schlumberger began to focus on why authoritarian regimes in the region have survived for so long and why scholars in the 1990’s mistakenly thought regimes in the region were in the process of democratizing.[3]  Failing to learn from their past, many enthusiastic academics after the 2011 uprisings may have made the same mistake as scholars in the 1990’s by proclaiming that liberal political transitions were inevitable in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.[4]  Sadly, only Tunisia has a realistic chance in the near future of transitioning into a democracy. 
                On the other hand, we should not assume that nothing has changed since the revolutions.  For example, since the Arab Spring began, the region has witnessed the re-politicization of the Arab masses; the reemergence of the military in the politics of many countries; the overthrow of several dictators; the igniting of civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen; and the realization among many authoritarian regimes that political and economic reforms are necessary if revolutions are to be avoided in the future.  Democratization might not be in the Middle East’s future, but a lot has changed.

                It is fair to say that the anticipated transitions to democracy following the 2011 uprisings have not been witnessed in the region with the possible exception of Tunisia, the country where the Arab Spring fittingly first began.  Following the overthrow of Tunisia’s authoritarian ruler Beni Ali, liberals, the Islamist Nahda party, and former members of the regime were able to work out several compromises, write a constitution, and hold free and fair elections.[5]  The process was not an entirely peaceful one and it was far from predetermined, but the country is still in the process of transitioning.  Perhaps the pact-making process between oppositional elements in Tunisia was easier than in Egypt and elsewhere because Tunisia had a relatively weak and depoliticized military on the eve of the revolution.  It is also possible that the transition has worked because the country’s main Islamist group, al-Nahda, spent its time in exile in Western Europe since the early 1990’s and had already adopted many liberal, democratic principles.  It is also possible that Tunisia’s relatively high literacy rate and its diversified economy, which is more industrialized and less reliant on rents than other states in the region, contributed to the peaceful transition.  We can also point to the fact that there are less social cleavages in the country than in other nations throughout the region.  We should keep in mind that Tunisia is only transitioning and has not yet consolidated its democratic system.  It will take a couple more peaceful election cycles with free and fair elections as well as continued respect for the political rights and civil liberties of citizens before we can confidently state that the country has successfully liberalized.  The country is still suffering from numerous economic, social, and political problems that might reverse the progress that has been made.

                Unfortunately, other countries in the Arab world have not been as lucky, especially the states that have suffered civil wars.  Unlike in Tunisia, most of Syria’s military decided to stay loyal to its authoritarian leader Bashar al-Assad by using lethal force against protesters.[6]  Due to the fact that most of the country’s security and military leadership are recruited from the Alawite minority, they feared that a democratic transition would lead to the Sunni majority gaining power.  The harsh crackdown on protests has led to a brutal civil war made worse by the involvement of outside powers.  Yemen has experienced a similar fate since protests erupted against long time leader Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011.  The country’s numerous social cleavages; devastatingly low levels of economic development that were made even worse by the protests; and the negative influence of neighboring states helped facilitate a civil war following the revolution between weak coalitions consisting of different tribal, regional, ethnic, and ideological groups.  Libya also witnessed a civil war following the overthrow of Muammar Ghaddafi in the summer of 2011 with the assistance of NATO’s air force.  Following a brief period of democratic transition, the country soon collapsed into civil war between various secular and Islamist factions.  This can partly be blamed on the previous regime, which was a highly personalized dictatorship that had weak institutions and a habit of playing divide and conqueror with the country’s various tribes.  When Ghaddafi was removed, governance in the country disappeared as did the chance of a peaceful democratic transition taking place.  The civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Libya have led to hundreds of thousands of deaths, billions of dollars in property damage, and hundreds of thousands of refugees who have flooded into neighboring countries.  The effects of these conflicts will no doubt be felt over the next generation.   When the violence dies down and states reconsolidate their hold on the region, the boundaries created by the Sikes-Picot agreement at the end of WWI may no longer exist.  Saying nothing has changed because democratic transitions did not take place or badly needed political and economic reforms have not been witnessed in these countries ignores the devastating impact of the civil wars created by the Arab Spring.

                Egypt has not experienced as much political violence as the above countries, but its democratic transition has failed.  Although the Egyptian military eventually decided to not support the incumbent Hosni Mubarak following the eruption of protests on January 25, 2011, they also did not support a real democratic transition either.  Mubarak was put under house arrest and the crony capitalist allies of his son Gamal were imprisoned, but the Security Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed power upon Mubarak’s resignation.   The military purposely delayed the transition to democratic elections, creating a division among the opposition over whether or not to tolerate SCAF’s “temporary” hold on power.  Furthermore, divisions among secular and Islamist protestors began to emerge following Mubarak’s resignation.   The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political organizations wanted elections before the writing of the constitution as they were confident of their electoral victory given their overwhelming numerical majority, political experience, and superior organization.  The liberals, on the other hand, wanted to write a constitution before holding elections.  The split created problems over the next two years as the oppositional elements on the right and left could not unite to write a legitimate constitution or prevent the military from stepping back into power.  The military, which had a history of playing divide and conquer with the opposition, weakened both the liberals and Islamists at various points by supporting one side over the other.  The Islamists did win parliamentary elections at the beginning of 2012 by an overwhelming majority, but the parliament was disbanded for dubious reasons in June of that year by a constitutional court staffed with members of the Mubarak regime.  The parliament was never able to write meaningful legislation.  Furthermore, Mohamed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, did win the presidency in a free and fair election in June of 2012, but SCAF stripped the executive of many of its powers prior to the election and both the liberal opposition and the elements of the old regime refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new government.  When Morsi attempted to push the military out of power and monopolize control over all three branches of government at the end of 2012, opposition against the new government grew.  On June 30, 2013 enormous protests broke out against the Brotherhood and Mohamed Morsi; three days later, the military, led by General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, orchestrated a coup d’état.  Since then, the military has reestablished an authoritarian system of government with fixed elections and the suppression of basic civil liberties and political rights.  This does not mean nothing changed from before 2011.  For one, this new authoritarian regime is dominated by factions of the government that support the military over the crony capitalists that were connected with Gamal Mubarak.[7]  This new authoritarian regime has far more populist support and it is far more aggressive in terms of clamping down on opposition.  Second, there is a lot more pressure on the government to promote economic and political development.  If the government fails to bring progress over the next couple of years, more political violence might take place in the future.  Given the military’s track record thus far and the severe nature of the economic problems in the country, the future does not look bright.

                In the Gulf, Morocco, Jordan and Algeria, revolutions were avoided all together.  With the exception of Bahrain, the wealthy Gulf States were able to buy off opposition using oil rents.  When protests started first in Tunisia and then spilled over into Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Libya, monarchs in the Gulf responded by increasing state welfare and government salaries.  Superficial reforms were also made to bolster the legitimacy of weak legislatures as well. [8] Although these reforms bought off the opposition, it is highly doubtful that this is a sustainable solution.  Economies in the Gulf are highly dependent on a single resource.  If the price of that resource declines, patrons won’t be able to pay off their clients.  Furthermore, as calls for democratization become stronger over the next generation, it will be harder to buy off the opposition.  Gulf monarchies are not completely immune to revolution despite their wealth.  The revolution in Bahrain, a country where a Sunni minority rules over a Shi’i majority, exemplifies this fact.  Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had to invade Bahrain when its monarchy was about to give concessions to the opposition.  Monarchies in Jordan and Morocco, lacking the same access to rents as the states in the Gulf, used methods they had mastered in the past to split the opposition: they made superficial electoral changes while promising to make liberal reforms in the future.  Minor concessions were given to the opposition in each country and some unpopular laws were changed.  It helped that these monarchs were relatively young, and they didn’t face the same legitimacy problems of the aging presidents in the region that were trying to pass power to their children.  Furthermore, monarchs in Morocco and Jordan don’t have to fix elections to the same degree as those in republics since real power is vested in the monarchy and not in parliament.  It remains to be seen how long this strategy of superficial electoral reforms and minor concessions will work in terms of successfully dividing the opposition.  There is far more pressure on monarchs in the region to create liberal political reforms than there was prior to the revolution but democratization doesn’t seem likely in the near future.

                One thing we should keep in mind is that many of the same economic, political, and social problems that existed before the revolutions are still currently affecting the region, and this will create a lot of problems in terms of democratization.  For one, most economies in the region are still highly dependent on rents like oil and other forms of revenue like transport rents and foreign aid.  Michael Ross’ rentier state thesis clearly outlines why this might be a problem for democratization in the future.   Rentier states lack the incentive to diversify their economies. [9] Without having competing centers of wealth and power in the form of a powerful business or labor class, it is tough to see how strong political opposition can form against authoritarian governments in places like the Gulf.  It might not be a coincidence that the states with the most diverse economies in the region—Tunisia, Lebanon, Israel, and Turkey—also have the highest scores on Freedom House’s index for measuring the amount of civil liberties and political rights possessed by citizens.  In the rentier states, authoritarian governments still have the ability to use rents to buy off dissent.  Furthermore, the geopolitical importance of the region means that Western governments will continue to support dictatorships for the sake of stability.

                On the other hand, there are a lot of changes taking place in the region that will make it difficult for many governments to maintain the status-quo.  The region was and is still suffering from demographic and environmental problems.[10]  Populations are currently growing at over 2 percent a year in the region, which is the second fastest in the world behind only Sub-Saharan Africa.  With the amount of young people increasing, it will become tougher to find the resources to provide people with jobs and a basic standard of living.  These demographic pressures are placing a lot of pressure on governments in terms of infrastructure and services, and places like Egypt that have larger populations than the Gulf and less oil will struggle to maintain their welfare states.  Dwindling resources, rising expectations, and growing populations will continue to cause problems with conflict in the region.  New forms of social media are making it easier for citizens to communicate, organize, and protest. [11] The only way out for a lot of governments in the future is to enact policies that will foster economic and political development in the future. 

                In conclusion, political scientists in the future need to focus less on trying to look for signs that states in the Middle East are democratizing; furthermore, they need to stop focusing so much on why they are still authoritarian.  It is better to focus on political systems as they actually are and not focus on what we want them to become.   We should focus on which factions within the state have more power and why; what resources and tools they have at their disposal to remain in power; and how they are able to influence society through government outputs.   So much attention is being paid to elections, NGO’s, and other signs of democratization (or signs of entrenched authoritarianism) that we too often neglect the basic functions of the state.  A government is supposed to keep its people safe; maintain an infrastructure; pick up garbage; enforce laws; regulate markets; educate its citizens; and promote economic development among other things.  Scholars of Middle East politics have spent much time dissecting fraudulent elections and powerless NGO’s but have neglected problems with the infrastructure, education, law enforcement, and corruption.  The latter issues are more relevant to the average citizen in the Middle East.

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[1]Valbjorn, Morten. “Upgrading Post-Democratization Studies: Examining a RePoliticized Arab World in a Transition to Somewhere,” Middle East Critique, 19(3), 2012: 183-200.

[2] Anderson, Lisa.  “Searching Where the Light Shines: Studying Democratization in the Middle East,” Annual Review of Political Science, 9, 2006: 189-214.

[3] Schlumberger, Oliver.  Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemcoratic Regimes.  Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2007.

[4] See Korany, Bahgat, ed.  Arab Human Development in the Twenty-First Century: The Primacy Of Empowerment.  The American University in Cairo Press: Egypt, 2014. 

[5] Brumberg, Daniel. 2013. “Transforming the Arab World’s Protection-Racket Politics,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 24, 3: 88-103.

[6] Theodoropoulou, Kastrinou. “A Different Struggle for Syria: Becoming Young in the Middle East,” Mediterranean Politics, 17 (1), 2012: 59-76.

[7]  Springborg, Robert.  “Arab Militaries,” in The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East, edited by Marc Lynch.  Columbia University Press: New York, 2014.

[8] Lust, Ellen.  “Elections,” in The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East, edited by Marc Lynch.  Columbia University Press: New York, 2014.

[9] Ross, Michael. "Does oil hinder democracy?" World Politics, 53 (3): 325-361.

[10] Richards, Alan, John Waterbury, Melani Cammett, and Ishac Diwan.  A Political Economy of the Middle East, 2013 edition.  Westview Press: Colorado, 2014.

[11] Lynch, Marc.  “Media, Old and New,” in The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East, edited by Marc Lynch.  Columbia University Press: New York, 2014.