Although classical realism and
liberalism have been supplanted by more nuanced theories in the field of
international relations in recent decades, the ideas and intellectuals
associated with these schools of thought have left a profound impact on the
academic community. The two most popular
theories today—neo-realism and neo-liberalism—still borrow heavily from their
predecessors.[1] This is why it is important to understand
the differences and similarities between the classical realist and liberal perspectives,
and how they differ from the schools that predominate today.
Both
classical schools share one very important thing in common that distinguishes
them from the neo schools of thought: the classical theories in the field of
international relations are built around their conception of human nature. To understand why two countries went to war,
made an alliance, or established trade, the focus is placed on the nature of
individual leaders. Assumptions are made
about their motivations based on presupposed perceptions of human biology and
behavior. On the other hand, the neo schools
of thought place the structure of the current international system—mainly its
anarchic nature—at the center of their international relations theories.[2] Although individual interests and human
nature are still important variables for these scholars, the neo schools assert
that individual actors are constrained by an international system under which
all states operate. In other words,
while the classical schools created international relations theories that
applied universally to all human beings, the neo-schools are parochial,
focusing on the current international system of sovereigns states operating in
an anarchic environment.
Of
course, the two classical schools differ greatly in terms of how they perceive
human nature. The realist school of
thought, which was inspired by Greek historians like Thucydides and enlightenment
scholars such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau, bases its international
relations theory on the premise that human beings are evil by nature and are
mainly concerned with increasing their own power at the expense of others.[3] In Thomas Hobbes Leviathan, he
expresses a great deal of pessimism about human beings; he felt that people
needed a powerful state led by a monarch who could suppress the violent nature
of his subjects. In exchange, people
would have a government that could solve collective action problems for them. In other words, people are not to be trusted
with liberty. Realists like James Morgenthau,
who have applied this theory of human nature to international relations, claim
that all nations are interested, first and foremost, in expanding their power
at the expense of other states; economic and social objectives are secondary.[4] International politics is seen as a zero-sum
game with winners and losers. In
Morgenthau’s world, morality does exist, but that morality is shaped by
political leaders who are only trying to justify their own political ambitions
to themselves and others. Therefore, when
two countries make an alliance or cooperate on an issue, they are doing it for
selfish reasons like to fight a common enemy for example. Although alliances and peace treaties can
take place in the international system, they are temporary and will only
persist as long as both sides see it as being in their best interest. The only way to prevent war between different
nations is to maintain a balance of power between them, but since the world is
constantly changing, war is inevitable.
The
liberal school of thought, which was inspired by Enlightenment thinkers like
John Locke and Emmanuel Kant, has a far more optimistic and idealistic view of
human nature. John Locke, in his Second
Treatise on Government, asserts that human beings are naturally good and
rational; it is society that corrupts individuals and not the other way around.[5] Left with their liberty, human beings could
peacefully cooperate with one another and create a democratic system of
government where all would benefit.
Therefore, governments should protect people’s civil liberties and
property. These liberal values affected
the German philosopher Emanuel Kant’s view of international relations.[6] Although Kant and other liberals in the field
of International Relations admit that the power and political interests affects
the relationship between countries, they also believe that those relationships
could become more peaceful and productive for both sides through cooperation.[7] For liberals, politics is a non-zero sum
game where both sides can benefit from their interactions, so war between
countries is not inevitable.
Immanuel Kant outlined three
scenarios where countries are less likely to fight each other and benefit from
cooperation. The first scenario is if
both countries are democracies. Most
liberals ascribe to democratic peace theory or the idea that democratic
governments are more likely to compromise and negotiate peacefully since their
internal political norms are based on consensus and not coercion.[8] Others argue that since democracies involve
the participation of the masses, they will be less likely to support going to
war whereas individual monarchs occupying a place of privilege would be less
hesitant to do so. Liberals in the last
few decades often point out that two democracies have very rarely gone to war
with each other over the last two centuries.
Kant’s second basis of cooperation
between countries is economic in nature.
Countries that have more extensive trade relations have a lot more to
lose by going to war and more to gain by cooperation. Furthermore, trade creates more social
contact between different nations, creating more empathy on both sides.[9]
Lastly, Kant argued that membership
in an international organization like a confederation could ease tensions
between nations by creating institutions that could enforce international laws
and promote dialogue between countries, which would in turn create a set of
international norms based on consensus.[10] John Stuart Mill also suggested that a
confederation of nations could one day ensure international peace.[11]
Realists, on the other hand, would
say that countries will only establish greater economic ties if the balance of
power question is already settled.[12] For example, they would say that members of
the European Union only cooperated because they were living in the shadow of
the United States and the Soviet Union.
With the question of power relations out of the way, they had a basis
for cooperation. Furthermore, they
would argue that democracies in the last half century did not go to war with
each other because they had a common enemy to fight: the Soviet Union. Realists also argue that the leaders of
democratic nations are constantly trying to maximize their power in the same
manner as the autocratic ones. Although
Democratic nations have not gone to war with each other, they often still go to
war with authoritarian regimes. Also,
realists would argue that international institutions like the United Nations
are deliberately structured to give certain countries more power than
others. The basis of peace is not
cooperation or international law but coercion by the major world powers.
Both schools of thought have had a
great influence on the neo liberal and neo realist theories that predominate
today. Although the neo schools are much
more pragmatic both in terms of their view of human nature and the nature of
relationships between different countries, their ideas are still heavily
influenced by the works of classical scholars.
Work Cited
1. Deudney, Daniel and G. John
Ikenberry. "The Nature and Sources
of International Liberal Order," Review of International Studies,
25: 1999, 179-96.
2. Doyle, M. (1983) “Kant,
Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy & Public Affairs,
12(3), 205-235.
3. Guzzini, Stefano. Realism in International Relations and
International Political Economy: the continuing story of a death foretold. Rutledge: London, 1998.
4. Lamy. S.L. (2011)
“Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism,” BSO,
pp. 114-129.
5. Maoz, Z. and Russett, B.
“Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” The
American Political Science Review, 87(3), 1993: 624-638.
6. Morgenthau, H.J. Politics Among Nations. Alfred Knopf: New York, 1960.
7. Niebuhr, R. Nations and Empires: Recurring Patterns in
the Political Order. Faber and
Faber: London, 1959.
8. Rosenberg, J. “What’s the Matter with Realism?,” Review
of International Studies, 16(4), 1990: 285-303.
9. Russett, B. “Liberalism,” DKS,
2010: 95-115.
10. Slaughter, A.M and J.E.
Alvarez. “A Liberal Theory of
International Law,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society
of International Law, 2000: 240-253.
[1] Lamy. S.L. “Contemporary Mainstream Approaches:
Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism,” BSO, 2011: 114-129.
[2]
Lamy, Ibid.
[3] Guzzini, Stefano.
Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy:
the continuing story of a death foretold.
Rutledge: London, 1998: Chapter 2
“Classical Realism: Carr, Morgenthau and the Crisis of Collective Security,”
(pp. 15-31).
[4] Morgenthau, H.J.
Politics Among Nations.
Alfred Knopf: New York, 1960: chapter 1 “A Realist Theory of
International Politics,” (pp 3-15).
[5]
Russett, B. “Liberalism,” DKS, 2010: 95-115.
[6]
Doyle, M. (1983) “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy
& Public Affairs, 12(3), 205-235.
[7]
Rosenberg, J. “What’s the Matter with
Realism?,” Review of International Studies, 16(4), 1990: 285-303.
[8] Maoz, Z. and Russett, B. “Normative and Structural
Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” The American Political Science
Review, 87(3), 1993: 624-638.
[9]
Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry.
"The Nature and Sources of International Liberal Order," Review
of International Studies, 25: 1999, 179-96.
[10]
Slaughter, A.M and J.E. Alvarez. “A
Liberal Theory of International Law,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law, 2000: 240-253.
[11]
Niebuhr, R. Nations and Empires: Recurring Patterns in the Political Order. Faber and Faber: London, 1959: Chapter 11
“The Vague Universalism of Liberal Democracy” (pp. 182-200).
[12]
Niebuhr, Ibid.
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