The Causes and Effects of Al-Infitah in Egypt

Introduction

            When Anwar Sadat became Egypt’s president in 1970 following the death of his predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser, he set in motion radical changes in economic policy known commonly as al-Infitah in Arabic, which means “the opening” in English, moving the country away from import-substitution policies and towards a free market system that involved greater interconnection with the global economy.[1]  This shift also had political implications as it moved the country away from the Soviet Union and towards the United States.  Sadat’s successor Hosni Mubarak, pressured by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international institutions in the midst of a debt crisis, continued the trend of neoliberal structural readjustment from the late 1980’s to the 2000’s with mixed results.[2]  The country experienced significant GDP growth but a growing gap between rich and poor as well, creating some of the structural conditions that led to the 2011 revolution.  The changes that took place in Egypt were not unique.  Many other countries throughout the Middle East and the developing world in general experienced similar liberal economic and political shifts throughout this time period with varying degrees of success and failure.[3]   Why did this happen and what were the consequences of al-Infitah?

                Given that the issue in question transcends national borders and involves the interaction of multiple states, it is best to approach it from an international-relations (IR) perspective.  There are several IR ontological theories that can help explain the spread of neoliberal economic reforms throughout the globe in the last forty years and in Egypt specifically.   These theories are as follows: (1) neo-realism, (2) neo-liberalism, and (3) economic structuralism.  Although each of these theories can help explain various aspects of what happened in Egypt and elsewhere in the developing world over the last four decades, by themselves, they can’t explain the full phenomenon.   To understand al-Infitah, neo-realists could analyze changes in Cold War power politics, which include the decline and collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of a uni-polar world led by the United States.   Neo-liberals could focus on the greater potential for peaceful cooperation between states created by advancements in communication and transportation technology as well the rise of international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank.  Finally, economic structuralists could analyze the oil shocks of the 1970’s, growing third world debt, and the developing world’s economic dependency on the West.    Each theory on its own fails to explain the full dynamics of al-Infitah; only when analyzing it from the perspective of all three IR ontological theories does a fuller picture begin to emerge.

                              

Neo-Realism

                Did Anwar Sadat and other political leaders in the developing world open up their economies beginning in the 1970’s in response to the decline of the Soviet Union and the growing hegemonic dominance of the United States?  Although there are some shortcomings to this theory as it neglects Egypt’s domestic dynamics and it underestimates the potential for states to gain collectively from cooperation, it is impossible to ignore the influence of Western military power on Egyptian politics over the last six decades. 

To understand the Infitah from a realist perspective, it is necessary to look at the independence movements in the developing world that took place in the aftermath of WWII.  Throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, and Libya witnessed the rise of anti-Western political movements.  This led to a series of revolutions, civil wars, and coup d’états that brought a new generation of leaders to power.[4]  Distrustful of European countries due to decades of colonial subjugation, Arab dictators like Abdel Nasser in Egypt called for the unification of the Arab world to defend their collective interests.  This foreign policy became known as Arab Nationalism, and it resulted in ill-fated unions between Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961, and Egypt and Yemen between 1962 and 1967.   It also led to a protracted conflict between Arab states and Israel.  Part of the Arab Nationalist platform was to close off the economy from Western manufactured goods in order to develop an industrial sector backed by the wealth and power of the state.  From the Arab Nationalist perspective, only through industrialization and militarization could the Arab world defend its interests.  

Arab nationalist movements might not have been possible without the military support provided by the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe, who supplied weapons and aid to Arab Nationalist regimes throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s to help them oppose the West.[5]  Meanwhile, the United States gave arms to its allies in the Arab Gulf, Turkey, Iran, and Israel during the same time period to counteract the influence of the U.S.S.R.  Like in the rest of the world, the Soviet Union and the United States used military and economic aid as a way to strengthen alliances in the region in their struggle for hegemonic domination.

However, the balance of power would not last forever.  By the late 1960’s, the United States was beginning to outpace the Soviet Union in terms of technological capacity, economic growth, and human development.  America’s allies throughout the developing world were clearly benefiting from the superior technology provided by the superpower.  In 1967, the tiny state of Israel won a shocking victory against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in a war that lasted only six days and displayed quite clearly the military superiority of the West.[6]  Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, the Golan Heights in Syria, and all of Palestine’s territory by the end of the war.  Although Abdel Nasser would stay in power another three years, his Arab Nationalist project had collapsed.

Nasser’s successor Anwar Sadat saw the writing on the wall.  With the Soviet Union clearly on the decline and Israel occupying part of Egypt’s territory, Sadat spent the next decade reversing the country’s foreign policy.   After several years of negotiations, he formally agreed to a peace treaty with Israel in 1978 at the Camp David Accords.   In exchange for recognizing the state of Israel and keeping the Suez Canal open to the international community, Egypt received the Sinai Peninsula back and approximately two billion dollars in annual American aid, 1.3 billion of which would go to the Egyptian military.[7]  America now provides training for Egyptian officers and some advanced military technology—not too advanced of course—in exchange for loyalty.  American power only continued to grow in the region in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Over this time period, Arab states may have engaged in economic structural reforms to appease Western government officials and international institutions promoting the Washington Consensus.[8]    The neoliberal reform packages proposed by the United States and the IMF often included recommendations to liberalize trade, reduce government spending, strengthen the rule of law, increase government transparency, and open up the political system to competitive elections.   Problems with national debt were not the only reason why developing countries attempted to make some of these reforms.  Complying with Western powers on these issues often meant greater access to military aid. 

A neorealist can argue that Arab states had no interest in making substantial changes to the structure of the economy or the political system but were pressured by Western political institutions to do so.   Indeed, Arab dictators often resisted the full implementation of liberal reforms, fearful that making real structural changes to the political system or the economy would lead to losing support from various sectors of society and control over the political system.[9]   What resulted was arguably the illusion of reform. 

For example, Anwar Sadat created a new constitution in 1971 and held parliamentary elections in 1977 for the first time since the pre-Nasser era, and his successor Hosni Mubarak held the first presidential elections with multiple candidates in 2005.[10]  However, elections in Egypt under Sadat and Mubarak were mockeries of the democratic process as the country’s ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) fixed the results of every contest to their benefit.  Elections served as a means to co-opt wealthy businessmen and moderate reformers into the NDP while presenting a false image of democratic legitimacy to the outside world.   Civil liberties were heavily restricted, which prevented oppositional parties from spreading their message and mobilizing voters.  The same process of illiberal democratic reforms took place in most other countries in the Middle East.

It can also be argued that liberal economic reforms implemented by Middle Eastern regimes were highly misleading.  It is true that Egypt denationalized over half of its state owned industries from the 1970’s to the 1990’s.  By the year 2000, approximately 76 percent of all state-owned industry had been privatized.[11]  It is also true that tariffs were reduced from 42.2 percent of all goods in 1990 to 16.7 percent in 2007, and quotas were eliminated by the beginning of the 2000’s in compliance with the standards of the World Trade Organization.  Free trade zones were created and foreign direct investment increased substantially.  However, most privatized industries in Egypt fell into the hands of crony capitalists with connections to the regime.  They received special perks from the state that included subsidies; special access to licenses and government contracts; and protection from foreign imports through non-tariff barriers.   Although industrial production did increase substantially as a total percentage of GDP in the 1990’s, the percent of industrial exports as a total percentage of foreign trade only increased from 25 to 33 percent.  Egypt’s industrial sector remained uncompetitive internationally and highly protected by the state.  Al-Infitah witnessed the reduced role of the state in society and more foreign trade, but it also saw the creation of a new political faction of crony capitalists by the 1990’s with ties to powerful members of Mubarak’s government.   A similar scenario can be found in other Arab states that made al-Infitah reforms.  From this perspective, “the opening” was only a partial one to appease the West.

A realist can also argue that the United States prioritized power politics over economic and democratic reforms as well.  Although the United States has placed pressure on Middle Eastern regimes to make liberal reforms, they have often backed down on these demands to prevent the loss of a strategic  ally in the region or if they needed the political support of an Arab state in the midst of a crisis.  For example, when the revolution took place in Egypt at the beginning of 2011, the United States initially supported a peaceful democratic transition, and they also condemned the Egyptian military when they overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013.[12]  However, after only a brief period of suspending military aid, the United States restored its support to Egypt’s military junta because they needed a strong ally to help stop the spread of radical Islamist groups like ISIS as well as weaken Iran’s proxy allies in the Gaza Strip and Yemen.   One can argue that the United States only pressures countries to implement liberal reforms when it doesn’t involve sacrificing their primary political interests. 

                However, the neo-realist image of an anarchic world of states competing in a zero-sum game fails to explain the full dynamics of al-Infitah.  Although it is easy to find a link between American military pressure and Egypt’s liberal reforms beginning in the 1970’s, it is much harder to make that same conclusion with Tunisia, a country that was not pressured militarily at all by the United States but still engaged in liberal structural reforms beginning in 1969.[13]  It is possible that power politics is not the only factor that influences relations between states.  Furthermore, both Egypt and the United States arguably made considerable gains from their cooperation throughout “the opening.”  The neo-realist view of a world dominated by a zero-sum game cannot make sense of this.

Neo-Liberalism

A neo-liberal would understand al-Infitah as being more than a product of American political hegemony.  They would also see it as a consequence of the development of new communications and transport technology; the spread of democratic norms; and the proliferation of international institutions that coordinate activity between states.[14]  These factors help explain why most countries throughout the world—even ones not directly influenced by the United States’ military—began integrating their economies into the global market place and adopting Western political norms.  The end result for most countries throughout the globe was a significant rise in GDP, life expectancy, and the average standard of living.[15]

A neoliberal would have a different interpretation of international relations during the 1950’s and 1960’s than their neorealist counterparts.  For example, when Israel, France, and Great Britain made the fateful decision to invade the Suez Canal in 1956, they may have done so according to a neo-liberal because they were living in an age when news traveled slower, international institutions were weaker, and distrust between nations was much higher in comparison with today.[16]  Although the technology of the era allowed for greater interconnection within states and the fostering of nationalist movements, most countries were still poorly connected with the global economy.  As a result, chauvinistic nationalist movements and powerful states that had a heavy hand in the economy were the norm throughout the middle of the twentieth century.  These were the same political forces that led to the devastation created by European imperialism, the World Wars, and the proxy conflicts of the Cold War. This distrust between nations led to an international game dominated by power politics.

However, by the late 1960’s and 1970’s, great advances in communications and travel arguably began to change the nature of relations between states and nations.  The rise of cheap air travel allowed businesses and non-governmental organizations to take their activities overseas to the remote corners of the planet.  As a result, thousands of NGO’s were established in Egypt by the 1990’s with the help of Western aid.  Furthermore, the spread of satellites, cell phones, and the internet in the following decades made communication across borders instantaneous.  From 2000 to 2011, the amount of internet users increased by 3,458 percent throughout the Middle East, and over 1,100 satellite channels were available by 2012 in the region.[17]  Western values and norms began spreading across the globe as a result.  Also, international institutions were able to use new communication, transportation, and statistical tools to increase cooperation between states.  With assistance from international organizations like the IMF and the WTO, most countries throughout the globe made structural reforms to interconnect themselves with the global economy.   

Under these changing international conditions from the 1970’s to the present, the IMF and the World Bank played a fundamental role in coordinating activity between international banks and countries like Egypt to solve debt and developmental problems.[18]  Both the Sadat and Mubarak regimes faced numerous balance of payments crises due to growing populations, economically unproductive state industries, unstable oil prices, and over bloated bureaucracies.  International institutions like the IMF were able to help Egypt restructure its economy and create greater macro-economic stability by providing their knowledge and expertise.[19]   When Mubarak negotiated with the IMF in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, he was able to obtain a deal where half of the country’s debt would be forgiven by international banks in exchange for instituting long term structural reforms, which included making cuts to government spending.   Although the neoliberal economic reforms were often inconsistent and crony capitalists dominated the process, Egypt did avoid an economic collapse.  Furthermore, the country was able to import new technology in the fields of communication, medicine, education, and transportation, which improved the life expectancy and standard of living of the average Egyptian.  The average Egyptian’s life expectancy increased from fifty three years in 1970 to seventy years in 2005.[20]  In addition, Egypt’s economy grew at an average rate of approximately five percent per year between 1990 and 2008.[21]  In turn, America gained a new ally in the region, and Western investors found a new market to invest their surplus capital.  The neoliberal perspective of al-Infitah shows how both the West and Egypt were able to gain mutually from their interaction.  International relations are not always a zero sum game.

These changing global dynamics may also have played a role in Egypt’s internal political reforms.  Although the activities of Islamist and liberal opposition groups were limited by the government and elections were fixed, the regimes of Sadat and Mubarak at various points in time gave more space for the political opposition to establish non-governmental organizations and even allowed some limited criticism of the state.[22]   Overtime, it became increasingly difficult for the government to clamp down on political dissent.  A neo-liberal would argue that the 2011 revolution was a result of the spread of mass communication technology like the internet, cell phones, and social networking as well as the influence of non-governmental organizations and Western governments on the country.   

However, there are some aspects of the Infitah for which neo-liberal theory can’t account.  For one, it can’t tell us why Syria and Iran did not engage in a similar economic or political opening.  Neo-realists can explain this by analyzing the role power politics played in the region; specifically, the current conflict between Iran and the United States over political dominance in the region, which involves economic sanctions on the Iranian regime due to its nuclear program.  Furthermore, neither of the neo-schools can explain why the wealth gap grew between rich and poor in Egypt as well as the rest of the globe between 1970 and 2011.  

Economic Structuralism

                Economic structuralists argue that both the neo-realist and neo-liberals can’t explain why al-Infitah led to an increase in the wealth gap between rich and poor over the last forty years.[23]  They would also argue that the neo schools underemphasize the role that international institutions like the IMF and multi-national companies play in international relations.  Lastly, economic structuralists see economics, not political power, as the most important factor affecting international relations.   According to economic structuralists, the state is nothing more than an apparatus by which the wealthy elite protect their economic interests.  To explain al-Infitah, economic structuralists would focus on how the oil crisis of the 1970’s and the growing debt of third world governments led desperate leaders of developing countries to make deals with the IMF to restructure their economies.[24] 

                Naturally, economic structuralists would analyze the Arab Nationalist regimes of the post colonial era from an economic standpoint.  In the 1950’s and 1960’s, Egypt’s political leadership attempted to end the country’s dependency on the West.  The country’s economy throughout the colonial era from 1882 to 1952 had been dependent on exporting cotton to Europe in exchange for manufactured goods.[25]  While Egypt’s aristocracy had grown wealthy from the export of cotton to Europe, the great majority of people were mired in poverty and illiteracy, living as peasants in villages.  When Abdel Nasser and other Arab Nationalist dictators came to power, they realized that the only way to create economic growth and modernize the country was through industrialization.  Since the population lacked the skills and the capital necessary to establish and run competitive factories, the state took on the responsibility of development by investing in manufacturing.  By the early 1950’s, Abdel Nasser had nationalized most of the countries businesses and placed high tariffs on goods to protect the state’s factories from outside competition.  These economic policies are known as import substitution industrialization (ISI).  Furthermore, to increase the average standard of living, the Egyptian state spent extensive amounts of money on providing welfare, education and jobs in the bureaucracies.  Large infrastructure projects like the High Dam at Aswan and public housing units in Cairo were constructed.  To pay for it, the government took out loans from banks abroad and accepted financial assistance from the Soviet Union.  The hope was that the investment would pay off in the future.

                However, ISI had many problems as corruption in the bureaucracy led to inefficient industrial production.  Furthermore, growing populations, soaring costs of welfare, and the war in Yemen from 1962 to 1967 put a strain on the state budget.[26]  Establishing a welfare state before industrializing often leads to problems with debt.  Lastly, by cutting themselves off from the West, they lost access to potential markets to which they could export their goods and import new technology.  By the late 1960’s, the Egyptian state found itself heavily in debt.   To make matters worse, oil prices world-wide increased dramatically in the early 1970’s as a result of the formation of the oil cartel OPEC and the oil embargo that took place during the 1973 war.  Desperate for capital, Nasser’s successor Anwar Sadat, like many other heads of state in developing countries throughout the world, had to make economic reforms.

                The best place countries could turn to for more capital was international banks.  However, economic institutions would not give out loans to financially unstable countries unless they made and fulfilled promises to restructure government spending.   Economic structuralists point out the critical role played by international institutions that represent the global capitalist class in pressuring third world governments to make neoliberal reforms.  From the neo-Marxist perspective, organizations like the IMF were not only interested in helping third world states balance their budgets through the cutting of government spending.  They were also interested in opening up the economies of developing countries so that Western businesses could find new markets for their products and new locations to establish their factories.[27]  The oil shocks of the 1970’s had hurt the profit margins of factory and business owners in Western countries, and many corporations and banks were looking for markets with cheaper labor and potential consumers.  Desperate to save their regimes from economic ruin, regimes like that of Sadat and Mubarak were willing to restructure their political-economy.

                Although al-Infitah reforms in the Middle East did allow for increased access to loans and foreign direct investment, it also created an enormous gap between rich and poor.[28]  To cut spending, states inflated the currency and cut the salaries of government workers, driving hundreds of thousands into poverty.  Government services in education and health care declined considerably.  Furthermore, government subsidies on food stuffs were either cut or substantially reduced.  Jobs were cut as new agricultural technology forced peasants off their land and new industrial technology created layoffs in manufacturing.  The youth were hurt the worst by these reforms as many bureaucracies chose to make spending cuts by not hiring new workers, leaving many college graduates unemployed.  The reforms created political conflicts between rich and poor as best exemplified in Egypt by the 1977 bread riots and the 2006 labor strikes by workers in the textile mills in the city of Mahalla in central Egypt.   Desperate for help, the poor turned to private charity networks funded by Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.  A small percentage of the youth were radicalized, joining Islamist organizations like al-Jihad that practiced political violence against the state.  Desperate for work, many of Egypt’s poor fled to work either in the West or in the Arab Gulf.  Meanwhile, the rich fled to wealthy suburbs like the Sixth of October and New Cairo to escape the deteriorating inner cities of Cairo and Alexandria.  These economic structural problems in Egypt and other Middle Easter countries were arguably the basis for the 2011 revolution.
                Egypt's al-Infitah reforms also led to greater economic dependency on the West.  In the late 1970's, significant oil deposits were discovered and exploited in Egypt with the help of Western companies.  By 1980, approximately thirty percent of Egypt's GDP and the majority of the country's exports were dependent on fossil fuel exports.  Along with oil, other rents like transportation fees from the Suez Canal, remittances from workers living in the Gulf, and partial rents like foreign aid and tourism were providing the Egyptian state with over two thirds of the government's revenue.  Although the government initially used this wealth to prop up the country's over bloated bureaucracy, inefficient state-protected industries, and expansive welfare state, the country's revenue from oil rents would gradually decline from 30 percent in 1980 to 8 percent of GDP in 2010 due to population growth, increased domestic demand for energy, and decreasing supplies.  Instead of responding to this problem by promoting economic development, free markets, and industrial exports, Egypt's government instead cut spending as requested by the IMF in the late 1980's and 1990's.  While many crony capitalists in fields such as fossil fuels, mineral resources, tourism, and telecommunications have grown wealthier as a result of Western dependency, the majority of the population has seen their welfare benefits cut, their educational systems decline, and their access to government jobs pulled out from under their feet.  Economic structuralists often point out that the Middle East's dependence on oil exports is holding back the region's development.    

                Of course, this theory fails to explain all aspects of al-Infitah.  For one, not all countries in the Middle East had the same degree of economic inequality or industrial exports.  IMF reforms in Turkey produced far more favorable results in terms of increasing industrial exports and improving the quality of life for the average person.[29] Political explanations like the quality of Turkey’s bureaucracy help explain this.  Also, economic structural theories claim that liberal IMF reforms made states throughout the globe more dependent on Western industrial goods, which in turn increased the amount of inequality throughout the globe.  However, Egypt’s industrial production increased as a percentage of GDP over the last forty years due to non-tariff protections of locally produced goods.  Furthermore, countries like South Korea and Turkey were able to gradually implement neo-liberal reforms while helping their industrial sector prepare for international competition.  Deindustrialization is not always a consequence of neoliberal reforms.

Conclusion

                Although each IR ontological theory provides a unique perspective on al-Infitah in Egypt and the rest of the developing world, each perspective cannot explain the full phenomenon.  Furthermore, there are other IR theories like Social Constructivism, Post-Colonialism, and Critical Theory that could shed further light on the causes of al-Infitah and its consequences for the Middle East and the world in general.  The idea encompasses too many political, social, and economic issues to be understood under one general theory. 

                In conclusion, there are several things to take from this analysis.  First, al-Infitah in Egypt was mainly the result of the following factors: 1) the decline of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower; 2) the growth of new technologies and international institutions associated with globalization in the late 1960’s and 1970’s; and 3) the balance of payments crisis as a result of the failures of ISI policies and the oil shocks of the 1970’s.  Second, al-Infitah had the following consequences for Egypt:  1) the partial liberalization of the economic and political system that included illiberal democratic reforms and the rise of a crony capitalist class; 2) the increase in international trade and the importation of new technology; 3) the increase of GDP and average living standards coupled with a growing gap in wealth between rich and poor; and 4) the creation of some of the long term political, economic, and social conditions that led to the Egyptian revolution in 2011. 

Work Cited

1. Adly, Amr.  State Reform and Development in the Middle East: Turkey and Egypt in the Post- Liberalization Era.  Rutledge: London, 2013.

2. Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry.  "The Nature and Sources of International Liberal Order," Review of International Studies, 25, 1999: 179-96.

3. Gause, Gregory.  “Systematic Approaches to Middle East International Relations,” International Studies Review, 1(1), Spring, 1999: 11-31.

4. Heydemann, Steven. 2014. “America’s Response to the Arab Uprisings: US Foreign Assistance in an Era of Ambivalence,” Mediterranean Politics Vol. 19, 3: 299-317.

5. Kadhim, Abbas, ed.  Governance in the Middle East and North Africa.  Rutledge: London, 2013.

6. Kauppi, M. and P. Viotti.  “Economic Structuralism: Global Capitalism and Postcolonialism,” VK, 2012: 187-207.

7. Khatib, Lina.  “Transforming the Media: From Tool of the Rulers to Tool of Empowerment,” in Arab Human Development in the Twenty-First Century: The Primacy of Empowerment, ed. Bahgat Korany.  The American University in Cairo Press: Cairo, 2014.

7. King, Stephen.  Liberalization Against Democracy.  Indiana University Press: Indian, 2003.

8. Lamy. S.L. “Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and NeoLiberalism,” BSO, 2011: 114-129.

9. Lipson, Charles.  “The International Organization of Third World Debt,” in Towards a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective, Edited by Robert Bates.  University of California Press: Los Angeles, 1988, pg 12-46.

9. Niblock, Tim and Emma Murphy, eds.  Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East. British Academic Press: London, 1993.

10. Ould-Mey, Mohameden.  "Structural Adjustment Programs and Democratization in Africa," pg 35-66 in Multiparty Democracy and Political Change: Constraints to Democratization in Africa.  Edited by John Mukum Mbaku and Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere.    Africa World Press: New Jersey, 2006.

11. Owen, Roger.  State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East.  Rutledge: London, 2004.

12. Richards, Alan, John Waterbury, Melani Cammett, and Ishac Diwan.  A Political Economy of the Middle East, third edition.  West View Press: United States, 2014.

13. Sayyid, Mustaph.  "International Dimensions of Middle Eastern Authoritarianism," pg 215-230 in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes. Edited by Oliver Schlumberger.   Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2007.

---

[1] Richards, Alan, John Waterbury, Melani Cammett and Ishac Diwan.  A Political Economy of the Middle East, pg 27.

[2] Adly, Amr.  State Reform and Development in the Middle East: Turkey and Egypt in the Post- Liberalization Era.  Rutledge: London, 2013, 70-115.

[3] Lipson, Charles.  “The International Organization of Third World Debt,” in Towards a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective, Edited by Robert Bates.  University of California Press: Los Angeles, 1988, pg 12-46.

[4] Owen, Roger.  State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East.  Rutledge: London, 2004, pg 19-29.

[5] Gause, Gregory.  “Systematic Approaches to Middle East International Relations,” International Studies Review, 1(1), Spring, 1999: 11-31.

[6] Owen, Ibid.

[7] Richards, Alan, John Waterbury, Melani Cammett, and Ishac Diwan.  A Political Economy of the Middle East, third edition.  West View Press: United States, 2014, 344-361.

[8] Niblock, Tim and Emma Murphy, eds.  Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East. British Academic Press: London, 1993.

[9] Sayyid, Mustaph.  "International Dimensions of Middle Eastern Authoritarianism," in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes. Edited by Oliver Schlumberger.   Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2007, 215-230.

[10] Owen, Ibid.

[11] Adly, Amr.  State Reform and Development in the Middle East: Turkey and Egypt in the Post- Liberalization Era.  Rutledge: London, 2013, 70-116.

[12] Heydemann, Steven. 2014. “America’s Response to the Arab Uprisings: US Foreign Assistance in an Era of Ambivalence,” Mediterranean Politics Vol. 19, 3: 299-317.

[13] King, Stephen.  Liberalization Against Democracy.  Indiana University Press: Indian, 2003.

[14] Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry.  "The Nature and Sources of International Liberal Order," Review of International Studies, 25, 1999: 179-96.

[15] Richards, Ibid, 57-65.

[16] Lamy. S.L. “Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and NeoLiberalism,” BSO, 2011: 114-129.

[17] Khatib, Lina.  “Transforming the Media: From Tool of the Rulers to Tool of Empowerment,” in Arab Human Development in the Twenty-First Century: The Primacy of Empowerment, ed. Bahgat Korany.  The American University in Cairo Press: Cairo, 2014.

[18] Lipson, Charles.  “The International Organization of Third World Debt,” in Towards a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective, Edited by Robert Bates.  University of California Press: Los Angeles, 1988, pg 12-46.

[19] Richards, Ibid, 9-20.

[20] Richards, Ibid, pg 100.

[21] Adly, Amr, Ibid.

[22] Kadhim, Abbas, ed.  Governance in the Middle East and North Africa.  Rutledge: London, 2013.

[23] Kauppi, M. and P. Viotti.  “Economic Structuralism: Global Capitalism and Postcolonialism,” VK, 2012: 187-207.

[24] Ould-Mey, Mohameden.  "Structural Adjustment Programs and Democratization in Africa," pg 35-66 in Multiparty Democracy and Political Change: Constraints to Democratization in Africa.  Edited by John Mukum Mbaku and Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere.    Africa World Press: New Jersey, 2006.

[25] Richards, Ibid, 24-27.

[26] Richards, Ibid.

[27] Ould-Mey, Ibid.

[28] King, Stephen.  Liberalization Against Democracy.  Indiana University Press: Indian, 2003.

[29] Adly, Ibid, 28-69.