Introduction
The
reputation of France’s Third Republic during the Belle Époque (1870-1914) as
the champion of democratic reform and enlightenment values stands in sharp
contrast with its policies towards Algeria.
The Algerian war of independence (1954-1962) and the Algerian civil war
(1992-1998) were violent reflections of the Algerian nation trying to define
itself in the wake of one hundred and forty two years of French exploitation
and conflicting ideas within its borders over the meaning of Algerian identity
and history.[1]
For France, the loss of
Algeria in 1962 presented a social crisis for a nation that was once a colonial
power.[2] Algeria was not merely one of France’s
colonies in West Africa or South East Asia nor was it like Tunisia or Morocco,
the other two nations of the Maghreb that were French protectorates. Algeria was considered a part of France and
was represented as three compartments in the French parliament.[3] After Algeria was directly controlled by the
French military from 1830 to 1871, power was handed over to the French colonists
and Algeria became a political extension of France across the Mediterranean Sea. During the Belle Époque, many Frenchmen saw
in Algeria an attempt to civilize what they perceived as a savage part of the
world—some Frenchmen saw it as an opportunity to spread French enlightenment
values while others saw it as an opportunity to spread Christian values.[4] Furthermore, many Frenchmen, from peasant
farmers to wealthy entrepreneurs, saw economic opportunities in Algeria. By the 1870s, a substantial number of Frenchmen,
as well as many Europeans from Italy, Spain, and Malta, settled in Algeria for
economic and political reasons. These
Algerians of European descent believed they were a part of France. Likewise, many Frenchmen viewed Algeria as an
extension of France, whose political power and social prestige became dependent
on its relationship to Algeria.[5] For Charles De Gaulle, losing Algeria in 1962
meant that the French nation had lost a part of itself and would have to
redefine its role in global politics or face the prospect of becoming
culturally and politically irrelevant among the nations of the world.
Despite
Algeria’s political and social importance to many Frenchmen, Algerian Muslims, who
were still in the majority, were not considered citizens of France.[6] Although some steps were taking during the
second empire (1851-1870) to try to give the Algerian Muslims some political
autonomy, after 1871, France began taking more aggressive steps to directly
control Algeria politically and economically.
Only the Pieds Noirs (literally meaning “black footed,” it was a term that
Muslims used to describe those of European descent in Algeria) became
recognized as citizens of France.[7] During the Belle Époque, the height of the
Third Republic, European migration to Algeria increased substantially and the
French consolidated their political control over what is today Algerian
territory, including much of the desert interior. The Algerian Muslims lost control of valuable
lands in the coastal regions and in the Atlas Mountains to the Pieds Noirs, who
isolated themselves from the Algerian Muslim population.[8] Although
most of the European colonists were not wealthy—in fact, many of them were poor
farmers and merchants—they considered themselves true Frenchmen, separate from
their Muslim counterparts. An economic,
cultural and political divide became entrenched between the Pieds Noirs and the
Algerian Muslims. This divide was made
worse by a change in French policy in 1871, which recognized Jewish Algerians
as citizens while denying their Muslim counterparts the same rights.[9] Anti-Semitism became worse in Algeria
following the enforcement of this policy, leading to the slow exile of Jews
from the country. Tensions between
Muslims and the Pieds Noirs also became worse over time, culminating in the war
of independence from 1956 to 1962.
Thus,
there was a sharp contrast between the rhetoric that justified French hegemony
over Algeria and the actual political, economic, and social transformations
that took place in Algeria during the Belle Époque. The colonization of Algeria led to the political
isolation and economic degradation of the Muslim communities in Algeria. The French quixotic and naïve image of its
relation to Algeria would eventually be shattered during the Algerian War of
Independence.[10] In this essay, I will examine the socio-political
and economic developments in Algeria that led to a political climate that was not
too dissimilar from apartheid in South Africa, and how France’s vision of its
relationship with Algeria during the Belle Époque was sharply contrasted with
the countries treatment of the Algerian Muslim population.
Political Motivations
for Colonizing Algeria: The Political Narrative from 1830 to 1870
Although the political
divide between Pieds Noirs and Muslims became solidified during the Belle
Époque, the roots of the divide are found at the start of French Colonial
history in Algeria in 1830. The social,
economic, and political relationship between the European colonists and the
Muslim populations during the Belle Époque arose out of the events of the political
narrative from 1830 to 1870. Therefore,
understanding the events of 1830 and the subsequent conquest of Algeria is
critical to understanding French-Muslim relations during the Belle Époque.
In
1830, the last French king of the Bourbon dynasty, Charles X (ruled 1824-1830),
was faced with internal opposition over his refusal to institute democratic
reforms. Faced with an unstable
situation at home, Charles X hoped that an impressive military victory abroad
would consolidate his power over the military and allow him to restore an
absolute monarchy to France.[11] Moreover, many supporters of the monarchy and
the French military believed France’s prestige as a world power, which was
damaged after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, could only be restored through a
great show of military strength. From
the era of the restored Bourbon dynasty (1815-1830) to the July Monarchy
(1830-1848), the Second Republic (1848-1851), the Second Empire (1851-1870),
and the Third Republic (1870-1940), many French politicians believed that
establishing political hegemony over North Africa and the waters of the western
Mediterranean Sea would exemplify France’s strength as a nation both abroad and
at home.[12] For this reason, during the last years of
Charles X’s reign, the political and military elites of France felt that the
conquest of Algeria could quell opposition to the government in France.
Map 1: Algeria[13]
Before 1830, Algeria
had been under the control of the Ottoman Turks since 516 C.E.[14]
During the eighteenth century, the strength of the Ottoman military, navy, and
economy declined, and by the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Sultanate was
forced to borrow substantial amounts of money from the Western powers of
Europe. The Ottoman Turks, severely
weakened by increased debt, political corruption, and European economic
competition, could no longer control its land holdings in Algeria. In 1830, the French King Charles X began the
conquest of Algeria on the pretense that the Algerian Dey (the Ottoman regency
of Algiers) had purposely broken relations with France by insulting a French
diplomat in 1827 by swatting him in the face with his fan.[15] Supposedly, the Dey was angry over money that
was owed to him by the French government from the days of the French directory
(late eighteenth century) and over French commercial aggressions in the
Mediterranean—this seemingly trivial event that was used as an excuse for the
invasion of Algeria became known as the Fan Affair. In reality, Charles X was hoping to
consolidate his own position at home and secure the waters of the Mediterranean
from Barbary (North African) pirates who had been causing trouble for
European and American merchants. On July
5th of 1830, after three weeks of fighting, the French conquered the
coastal city of Algiers (See Map 1).
Charles
X, however, was unable to secure his throne in France. By the end of the same month, Parisians began
rioting over Charles X’s failure to institute democratic reforms.[16] In late July, Charles X was forced out of
power and was replaced by the more liberal monarch from Orleans, Louis-Phillipe,
in early August. The Orleanist monarch,
like his predecessor, continued the military conquest of Algeria. Within France, members of the military and
the government debated over whether or not France should occupy Algeria on a
permanent basis. In 1830, the French had
occupied Algiers and several coastal cities, but the French army was met by fierce
resistance from what was left of the Ottoman administration in Constantine and
other parts of Eastern Algeria, and from indigenous tribal and Islamic elements
in the West near the cities of Oran and Tlemcen. Louis-Phillipe, who feared that the British
might fill the power vacuum left in Algeria following the collapse of the
Ottoman administration in Algeria, sided with proponents for a long-term
occupation of the country. From 1830 to
1847, the so-called July Monarchy engaged in a long and brutal war with opposition
elements in Algeria.
In
response to the French invasion, many religious sects in Algeria called for a holy
war.[17] Islam was a source of unity and a focal point
of opposition against the French among the indigenous peoples of Algeria who were
ethnically, geographically, and economically diverse. Although the Ottoman Dey and the Turkish
landlords drew resentment among many of the Arab and Berber Muslim communities
in the early nineteenth for their corruption, many Algerian Muslims would look
back on the Ottoman era with a sense of nostalgia since it was the era of the
last great Islamic empire. From 1830 to
1847, various resistance movements sprang up in Algeria that centered on Islam
as a cultural element that united the people of the region against the foreign
invaders. From
1830 to 1836, the Dey of Constantine, Ahmad ibn Muhammad, was able to resist
French occupation in eastern Algeria.[18] In order to draw support from local
Algerians, the Dey reformed Ottoman political and social policies. He radically changed eastern Algeria’s
leadership, replacing Turkish officials with local Arab shaykhs. Moreover, he changed Algeria’s tax code to meet
the standards of Shari’ah law and made Arabic the official language of the
bureaucracy. He controlled most of eastern
Algeria until 1836, when the French military forced him to surrender. Another important resistance movement took
place in western Algeria around the city of Tlemcen. The movement was led by Abd al-Qadir, the son
of the Sharifan religious leader Muhyi al-Din.
Abd al-Qadir called for Jihad against the French occupiers. With the support of many Muslims in Morocco, he
was able to control most of Western Algeria by 1839. Furthermore, he was able to establish
alliances with important Algerian tribes and he gained the support of many
religious sects in western Algeria by enforcing laws that were based on the Shar’iah
ethic. His resistant movement lasted
until 1847. Other resistance movements
of less importance—but significant none the less—sprang up in Northern Algeria from
1830 to 1847.
These
movements were eventually overwhelmed by the strength of French military
power. By 1847, France had over 100,000
troops in Algeria, and by 1848, all of northern Algeria was under their control.[19] Louis-Phillipe,
determined to stop a power vacuum from forming in the Maghreb, used extensive
resources and brutal force in subduing the Algeria population. In 1834, the French annexed all Algerian
lands that were under the control of the French military—which at that time was
mainly Algiers and the surrounding environs—and the French military was placed
in control of the civilian administration.[20] By 1847, the cities Oran and Constantine were
also conquered, allowing the French military to begin taking more control of
important agriculture lands in the valleys of the Atlas Mountains. With the fall of the Turkish administration,
Ottoman crown lands were seized by the French military, and after 1834, many of
the lands conquered by the French were confiscated and were sold to Europeans
and wealthy Muslims. As a result, a land
rush took place, starting with the area surrounding Algiers in 1834. European farmers and merchants from France,
Spain, Italy, and Malta began pouring into Algeria.[21] Many Algerian tribes lost control of their
lands and their grain storage facilities, which were also privatized and sold
to Europeans and rich Muslims.[22] The French conquest of Algeria was a long and
brutal struggle that saw the destruction of important agricultural lands, a
large Muslim death toll, and a drastic demographic transition.
Many within the French government
and the military justified the brutality by claiming that only an overwhelming colonial
victory could make France a world power again in the eyes of other European
nations.[23] Many supporters of the war also justified the
conquest on the pretense that the French were bringing civilization to a savage
people who had been exploited by the Ottoman Sultanate. The French would bring modern law and order
to Algerian society. However, other
politicians within France did not express the same optimism. The important French politician and historian
Alexis Tocqueville believed that the French had acted more savagely then the
Ottomans who came before them by following through with a scorched earth policy.[24] He also believed that the brutal policies of
the military were not conducive towards spreading “civilization” in Algeria, or
establishing goods relations with the Arab populations of Algeria. The twentieth-century French historian
Benjamin Stora summarizes some of the brutal methods used by the French
military:
The war had seen
many exactions. In 1842, Saint Arnaud
destroyed part of Blida; Cavaignac inaugurated “smoke-outs,” asphyxiating
rebels in caves on the west bank of the Cheliff, Canrobert razed a village in
the Aures to “terrorize the tribes”; Pellissier, colonel of Bugeaud’s column,
smoked out a thousand men from the Ouled Riah tribe who had sought refuge in
the caves. That last incident led a
member of the investigating commission, formed by the kingdom of France in
1833, to say: “We have surpassed in barbarism the barbarians we came to
civilize.”[25]
Although the French government justified
the conquest of Algeria based on the pretext that French hegemony over Algeria
was better for both the people of France and North Africa, the brutal legacy of
the war created an immediate political division between the French colonists
and the Muslim populations.
Despite the brutality
of the war, the July Monarchy at least recognized that establishing permanent
rule over France’s new Muslim subjects would require giving the Muslims of Algeria
some political autonomy. The lands ordinances
of 1845 created a tripartite political structure in Algeria between the
military, the Pieds Noirs, and the Arabs; the military held most of the power
in this relationship until 1871.[26] In communities where the colonists were the
clear majority, those who were French citizens would vote for a mayor and
French law would be imposed. In regions
of Algeria not yet fully controlled by France, the military would continue to
have full control. However, communities
that were under French control but had a clear Muslim majority were given some
self-autonomy. In these regions,
bureaucracies consisting of indigenous Arabs would enforce tax collection and
the rule of law. Furthermore, in Muslim
communities throughout Algeria, the courts of the Qadis (“Shari’ah
judges”) continued to play an important legal role in Muslim society throughout
the nineteenth century.[27] In this respect, there was some continuity
between the Ottoman and French periods in Algerian history.
In 1848, another
revolution took place in France which saw the overthrow of the Orleanist
monarch, Louis-Philippe, and the establishment of the Second Republic
(1848-1851). The Second Republic’s most
notable political policy in Algeria was dividing the colony into three separate
compartments: Constantine, Algiers, and Oran (See Map 1).[28] The politicians of the Second Republic also
attempted to reduce some of the powers of the military and give French
civilians in Algeria more political rights, and the Second Republic also freed
all slaves in colonial territories. The
political climate in Northern Algeria became more stable by the Second Republic,
and the army began campaigns farther into the Atlas Mountains and the Algerian
Sahel. The Second Republic, however, was
short-lived. In 1851, Louis Napoleon
Bonaparte III, the nephew of Napoleon, seized control of the French presidency
and started the Second Empire, which lasted until the Franco-Prussian war in
1870.
During the Second
Empire, Emperor Napoleon III continued a system of trilateral control over
Algeria.[29] In many ways, Napoleon III was a romantic who
respected the cultural traditions of the Arab and Berber tribal shaykhs, and he
was sympathetic towards their plight. In
1863, he passed a law which gave the Arab tribesman some of their land back,
and he tried to create a policy that would allow for a slow transition from a tribal
based system of land ownership to privatization. The emperor believed that for the French to
have a permanent influence over Algeria, the Arabs must eventually be
recognized as citizens of France and equal in status to that of the European
settlers.
Napoleon III’s ideals,
however, were never realized; instead, over time, indigenous Algerians lost
more control of important agricultural lands and instead of integration,
Muslims became increasingly isolated from the European settlers. Although the 1845 ordinances gave Arabs some
self autonomy, many tribes lost control of their former lands, and a Malthusian
nightmare was created when many Arab and Berber tribesmen no longer had the
same agricultural surpluses to feed the Muslim populations during dry seasons.[30] From the late 1840s to the 1870s, several
severe famines broke out in Algeria.
Napoleon III’s land
reform law did little to slow down the loss of tribal lands to European
settlers. Moreover, although Napoleon
III’s second Algerian decree in 1865 gave more rights to Algerian Muslims,
including recognizing their cultural practices and allowing them more
participation in French civilian and military affairs, the Muslim populations
resented another part of the decree which gave Muslim converts to Christianity
the opportunity to become full citizens.[31] Although Napoleon III was genuinely concerned
about the treatment of the Muslim populations in Algeria, socio-political and
economic forces were also creating an increasingly larger economic and
political disparity between the Pieds Noirs and the Muslim populations. The reality is that the French government was
not doing enough to protect the rights of the Algerian tribesman; in reality, Muslim
Algerians would never gain the same rights as French citizens of European
descent. The situation for the Algerian Muslims
became even worse following the Franco-Prussian war and the rise of the Third
Republic.
Political
Developments in Algeria following the Establishment of the Third Republic
Following the rise of
the Third Republic, the economic status of Muslims in Algeria became worse and
a permanent political divide was created between the Pieds Noirs, the Muslims,
and the Jews. One of the more important
reasons for the growing economic and political gap between the Muslims and the Pieds
Noirs was the permanent handover of power from the military to the civilian
colonists after the collapse of the Second Empire.[32] After 1871, European migration to Algeria
increased substantially and the economic disparity between French and Muslim
colonists widened. During the Third
Republic, the civilian colonial government made even less of an effort to
protect the rights of Arab and Berber tribesman, and little effort was made to
promote a policy of Arab and Berber integration into the French colonial government.
The Franco-Prussian war
of 1870, which was a humiliation for France, was the beginning of a new era in
French-Algerian relations. The French,
having surrendered to the Germans and suffered several years of foreign
military occupation, lost much of their prestige as a world power.[33] In the midst of the war, the Second Empire
collapsed, and a rebellion, led by a group of radical liberals, broke out in
the Paris commune. In the wake of this
crisis rose the Third Republic. Initially,
the Third Republic was led by conservative politicians who were hoping to
eventually restore a liberal constitutional monarchy such as that of the
Orleanist monarch Louis-Phillipe. After
the Paris Commune, many Frenchmen were fearful of another rebellion by radical
liberals. Moreover, it was the liberal politicians
who were fighting for continued resistance against the German occupiers, while
conservatives were in favor of surrendering to the Germans to avoid a costly
war. As a result of radical liberal
attitudes at the time of the occupation and fear over another revolution, most Frenchmen
looked toward conservative politicians such as Adolphe Theirs to reestablish
order in French society. After
surrendering to the Germans, the French were forced to pay the Germans reparations
and surrender the eastern provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.
The political crisis
led to the flight of over five thousand Frenchmen from the region of Alsace and
Lorraine. Many of these Frenchmen were
settled in Algeria at the expense of Arab tribesmen who lost land in the
process.[34] In response to the demographic crisis, in
1871, Arabs from the coastal region of Kabylie raised a revolt that eventually
spread to other regions in Algeria.[35] The revolt was caused by the growing
demographic crisis and the political policies of the French minister of Justice
Adolphe Cremieux. This French minister
reversed many of the reforms made by the July Monarchy and the Second Empire,
which had previously allowed some Arab tribesman political control over their
lands. The colonists were given greater legal
control over the lands of Arab tribesman while the power of the Qadis and the
Arab Sheikhs was reduced substantially.
Moreover, Cremieux was able to convince the French parliament to pass a
law which made Jewish-Algerians French citizens. During the Second Empire, Cremieux, who was
Jewish, had played an important role in the establishment of French organizations,
such as the Alliance Israelite Universelle, that helped protect persecuted Jewish
communities in Iran, the Ottoman Empire, Eastern Europe, and North Africa. Prior to France’s colonization of Algeria,
the Jewish communities had lived side-by-side with Arab and Berber Muslims in
the region for over a millennium.[36] However, from the beginning of French
occupation, Jewish communities were treated differently than their Arab
counterparts and were becoming an increasingly separate political faction in
Algeria.[37] Cremieux’s 1871 law to enforce Jewish
equality in Algeria led to the rise of anti-Semitism in Algeria among both the
colonists and the Muslim populations, leading to the slow exile of Jews from
the region. Cremieux’s political reforms
in Algeria, along with the drastic demographic change following the Franco-Prussian
War, also led to the Muslim revolt in 1871.
The revolt was eventually crushed and new laws were passed which led to
the confiscation of even more Muslim lands.
The economic and
political status of Muslims in Algeria was affected negatively by the major democratic
transformations in Algeria. From 1870 to
1871, there was a call for greater democratic reforms in France and among
colonial Algerians. In 1870, the
military regime that had dominated Algeria collapsed and a civilian regime rose
to power. After the French military crushed the Muslim
rebellion in Kabylie, power in Algeria was permanently handed over to the
Algerian colonists. The Cremieux laws
gave colonists greater representation in French parliament and they were given
most of the rights of French citizens in France. [38] Algeria
was to be a continuation of the French nation across the Mediterranean Sea. The Muslim populations, however, were not
given the same rights as Pieds Noirs.
Moreover, stern measures were passed to control the Muslim
populations. Muslim rights to free
assembly and due process waned following the rise of a civilian government that
was fearful of another uprising among the Muslim populations.
The economic situation
from 1870 to the end of the nineteenth century only grew worse for the Muslims
of Algeria. European migration to
Algeria increased substantially from 1870 to the 1890s, leading to the confiscation
of the lands of more Arab tribesmen.
There are several reasons why this took place. During the late 1870s and 1880s, a series of
insect infestations led to the destruction of many vineyards in France.[39] Many poor farmers moved to Algeria where much
of the wine industry had moved following the blight in France. The great irony here is that the Arab
tribesmen were losing valuable land that once was used for growing wheat but
was then used by French colonists for viticulture; while many Algerians were
suffering from famine, the lands were being used to produce a product that is
forbidden in the Qur’an. Although
Muslims practiced viticulture in Algeria before the French arrived, it was for
a much smaller market. Moreover, from
1870 to World One I, colonists were given tax exemptions, greater access to land,
and greater control over Algeria’s resources as the military continued to
expand into the Algerian Sahel and the Sahara.[40] At the same time, Muslim taxes were
substantially increased. By World War I,
there were approximately 800,000 European descendants living in Algeria.
It is during the Belle Époque
that Algerian coastal cities such as Algiers and Constantine truly became
European in character. Although there were still substantial Muslim communities
in Algiers and Constantine—in fact, these cities continued to be the centers of
a vibrant Arabic literary culture—European languages, laws, architecture, and
technology had changed the culture of Algiers and other coastal cities. By the early twentieth century, European
hotels, restaurants, and social clubs could be found in the cities of Algiers,
Oran and Constantine. These cities
become centers of European tourism.
Tourist guide-books of Algiers were produced for upper class and upper
middle class Europeans who frequently traveled to the region for recreational and
health purposes (drier climate). Guidebooks
provided descriptions of good restaurants, tourist destinations, and the
culture of the local Arab and Berber populations.[41] Moreover, the French had improved Algeria’s
infrastructure, building a network of railroads in the country that connected
the Algerian Sahel with the coastline.
Adventurous Europeans who could afford it were traveling to the Algerian
Sahel and the Sahara by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.[42]
During this time
period, many novels and guide books gave romantic descriptions of the Algerian
Sahara and the tribesman that occupied the region, many of whom were still
politically autonomous from the colonial government. The Algerian Sahel and Sahara provided a
quixotic image of Algeria, which became ingrained in the minds of many Frenchmen. Although most of the Pieds Noirs and the
French middle classes did not have the financial means to travel to the
Algerian Sahara, artistic images and novels provided a growing literate
European population with images of far off lands in North Africa.[43]
Although many negative
images of Arabs and Muslims circulated in France throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth century, many European writers also praised the virtue of Arab
tribesman and even Arab history; European perceptions of Muslim and Arab
culture were not always that of uncultured savages.[44] Moreover, although the interactions between Muslims
and the Pieds Noirs in Algeria throughout the Belle Époque can be compared with
that of apartheid in South Africa, not every cultural interaction between
Muslim Algerians and Europeans was negative.
For example, many late nineteenth and early twentieth century Muslim
writers in urban centers were highly influenced by the literary and political
culture of France.[45] In cities such as Algiers, Oran, and
Constantine, a generation of literate Muslims became influenced by French
political and social culture, and many expressed their identities in both
Islamic and French terms. It is this
generation of Muslim writers that would begin laying the intellectual
foundations for Algerian nationalism. Many
Muslim writers, influenced by a variety of French and European political ideals
including democracy, liberalism, socialism, and communism, as well as by Arab
and Islamic ideals, began calling for political reforms to bring unity to all
peoples of Algeria. French culture, in many
ways, played an important role in shaping Algerian nationalist movements
throughout the twentieth century.
However, the overall
relationship between the Pieds Noirs and the Muslim population can be described
as a brutal and one-sided relationship; the Muslim populations were
economically, politically, and socially disenfranchised during one hundred and
twenty four years of French rule. The
events following the Franco-Prussian War and the colonist takeover of power in
Algeria set the political tone between the Pieds Noirs, the Jews, and the
Muslim populations until the Algerian War of independence from 1954 to
1962. After the revolt of 1871, no major
resistance to French occupation took place for over eighty years.[46] The French had successfully subdued Muslim
resistance to French control, leading to an eighty year period of relative
political stability—at least in Northern Algeria. Furthermore, from 1871 to 1954, any attempt
to make political reforms that would have improved the economic and political
situation of Muslims in Algeria were usually rejected by the colonist
administration in Algeria. Politicians
who supported reform to improve the lot of Algerian Muslims, such as the radical
liberal Clemenceau, were in the drastic minority in French Parliament.[47] Although Frenchmen considered Algeria as a
part of the French nation, the Muslim populations were never considered true Frenchmen. During the Belle Époque, many Frenchmen—as
well as many of the European colonists—held a quixotic and naïve image of
France’s relationship to Algeria that ignored the growing divide between the
Muslim majority and the colonial minority.
Naïve
French Perceptions on Algeria during the Belle Époque
The French colonization
of Algeria involved the brutal repression of the region’s Muslim
population. Although many in France felt
that the acquisition of overseas territories was an economic and political
drain on the French military and economy, few were directly outspoken about the
mistreatment of Muslims in Algeria; Clemenceau’s push for reform in Algeria was
more of an exception to the rule rather than the norm. Many Frenchmen who defended French policies
in Algeria felt that the Algerian Muslim populations would benefit from the
so-called French-civilizing mission.
Some leaned towards the importance of spreading capitalism to these
countries while others stressed the importance of enforcing modern laws. Others, such as the Christian conservative
population, felt that the spread of Christianity would help civilize the
indigenous Algerian population.
Moreover, many French politicians continued to equate French military
and political greatness with the countries relationship to Algeria. Many held romantic views of Algeria’s
relationship to France, believing that Algeria best exemplified the French
nation’s civilizing mission. In many
ways, this quixotic view of Algeria was a naive view of France’s real
relationship with most of the Algerian population. This delusional perception of French-Algerian
relationships would only be shattered by the Algerian War of independence from
1954 to 1962.
The moderate French
politician Jules Ferry, who was prime minister of France for over a total of
three years from 1879 to 1885, believed that colonial ventures were necessary
in order to create new markets across the globe and establish new outlets for
capital investment. The conquest of Tunisia
and Indo-China were justified on this basis, as was the ongoing privatization
of Algerian lands that was causing grave economic problems for the Muslim
populations. In a preface to his book Tonkin et la Mere-Patrie, Ferry
justifies his support of French colonial policies:
Colonial policy
is the daughter of industrial policy.
For wealthy States, where capital abounds and accumulates rapidly, where
the manufacturing element is growing continuously, attracting the most
energetic and restless if not the most numerous section of that part of the population
which lives by manual labor—where cultivation of the soil itself is forced to
become mechanized in order to survive—exports are an essential factor of public
prosperity. The spread of capital, like
the demand for work, is measured by the extent of the foreign market. If manufacturing nations had been able to
arrange a division of industrial labor, a systematic and rational allocation of
industry according to the aptitudes, economic, natural, and social conditions
of the different producer countries, setting the cotton industry here,
metallurgy there, reserving alcohols and sugars for one, woolens and silks for
the other, Europe might not have needed markets for products beyond its own
boundaries.[48]
Jules Ferry believed that the
transformation of colonial economies was necessary for the continued growth of
France’s economy. Moreover, Ferry
believed that the economic transformation of France’s colonies would be of
benefit to the indigenous populations.
However, Ferry cannot be simply described as an imperial ideologue. Although he felt that France should expand
its role in colonial affairs, he was also one of the few politicians who pushed
for political reforms to help Muslim populations in Algeria.
Many
liberal politicians during the Belle Époque, however, were against France’s continually
expanding role in colonial affairs.
Following the collapse of the Second Empire, liberal Frenchmen such as
Leon Gambetta argued that the French military was being wasted in Algeria and
more focus should be placed on internal security.[49] Gambetta, who was forced to flee Paris in
1870 during the German occupation, continued to call for French military
resistance against the Germans and was lobbying for the return of French troops
from Algeria to protect the homeland. After
the German occupation, many liberals continued to call for a smaller Algerian
military presence in North Africa.
Indeed, most of
France’s poor and lower middle class during the Belle Époque also cared little
for France’s empire—it was many of the conservative elites who were more
concerned with France’s role overseas.[50] A larger populist movement that was supportive
of the French empire and its relationship with Algeria was only realized later
in the twentieth century.
Although
much of the French population and many members of the French Parliament did not
take much interest in colonial affairs, there was still a substantial amount of
Frenchmen who supported France’s “civilizing mission” in Algeria. One important sector of support came from
many conservative Catholics. In the
1870s, many Roman Catholics in France saw Algeria as a doorway to spreading
Christianity in Africa. Throughout the
nineteenth century, French Catholic missionaries had been active throughout much
of the world, including in India, East Asia, and the Pacific. However, French missionaries only began
making significant progress in Africa in the 1870s.[51]
In Algeria throughout
the 1870s, the most important French-Catholic missionary was the archbishop of
Algiers Cardinal Lavigerie.[52] From 1868 to 1869, the archbishop was in
conflict with the Governor of Algeria, Marshal MacMahon, over whether or not
the French missionaries should convert Muslim orphans who had been rescued from
the famine of the mid-1860s to Christianity.
Lavigerie was able to gain enough support in 1869 to convince the
colonial administration to allow Catholic missionaries to work side-by-side
with civil administrations in establishing hospitals, schools, and civil
services in Algeria.[53] In 1869, he established the Societe des
Missionaries de’Afrique and he began recruiting and training missionaries in
France and Algeria. In his speeches, he
mixed nationalism with religion, claiming that the missionaries were
accomplishing God’s work by taking part in French interests in spreading
civilization:
Go forth, then,
in the name of God and with His help.
Succor the little ones, relieve the suffering, comfort them that weep,
heal the sick. It will be the honor of
the Church to see you spreading your work of charity step by step, right to the
center of this immense continent. It
will be the honor of France to see you completing her work, by carrying
Christian civilization far beyond her conquests into this unknown world whose
gates have been thrown open with such glory by the valor of her captains. And if, my dear sons, you find hostility in
this country, as a result of the irreligious passions which unhappily lead a
stray a section of this colony, do not doubt that so long as you can combine
devotion with wisdom, you will always find protectors among the eminent men
whose noble qualities and impartial justice endow with such high honor the
government, the army, the law, the magistrature and the administration of
Algeria.[54]
This excerpt from the cardinal’s speech
in 1874 in Algiers reflects the viewpoints on colonization of many conservative
Frenchmen of the Third Republic.[55]
Liberals
who supported colonization, however, rejected the Christian nationalist
rhetoric. For liberals, the Catholic Church
was the embodiment of right wing ideology, and its continued influence was a
threat to the security of the Third Republic.[56] Throughout the late 1870s and 1880s, a major
political transition took place in the Third Republic which saw the collapse of
the right wing movement, which consisted of Orleanist, Monarchists, and
Bonapartists, and the rise of the left wing in France, led by politicians such
as Leon Gambetta and Jules Ferry.[57] Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, French
schools became secularized and more democratic rights were given to the French
masses. For liberals who believed in the “civilizing mission,” their rhetoric
was stripped of religious elements—France’s mission abroad was to spread
rationalist-enlightenment values.
Throughout the Belle
Époque, Frenchmen continued to hold romantic views of Algeria. Moreover, Algeria was France’s most prized
colony. The nation’s relationship to
Algeria defined French cultural and political greatness. Although some Frenchmen recognized the need
for political reforms in Algeria, most Frenchmen ignored the plight of the
Muslim populations.[58] The great irony is that while democratic
reforms and “enlightenment” values were supposed to be a defining trait of the
Third Republic, Algeria’s Muslim population become poorer and less politically
relevant. The Pieds Noirs refused to
institute true demographic reforms in the spirit of the Third Republic, and
France’s political elites at home were satisfied with their pristine image of
France’s relationship with Algeria. They
refused to recognize the political realities.
Conclusion
Following World War I,
the Algerian nationalist movement gained strength in cities such as Oran,
Constantine, and Algiers. Political
parties such as the National Liberation Front (FLN) mixed French, Arabic, and
Islamic rhetoric to forge new identities that could unite the diverse
communities of Algeria. These political
parties began calling for greater political reforms.
However, the Pieds
Noirs and the French government were too slow in making reforms. Their perceptions of Algeria did not match
the political realities in their colony.
This is why the Algerian War of Independence from 1954 to 1962 was such
as shock to the French nation. Opposition
movements in Algeria were growing more hostile and were demanding greater
reforms; Algerians were now in a better position to begin demanding more
political rights.[59] After World War II and the rise of the Fourth
Republic (1945-1958), the French had lost much of their military and economic
strength. The British, the French, and
other European powers were losing their colonies abroad in the wake of a
disastrous war. From the 1950s to the
1970s, the British gave independence to most of their colonies. Relative to the French, the British came to
grips with their own decline in military strength; most of Great Britain’s
former colonies made a more peaceful transition to independence. The French, however, had a more difficult
time coming to grips with having to lose a region that Frenchmen considered a
part of the nation. The French would not
let Algeria go without a fight.
In
1977, the Algerian War of Independence was famously labeled the “Savage War of
Peace” by the French historian Alistair Horne.
The title perfectly describes France’s historical relationship with
Algeria from 1830 to 1962. The French
never considered Algeria’s War of Independence an actual war. They believed they were pacifying the region
to bring it back under French control.
France’s inability to deal with the political realities in its
relationship with Algeria led to a brutal war in Algeria that the French
ironically labeled as a mission to pacify a part of the French nation. The Algerian Muslim populations, however, viewed
their history with France as a long and brutal relationship. The seeds of France’s misconceptions of their
relationship with Algeria lie in their long colonial history and their refusal
to recognize the economic and political injustices that were being carried out
against Algeria’s Muslim population during the Belle Époque.[60]
Works
Cited
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Review 20, No. 1 (1995): 25-86.
2. Brett, Michael. “Legislating for Inequality in Algeria: The
Senatus-Consulte of 14 July 1865.” Bulletin
of the School of Oriental and African Studies: University of London 51, No.
3 (1988): 440-461.
3. Bury, J.T. Gambetta
and the Making of the Third Republic.
London: Longman Group Limited, 1973.
4.
Christelow, Allan. “The Muslim Judge and
Municipal Politics in Colonial Algeria and Senegal.” Comparative Studies in Society and History
24, No. 1 (1982): 3-24.
5.
Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. Oxford: Westview Press, 2004.
6.
Crawford, Mabel Sharman. Through Algeria. London: Richard Bentley, 1863.
7.
Gardi, Rene. Blue Veils, Red Tents: The Story of a Journey Across the Sahara. Translated by Edward Fitzgerald. New York: Roy Publishers, 1955.
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Laskier, Michael. “Aspects of the
Activities of the Alliance Israelite Universelle in the Jewish Communities of
the Middle East and North Africa: 1860-1918.”
Modern Judaism 3, No. 2 (1983): 147-171.
13.
Lorcin, Patricia Ed. Algeria and France,
1800-2000: Identity, Memory, and Nostalgia.
Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006.
14.
Lorcin, Patricia. “Imperialism, Colonial
Identity, and Race in Algeria, 1830-1870: The Role of the French Medical Corps.” Isis 90, No. 4 (1999): 653-679.
15.
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The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871-1914. Translated by J.R. Foster. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
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Naylor, Phillip C. France and Algeria: A History of Decolonization and Transformation. Gainesville, Florida: University Press of
Florida, 2000.
18. Rivlin, Benjamin.
“Context and Sources of Political Tensions in French North Africa.” Annals
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Issues 298, (1955): 109-116.
19.
Rogers, George Allen. A Winter in Algeria, 1863-64. London: Sampson Low, Son, and Marston, 1865.
20.
Smith, Andrea L. Colonial Memory and Post Colonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria
and France. Indianapolis, Indiana:
Indiana University Press, 2006.
21.
Stora, Benjamin. Algeria, 1830-2000.
Translated by Jane Marie Todd.
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2001.
22. Thiers, Louis Adolphe. Memoirs
of M. Thiers, 1870-1873. Translated
by F. M. Atkinson. New York: Howard
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23. Thomson, David Ed.
France: Empire and Republic, 1850-1940: Historical Documents. London, Macmillan Press, 1968.
24. Winnacker, Rudolph A.
“Elections in Algeria and the French Colonies under the Third
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[1]
Phillip C. Naylor, France and Algeria: A
History of Decolonization and Transformation (Gainesville, Florida:
University Press of Florida, 2000): 5-6, and Patrici Lorcin Ed., Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity,
Memory, and Nostalgia (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press,
2006): 1-17.
[2]
Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000,
translated by Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
2001): 87-93.
[3]
Andrea L. Smith, Colonial Memory and Post
Colonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France (Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana University
Press, 2006): 69.
[4] David Thomson Ed., France: Empire and Republic, 1850-1940:
Historical Documents (London, Macmillan Press, 1968): 306-310
[5]
Rudolph A. Winnacker, “Elections in Algeria and the French Colonies under the
Third Republic,” The American Political Science Review 32, No. 2 (1938):
261-277.
[6]
Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 589.
[7] Stora, 8.
[8]
Kjell Halvorsen, “Colonial Transformation of Agrarian Society in Algeria,” Journal
of Peace Research 15, No. 4 (1978): 323-343.
[9]
Michael Laskier, “Aspects of the Activities of the Alliance Israelite
Universelle in the Jewish Communities of the Middle East and North Africa:
1860-1918,” Modern Judaism 3, No. 2 (1983): 147-171.
[10]
Peter Dunwoodie, “Assimilation, Cultural Identity, and Permissible Deviance in
Francophone Algerian Writing of the Interwar Years,” Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, and Nostalgia,
edited by Patricia Lorcin, (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press,
2006): 63-83.
[11] Lapidus, 587.
[12] Stora, 4.
[13] Yahoo Maps, http://media.maps.com/magellan/Images/ALGERI-W1.gif.
[14]
William L. Cleveland, A History of the
Modern Middle East (Oxford: Westview Press, 2004): 61-80.
[15] Stora, 5.
[16] Naylor, 13.
[17] Lapidus, 588.
[18] Halvorsen, 332.
[19] Stora, 4.
[20] Halvorsen, 332-3.
[21] Naylor, 14-15.
[22] Benjamin Rivlin, “Context and
Sources of Political Tensions in French North Africa,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political Science: Contemporary Africa Trends and Issues
298, (1955): 110.
[23] Stora, 3.
[24] Naylor, 297.
[25] Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000, translated by Jane
Marie Todd (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2001): 5.
[26] Halvorsen, 332-3.
[27] Allan Christelow, “The Muslim
Judge and Municipal Politics in Colonial Algeria and Senegal,” Comparative
Studies in Society and History 24, No. 1 (1982): 3-24.
[28] Halvorsen, 261.
[29] Winnacker, 261.
[30] Naylor, 1-8.
[31]
Michael Brett, “Legislating for Inequality in Algeria: The Senatus-Consulte of
14 July 1865,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies:
University of London 51, No. 3 (1988): 440-461.
[32] Stora, 5.
[33]
Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeleine Reberioux, The
Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871-1914, translated by
J.R. Foster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 3-17.
[34]
Gabriel Hanotaux, Contemporary France,
Volume I (1870-1873), translated by Charles Tarver, (London: Archibald
Constable and Company, 1903): 509.
[35] Lapidus, 588.
[36] Michael Laskier, “Aspects of the
Activities of the Alliance Israelite Universelle in the Jewish Communities of
the Middle East and North Africa: 1860-1918,” Modern Judaism 3, No. 2
(1983): 147-171.
[37] Jay Berkovitz, “The French Revolution and the
Jews: Assessing the Cultural Impact,” AJS
Review 20, No. 1 (1995): 25-86.
[38] Halvorsen, 336.
[39] Naylor,
[40] Stora, 7.
[41]
Joseph C. Hyam, An Illustrated Guide to
Algiers, (Algiers: Hyam, 1913.)
[42]
George Allen Rogers, A Winter in Algeria,
1863-64, (London: Sampson Low, Son, and Marston, 1865.)
[43] Mabel Sharman Crawford, Through Algeria ( London: Richard
Bentley, 1863.)
[44]
Rene Gardi, Blue Veils, Red Tents: The
Story of a Journey Across the Sahara, translated by Edward Fitzgerald (New
York: Roy Publishers, 1955.)
[45]
Julia Clancy Smitih, “Migrations, Legal Pluralism and Identities,” Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity,
Memory, and Nostalgia, edited by Patricia Lorcin, (Syracuse, New York:
Syracuse University Press, 2006): 3-17, and Naylor, 8-10.
[46] Stora, 10-11.
[47] Mayeur and Madeleine, 293-295.
[48] Thomson, 307-8.
[49] J.T. Bury, Gambetta and the Making of the Third Republic (London: Longman
Group Limited, 1973.)
[50] Mayeur and Reberioux, 267-295.
[51] Thomson, 307.
[52] Naylor, 17.
[53]
Patricia Lorcin, “Imperialism, Colonial Identity, and Race in Algeria,
1830-1870: The Role of the French Medical Corpsn” Isis 90, No. 4 (1999):
653-679.
[54]
Thomson, 307.
[55] Rodgers, 144-154.
[56] Thompson, 227-261. Thompson shows several speeches by left wing
politicians from the Second Empire and the Belle Époque that preach the
necessity of the separation of church and state.
[57] Mayeur and Reberioux, 5-42.
[58] Benjamin Rivlin, “Context and
Sources of Political Tensions in French North Africa,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political Science: Contemporary Africa Trends and Issues
298, (1955): 109-116.
[59] Stora, 12-31.
[60] Naylor, 15.
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