A Literature Review of Corruption

                Why is it that some countries in the Middle East have spent significantly more money on their educational systems in last two decades but have not seen significant improvement in student performance?[1]   David Chapman, in an article titled “Education Quality in the Middle East,” claims that a lack of economic resources is often cited by political scientists as the major reason why developing countries struggle to improve their schools.  David Waldner, in his book State Building and Late Development, would claim that structural problems within the state are the reason why there is a lack of tax revenue to spend on institutions associated with human development like education or health care.[2]  However, the lack of resources alone can’t fully explain the problem in this case since increased spending did not lead to improved governance.   Political scientists like David Chapman, Stephen Heyneman, Kathryn H. Anderson, Nazym Nuraliyeva, and others believe that corruption needs to be taken seriously as an independent variable to explain the disappointing lack of development in educational systems throughout the Middle East.[3]     Corruption negatively affects the performance of administrators, teachers, and students.  Although very few in the field would disagree with this sentiment, there are major debates over how to define, measure, and reduce corruption with the goal of improving governance in the developing world.   Without a consensus on these questions, it will be very difficult to assess the impact of corruption on educational systems. 

                The first problem is defining corruption.  Almost all political scientists seem to agree that corruption is the misuse of public office for personal gain.[4]  However, there are some disagreements over what constitutes the misuse of political power.  One type of corruption, grand corruption, involves political elites manipulating the writing and enforcement of laws for a client in exchange for a bribe or a favor.   However, it is often difficult to define in certain instances when a politician is engaging in this behavior.  If a politician urges the public and his fellow politicians to go to war because it is necessary for the country’s security, but at the same time he is receiving legal campaign finance contributions from an arms company, is he engaging in grand corruption?  Maybe the war is necessary and the campaign financing has nothing to do with the decision making.  The opposite could also be true.  We also have problems defining petty corruption, which is when bureaucrats accept small bribes or some other form of compensation in the exchange for special favors.  A teacher that accepts a bribe from a student for a better grade or an administrator that misuses public funds meant for the school for personal profit is engaged in petty corruption.  In certain cases, petty corruption might not be a misuse of power.  If there are irrational laws and regulations on the books that make it impossible for a businessman to operate legally, bribes might be necessary to cut through red tape.  Also, many bureaucrats depend on small tips because of very low salaries.  All political scientists seem to agree that the growth of petty corruption will cause long term problems in governance, but bureaucrats and private citizens that often engage in this behavior are not doing so for personal benefit but because it is the only way to get something done.[5]   Furthermore, although many political scientists that specialize in studying corruption like Arvind Jain claim that petty corruption never increases economic growth in the short term, others like Bertram Spector believes that it can in certain cases.[6]  There is no clear consensus.

Measuring corruption is an even more contentious issue.   There are multiple methods that are currently in use to measure the problem by institutions like Transparency International, the World Bank, Business International Corporation, Political Risk Services, World Competitiveness Report, and Political and Economic Risks Consultancy.[7]  They all have slightly different methods for defining and quantifying it, but there does seem to be some common trends.  They all tend to rely on multiple surveys conducted in each country that are given to politicians, businessmen, non-governmental organizations, and average citizens asking them about their perceptions of corruption.  Surveys given to specific experts will also ask questions about a country’s laws, regulatory institutions, level of government transparency, degree of judiciary independence, efficacy of law enforcement, and many other institutional factors that can affect the level of corruption.  Furthermore, average citizens are asked about their perceptions of corruption, how often they pay bribes, and whether or not they feel their country has problems dealing with this issue.  There are several complications with these surveys.  For one, they all ask slightly different questions, they are distributed in a different manner, and certain factors are weighted heavier than others when the data is aggregated.  This will produce slightly different results that will change the rankings.   It is a credit to these surveys that despite their diversity, the great majority of countries only have a slightly different ranking depending on the method used.  However, we need to keep in mind that these institutions are only measuring perceptions of corruption and evaluating the institutions that are associated with the problem; they are not directly studying actual incidences of corruption.  Furthermore, most of these surveys don’t deal with corruption in educational institutions.  Understandably, the greatest focus in placed on regulatory institutions, the police, the judiciary, and legislatures because without the rule of law, corruption will become prevalent in all institutions, educational or otherwise.   There are a few political scientists who have tried to study the issue of corruption in education, but the data available is comparatively small.[8]

Lastly, the debate on how to reduce corruption has evolved throughout the last three decades.  According to Bertram Spector, there have been three different phases since 1993 in terms of the popular methods used to deal with corruption.[9]   In phase number one between 1993 and 1999, the main goal of international organizations that sought reform was to improve the methods used to measure it; evaluate the financial costs within each country; and to present the data in conferences to the political elites of each country with the hope that they would take action.  This light form of intervention produced almost no results in terms of encouraging countries to make reforms or reducing the level of corruption.  Without any incentives or programs for how to deal with it, politicians ignored the rhetoric.  In phase two throughout the 2000’s, international organizations shifted their strategy, opting to use a mixture of financial incentives and public relations campaigns to push governments to make reforms and change the culture of countries throughout the globe.  This strategy had better results than the first phase, but the level of improvement was still disappointing.  In phase three, which began only a few years ago, international organizations are now beginning to see corruption in a more holistic manner.  Recent studies have shown that non-institutional factors like political stability and economic development are correlated with higher levels of corruption.   Whereas some political scientists like Yadeeva Vineeta and Janos Kornai focus more on institutions, Bertram and others show that levels of corruption are intertwined with other general political, economic, and social problems.[10]  To reduce corruption, other societal issues can’t be ignored.   Furthermore, this third wave of corruption reform has emphasized different reform strategies for different types of democratic and authoritarian regimes.  A program that works in one country may not work in another. 

As this debate evolves, it is important that we continue to refine our definitions, measurement tools, and reform programs to deal with corruption.  We will never have a perfect measurement of corruption or total consensus on this issue, but as we improve our understanding of this phenomenon, governments and international organizations can craft better programs to combat the problem.  Furthermore, we will gain a better understanding of how corruption affects educational institutions. 

Work Cited Page

1. Ahmad, Eatzaz, Muhammad Aman Ullah, and Muhammad Irfanullah Arfeen.  "Does Corruption Affect Economic Growth," Latin American Journal of Economics, Vol. 49, No. 2, November, 2012: pg 277-305. 

2.  Chapman, David.  “Education Quality in the Middle East,” International Review of Education, Vol. 55, No. 4.  July, 2009.

3. Heyneman, Stephen, Kathryn H. Anderson, and Nazym Nuraliyeva.  "The Cost of Corruption in Higher Education," Comparative Education Review, Vol. 52, No. 1, February, 2008.

4.  “Human Development Report, 2013: The Rise of the South, Human Progress in a Diverse World,” United Nations Development Program: New York, 2013. 

5.  “Is Transparency International’s Measure of Corruption Still Valid?,” www.theguardian.com, December 3^rd, 2013.

6. Jain, Arvind.  “Corruption: A Review,” Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 15, No.1, 2001: pg 71-121.

7. Kornai, Janos, Laszlo Matyas, and Gerard Roland, eds.  Corruption, Development, and Institutional Design.  Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2009.

8. Lambsdorf, Graf.  The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform.  Cambridge University Press: Great Britain, 2008.

9. “Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Key Findings, 2000-2012,” www.oecd.org, September, 2014. 

10. Spector, Bertram.  Detecting Corruption In Developing Countries: Identifying Causes/Strategies for Action.  Kumarian Press: United States, 2012.

11. Stewart, William.  “Is PISA Fundamentally Flawed?,” www.tes.co.uk, September 16^th, 2014.

12. “Transparency International: Global Perceptions Index 2013,” http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results, 2014. 

13. Waldner, David.  State Building and Late Development.  Cornell University Press: New York, 1999.

14. Yadav, Vineeta.  Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries.  Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011.

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[1] Chapman, David.  “Education Quality in the Middle East,” International Review of Education, Vol. 55, No. 4.  July, 2009.

[2] Waldner, David.  State Building and Late Development.  Cornell University Press: New York, 1999.

[3] Heyneman, Stephen, Kathryn H. Anderson, and Nazym Nuraliyeva.  "The Cost of Corruption in Higher Education," Comparative Education Review, Vol. 52, No. 1, February, 2008.

[4] Jain, Arvind.  “Corruption: A Review,” Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 15, No.1, 2001: pg 71-121.

[5] Lambsdorf, Graf.  The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform.  Cambridge University Press: Great Britain, 2008.

[6] Spector, Bertram.  Detecting Corruption In Developing Countries: Identifying Causes/Strategies for Action.  Kumarian Press: United States, 2012.

[7] “Transparency International: Global Perceptions Index 2013,” http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results, 2014, “Human Development Report, 2013: The Rise of the South, Human Progress in a Diverse World,” United Nations Development Program: New York, 2013, and “Is Transparency International’s Measure of Corruption Still Valid?,” www.theguardian.com, December 3^rd, 2013.

[8] Heyneman, Stephen, Kathryn H. Anderson, and Nazym Nuraliyeva.  "The Cost of Corruption in Higher Education," Comparative Education Review, Vol. 52, No. 1, February, 2008.

[9] Bertrom, Ibid. 

[10] Yadav, Vineeta.  Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries.  Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011.

Theories in International Relations: Comparing and Contrasting Classical Social-Constructivism and Post-Structuralism

                 When international relations (IR) first became a distinct field within Western academia in the middle of the twenty century, it was dominated by rational schools of thought that, for the most part, took their epistemology for granted.[1]  Realism, liberalism, economic structuralism, and the neo-schools, despite their ontological differences, all assumed that researchers could observe the world objectively and obtain empirical knowledge through the scientific method.  However, by the 1980’s, many new schools of thought emerged within the reflexivist tradition that challenged the objectivity of political scientists and their ontological assumptions.  Two of these new perspectives were called classical social-constructivism and post-structuralism.  Both theories challenged the epistemological assumptions of the older schools but did so in different ways.  Classical social-constructivists have compromised more with rationalists on epistemological issues than their post-structuralist counterparts.  As a result, proponents of the two schools use different methodologies in their research.  However, both IR theories assume that semi-irrational, ideational factors that are difficult to measure influence the behavior of states, making it difficult for political scientists to objectively understand reality. 

                One thing scholars within these two schools have in common is that they don’t share a distinct ontology or a way of explaining how the world works.   Instead, classical social-constructivism and post-structuralism are distinct schools because of their epistemology.[2]  Whereas the rational schools of thought have an epistemology based on the scientific method and empiricism, the post modern schools of thought are more reflexive in nature, questioning how the political science community obtained their knowledge of the world and made their conclusions.  By doing this, they are also questioning the very core values of modernity and Western civilization, which has a high regard for science and rationality.   Classical social-constructivism and post-structuralism share a lot in common with post-colonialism, gender studies, and critical theory in this manner.  The reflexivist trends found in these schools also affect their methodologies.  Instead of focusing exclusively on explaining events by finding causation between individual variables, the reflexevist schools focus more on understanding IR, studying issues like cultural trends, values, norms, and language.  The proponents of these schools doubt that the social sciences can produce universal truths based on completely objective scientific research.

                Another thing both schools share in common is that they tend to place a lot of importance on how semi-irrational, ideational factors like ideas, symbols, language, and culture influence the decision making of political scientists and political actors.[3]  This differs from the rational schools, which place a lot of importance on material factors such as power and wealth to explain how states make decisions in IR.  The rational schools measure power and wealth in terms of material resources such as technology, weapons, natural resources, and demographics.  Also, realists and economic structuralists in particular have very inflexible views on how human beings will use these resources.  For example, according to realists, resources will be used rationally by political agents to maximize their own power, and peace can only be achieved by actors when a balance of power is reached.  On the other hand, liberals do believe that it is possible for agents in the international system to cooperate under different circumstances for mutual benefit, but most still place a lot of importance on wealth and power in determining relations between countries.  According to Alexander Wendt, only “strong liberals” will acknowledge the great importance of shared norms like democracy in mitigating conflict irrespective of the resources available or the balance of power.[4] 

However, the post modern schools assert that semi-irrational, ideational factors like ideas, culture, values, and language also influence the behavior of state actors.  From this perspective, the decisions human beings make are not always rational and easy to predict nor are the factors that influence their decisions easy to measure.  For example, classical social constructivists agree with neo-realists and neo-liberals that a system defined by anarchy among states exists and affects international relations; however, the constructivists also feel that states will behave in a system without rules based on how they conceive of anarchy.[5]   In other words, constructivists believe states are influenced by cultural norms that legitimize how political actors are supposed to act within a system without enforced rules; these norms are constantly being reconstructed, changing how states act regardless of the resources at their disposal.  Hence, social norms form the structure by which states act and not power or economics.  Post-structuralists go even further in terms of questioning our preconceived assumptions of ideas like anarchy, sovereignty, and power, questioning whether states are the only international actors in the current system or even if a state of international anarchy even exists. 

                Although both classical social-constructivists and post-structuralists have a lot in common, there are also many differences between them.  For one, classical social-constructivists are able to make more compromises with the rational IR theories and even make limited use of the scientific method in their work.  Social-constructivists in general believe that the decisions of political actors are affected strongly by shared norms and customs within a given community that legitimize certain types of action and delegitimize others, creating what Emile Durkheim called a collective consciousness; so, some scholars within this field believe that it is possible to measure social norms and customs through surveys and other scientific methods.[6]  However, they also tend to feel that these methods of quantifying culture are limited and there is still a high degree of subjectivity in the process.  Therefore, surveys should be supplemented with more intimate studies of the culture through anthropological observations and analyzing cultural artifacts.  The political scientist Alexander Went labeled social constructivists that can compromise with strong liberals as classical social-constructivists since they held many of the same epistemological and ontological assumptions of classical liberals.[7] 

                However, bridging the gap between post-structuralism and the rationalist schools is far less likely according to James Der Derian.[8]   Unlike the classical social-constructivists, post-structuralists are more radical in terms of their antagonism towards the use of the scientific method in the social sciences.  Post-structuralists believe that we are not able to objectively evaluate reality.  Instead, they believe that we subjectively interpret the world based on the words and symbols we share with each other since language is the only we create a picture of the world within our heads.  According to this theory, language is only given meaning based on the context in which it used in discourse.  Therefore, one’s view on any issue in IR is drastically altered by the way in which language is used to describe it.  For example, using the word terrorist or freedom fighter to describe an armed group drastically alters our perceptions of it.  Since language is highly flexible and can be altered drastically from one conversation to another, post-structuralists doubt that we can objectively understand reality or that a community can have a common culture with shared values and norms.  This contradicts the ethos of classical social constructivism.

                The difference between the epistemologies of the two schools has led to significant differences in methodology.    Since social constructivists are concerned with the shared values and beliefs of community, they are also concerned with how people come to identify themselves as part of community, and how their membership in the community shapes their values.[9]  To measure this, classical social constructivists can conduct surveys and interviews; live within and observe the culture; and analyze the social artifacts produced by the community in the form of literature, film, and art.  The culture of the community will determine who has the legitimacy to rule and what is expected of them once they get into power.  Therefore, understanding how individual identities are constructed and how individuals in term affect the culture of the community is the major occupation of this school.  Post-structuralists, on the other hand, are more concerned with deconstructing language.  Scholars in the field believe that power is determined by how the use of words evolves in relation to other words.[10]  If one word becomes more frequently used then another, it can tell us about the power structure within a political community.  This is why post-structuralists study the genealogy of words and symbols, and how their usage and application changes overtime.  

                Due to their lack of a clear ontology to explain how states interact, the reflexevist schools are nowhere near as popular as the rational theories within the IR tradition.  Perhaps there is good reason for this since acting on the assumption that we can’t objectively understand the world has few practical purpose for state officials and political activists interested in making reforms.  If our species had acted on this assumption, the scientific revolution and industrialization would not have been possible.  However, we should not be so quick to dismiss the value of the reflexevist schools.  They force political scientists to confront their own biases and can help us improve our methodologies.

               

Work Cited

1. Der Derian, James. (1990) “The Space of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed,” International Studies Quarterly, 34, 295-310.

2. Dillon, M. – Neal, A.W. (2008) “Introduction,” in M. Dillon and A.W. Neal (eds.) Foucault on Politics, Security and War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 1-18.

3. Finnemore, Martha and Kathyrn Sikkink.  (2001) "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," Annual Review Political Science, 4, 2001: 391-416.

4. Hansen, L. (2011) “Poststructuralism,” BSO, pp. 166-180.

5. Viotti, P. – Kauppi, M. (2012) “Constructivist Understandings,” VK, pp. 313-337.

6. Wendt, Alexander. (1992) “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, 46(2), 391-425.

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[1] Der Derian, J. (1990) “The Space of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed,” International Studies Quarterly, 34, 295-310.

[2] Viotti, P. – Kauppi, M. (2012) “Constructivist Understandings,” VK, pp. 313-337.

[3]Finnemore, Martha and Kathyrn Sikkink.  "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," Annual Review Political Science, 4, 2001: 391-416.

[4] Wendt, Alexander. (1992) “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, 46(2), 391-425.

[5]Wendt, Ibid.

[6] Viotti, P. – Kauppi, M. (2012) “Constructivist Understandings,” VK, pp. 313-337.

[7] Wendt, Ibid.

[8] Der Derian, James. (1990) “The Space of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed,” International Studies Quarterly, 34, 295-310.

[9] Hansen, L. (2011) “Poststructuralism,” BSO, pp. 166-180.

[10] Dillon, M. – Neal, A.W. (2008) “Introduction,” in M. Dillon and A.W. Neal (eds.) Foucault on Politics, Security and War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 1-18.

The intellectual roots of international relations theory: comparing and contrasting the classical realist and liberal schools of thought

Although classical realism and liberalism have been supplanted by more nuanced theories in the field of international relations in recent decades, the ideas and intellectuals associated with these schools of thought have left a profound impact on the academic community.  The two most popular theories today—neo-realism and neo-liberalism—still borrow heavily from their predecessors.[1]   This is why it is important to understand the differences and similarities between the classical realist and liberal perspectives, and how they differ from the schools that predominate today. 

                Both classical schools share one very important thing in common that distinguishes them from the neo schools of thought: the classical theories in the field of international relations are built around their conception of human nature.  To understand why two countries went to war, made an alliance, or established trade, the focus is placed on the nature of individual leaders.  Assumptions are made about their motivations based on presupposed perceptions of human biology and behavior.   On the other hand, the neo schools of thought place the structure of the current international system—mainly its anarchic nature—at the center of their international relations theories.[2]   Although individual interests and human nature are still important variables for these scholars, the neo schools assert that individual actors are constrained by an international system under which all states operate.   In other words, while the classical schools created international relations theories that applied universally to all human beings, the neo-schools are parochial, focusing on the current international system of sovereigns states operating in an anarchic environment.   

                Of course, the two classical schools differ greatly in terms of how they perceive human nature.  The realist school of thought, which was inspired by Greek historians like Thucydides and enlightenment scholars such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau, bases its international relations theory on the premise that human beings are evil by nature and are mainly concerned with increasing their own power at the expense of others.[3]  In Thomas Hobbes Leviathan, he expresses a great deal of pessimism about human beings; he felt that people needed a powerful state led by a monarch who could suppress the violent nature of his subjects.   In exchange, people would have a government that could solve collective action problems for them.  In other words, people are not to be trusted with liberty.  Realists like James Morgenthau, who have applied this theory of human nature to international relations, claim that all nations are interested, first and foremost, in expanding their power at the expense of other states; economic and social objectives are secondary.[4]   International politics is seen as a zero-sum game with winners and losers.  In Morgenthau’s world, morality does exist, but that morality is shaped by political leaders who are only trying to justify their own political ambitions to themselves and others.  Therefore, when two countries make an alliance or cooperate on an issue, they are doing it for selfish reasons like to fight a common enemy for example.  Although alliances and peace treaties can take place in the international system, they are temporary and will only persist as long as both sides see it as being in their best interest.  The only way to prevent war between different nations is to maintain a balance of power between them, but since the world is constantly changing, war is inevitable.

                The liberal school of thought, which was inspired by Enlightenment thinkers like John Locke and Emmanuel Kant, has a far more optimistic and idealistic view of human nature.  John Locke, in his Second Treatise on Government, asserts that human beings are naturally good and rational; it is society that corrupts individuals and not the other way around.[5]  Left with their liberty, human beings could peacefully cooperate with one another and create a democratic system of government where all would benefit.   Therefore, governments should protect people’s civil liberties and property.   These liberal values affected the German philosopher Emanuel Kant’s view of international relations.[6]  Although Kant and other liberals in the field of International Relations admit that the power and political interests affects the relationship between countries, they also believe that those relationships could become more peaceful and productive for both sides through cooperation.[7]   For liberals, politics is a non-zero sum game where both sides can benefit from their interactions, so war between countries is not inevitable.

Immanuel Kant outlined three scenarios where countries are less likely to fight each other and benefit from cooperation.  The first scenario is if both countries are democracies.  Most liberals ascribe to democratic peace theory or the idea that democratic governments are more likely to compromise and negotiate peacefully since their internal political norms are based on consensus and not coercion.[8]  Others argue that since democracies involve the participation of the masses, they will be less likely to support going to war whereas individual monarchs occupying a place of privilege would be less hesitant to do so.  Liberals in the last few decades often point out that two democracies have very rarely gone to war with each other over the last two centuries.

Kant’s second basis of cooperation between countries is economic in nature.  Countries that have more extensive trade relations have a lot more to lose by going to war and more to gain by cooperation.  Furthermore, trade creates more social contact between different nations, creating more empathy on both sides.[9] 

Lastly, Kant argued that membership in an international organization like a confederation could ease tensions between nations by creating institutions that could enforce international laws and promote dialogue between countries, which would in turn create a set of international norms based on consensus.[10]  John Stuart Mill also suggested that a confederation of nations could one day ensure international peace.[11]

Realists, on the other hand, would say that countries will only establish greater economic ties if the balance of power question is already settled.[12]  For example, they would say that members of the European Union only cooperated because they were living in the shadow of the United States and the Soviet Union.  With the question of power relations out of the way, they had a basis for cooperation.   Furthermore, they would argue that democracies in the last half century did not go to war with each other because they had a common enemy to fight: the Soviet Union.  Realists also argue that the leaders of democratic nations are constantly trying to maximize their power in the same manner as the autocratic ones.  Although Democratic nations have not gone to war with each other, they often still go to war with authoritarian regimes.  Also, realists would argue that international institutions like the United Nations are deliberately structured to give certain countries more power than others.  The basis of peace is not cooperation or international law but coercion by the major world powers.

Both schools of thought have had a great influence on the neo liberal and neo realist theories that predominate today.  Although the neo schools are much more pragmatic both in terms of their view of human nature and the nature of relationships between different countries, their ideas are still heavily influenced by the works of classical scholars. 

               

Work Cited

1. Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry.  "The Nature and Sources of International Liberal Order," Review of International Studies, 25: 1999, 179-96.

2. Doyle, M. (1983) “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12(3), 205-235.

3. Guzzini, Stefano.  Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: the continuing story of a death foretold.  Rutledge: London, 1998.

4. Lamy. S.L. (2011) “Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism,” BSO, pp. 114-129.

5. Maoz, Z. and Russett, B. “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” The American Political Science Review, 87(3), 1993: 624-638.     

6. Morgenthau, H.J.  Politics Among Nations.  Alfred Knopf: New York, 1960. 

7. Niebuhr, R.  Nations and Empires: Recurring Patterns in the Political Order.  Faber and Faber: London, 1959.

8. Rosenberg, J.  “What’s the Matter with Realism?,” Review of International Studies, 16(4), 1990: 285-303.

9. Russett, B. “Liberalism,” DKS, 2010: 95-115.

10. Slaughter, A.M and J.E. Alvarez.  “A Liberal Theory of International Law,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 2000: 240-253.

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[1] Lamy. S.L. “Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism,” BSO, 2011: 114-129.

[2] Lamy, Ibid.

[3] Guzzini, Stefano.  Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: the continuing story of a death foretold.  Rutledge: London, 1998:  Chapter 2 “Classical Realism: Carr, Morgenthau and the Crisis of Collective Security,” (pp. 15-31).

[4] Morgenthau, H.J.  Politics Among Nations.  Alfred Knopf: New York, 1960: chapter 1 “A Realist Theory of International Politics,” (pp 3-15).

[5] Russett, B. “Liberalism,” DKS, 2010: 95-115.

[6] Doyle, M. (1983) “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12(3), 205-235.

[7] Rosenberg, J.  “What’s the Matter with Realism?,” Review of International Studies, 16(4), 1990: 285-303.

[8] Maoz, Z. and Russett, B. “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” The American Political Science Review, 87(3), 1993: 624-638.   

[9] Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry.  "The Nature and Sources of International Liberal Order," Review of International Studies, 25: 1999, 179-96.

[10] Slaughter, A.M and J.E. Alvarez.  “A Liberal Theory of International Law,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 2000: 240-253.

[11] Niebuhr, R. Nations and Empires: Recurring Patterns in the Political Order.  Faber and Faber: London, 1959: Chapter 11 “The Vague Universalism of Liberal Democracy” (pp. 182-200).

[12] Niebuhr, Ibid.

Do Political Leaders Shape Society?

Do political leaders play the primary role in determining the nature of economic development, social conflict, political transition, and state building within a country?  Many political scientists have debated this question and with good reason.  States and their leaders do play a great role in shaping the economy and lives of the average citizen within society.  Political elites can implement change by reforming or creating institutions.  In turn, those institutions can create lasting changes in a country’s culture or economic system.  However, we must not allow ourselves to become dogmatists by believing that the state and its leaders play an exclusive role in shaping a country’s political system.  State and society are two sides of the same coin; each one shapes the other.   In other words, political change doesn’t come from above or below; both occur simultaneously.    

            Although this may seem obvious to most political scientists who seem to take the middle ground on this question today, attitudes were very different in the 1960’s and 1970’s in the West.  At the height of the Cold War, political scientists tended to neglect the importance of the state and political leaders in shaping the economy and society.  Capitalist regimes were fighting an ideological war with communism, so Westerners were quick to denounce the role states and their political leaders could play in fostering economic development.[1]   The failure of communist regimes to create significant economic growth only hardened these feeling.  What emerged was a field of thought in the social sciences known as structuralism, which saw the state as being little more than a playing field for different social forces competing for political power.  Structuralism places an emphasis on studying different social classes by analyzing how relations between businesses, labor unions, interest groups, and other groups within society affect the state.  This made sense for people who studied democratic, capitalist regimes in the United States and Great Britain.   Competitive elections allow different political parties and interest groups the ability to influence government decisions.  Furthermore, the Behaviorist Revolution of the 1950’s and 1960’s left little room for individual free will and autonomy.  Individual behavior was seen as being shaped by society and thus predictable. 

However, with the decline of tensions between the East and the West by the 1980’s; the independence of many new states throughout the developing world; and the growth of developmental states in East Asia, there emerged a renewed interest in analyzing the role of the state in shaping society within the academic community.  In particular, there was a revived interest in institutionalism, a field of thought in political science that analyzes how state institutions can shape society.  In fact, many structuralists incorporated institutionalism into their way of thinking.  In 1984, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly and several other political scientists each wrote chapters for the book Bringing the State Back In.[2]  Their essays showed how states can play the role of an autonomous actor that can shape the lives of their citizens.  The role of individual political leaders and state institutions in shaping society was once again taken seriously. 

 One of the controversial debates mentioned in these essays and in other works was over whether or not states and political leaders can play a role in economic development.  For those coming from the Anglo Saxon tradition that upheld the economic philosophies of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman, the idea that states from above can create economic growth was illogical.[3]  According to their theories, the government should only concern itself with protecting private property and maintain the infrastructure.  It was up to private entrepreneurs who were mostly free of government restrictions to create growth; states should stay out of the business of economic planning and industrialization as high taxes and excessive regulations could hinder growth.  Government intervention in the economy would only lead to inefficiency since the sellers and buyers are in the best positions to determine what should be produced and for how much it should be sold.

However, the extensive role the state played in countries like Japan and Korea to create economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century defied the expectations of many Western political scientists.  Meredith Woo Cummings, Chalmers Johnson, and Bruce Cummings, in their book The Developmental State, showed how several governments in East Asia used a mix of selective tariffs and loans to protect the growth of local industry.[4]   The state chose to support productive companies while allowing others to fail without prejudice.  Furthermore, instead of investing resources in a welfare state, government leaders in Japan and South Korea decided to invest in long term economic development, investing tax revenue into education and health care.  In other words, the bureaucracy was an autonomous actor that fostered economic development.  Whereas central planning boards in the communist bloc failed, those in East Asia like the MITI in Japan succeeded at creating long term growth.  

In another example of relatively successful state intervention and individual initiative, Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, in an essay entitled “State Structures and the Possibilities for Keynesian Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States,” showed how state spending on infrastructure and social welfare as well as economic regulations can lead to structural economic changes that can lead a country out of a depression.  Many political scientists and economists have argued that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal played a large role in the country’s recovery from the Great Depression.  Unlike the theory of Monetarism developed by Milton Friedman, Keynesian economics reserves a large role for political leaders to solve long term structural problems affecting an economy through the building of infrastructure and economic regulation.

States and their political leaders can also play a role in creating economic stagnation through the way they construct institutions.  As David Waldner in State Building and Late Development shows, political leaders in newly independent states in the aftermath of World War II played a great role in fostering either economic growth or stagnation depending on the decisions they made.[5]  In newly independent countries with severe conflicts among the elites, political leaders often made the choice to build regime coalitions by distributing the resources of the state to potential allies.  Rational choice theorists would say that political leaders facing serious challenges to their rule will focus on short term survival over long term economic development.  In states like Syria and Egypt, land was redistributed from the rich to the poor; wages were increased for industrial workers; bread subsidies for the poor were created; free education was provided for the masses; the bureaucracy was expanded and filled with loyal clients; many new technologies were purposely kept out of the country to protect jobs; businesses were nationalized; and tariffs were implemented to protect inefficient local industries.[6]  Unlike developmental states in East Asia, extensive resources were wasted in Egypt and Syria by leaders who were more concerned with building support for the regime and destroying potential enemies than creating long term economic development.  Bureaucracies became bloated and inefficient; taxes were not collected efficiently; and little money was left over for quality investments in education, healthcare, and the infrastructure.   Furthermore, unproductive businesses were kept afloat for political reasons as their owners or managers were allies of the political elite.  Reforms in authoritarian systems with these structural problems became difficult as the elimination of bread subsidies or privatization of businesses might lead to riots or the loss of important political allies.  Political elites played a large role in creating the conditions for economic stagnation due to the nature in which they built the institutions of the country.   On the other hand, political leaders in countries with relatively united elite that focused on long term development like Park Chung Hee in South Korea created merit based bureaucracies that can build and maintain infrastructure; collect taxes efficiently; educate the public; and maintain the rule of law.  The result has been economic growth. 

Political leaders can also play a role in shaping political conflict like revolutions.   Throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century, revolutions were seen as processes that started from below and not the other way around.  Revolutions were supposedly the product of disenfranchised lower classes rising up against unpopular regimes.  This view point was predominant among structuralists in the 1970’s.  However, the second half of the twentieth century has witnessed a plethora of revolutions of all shapes and sizes across the developing world.   Political Scientists like Jeff Goodwin, Timur Kuron, and Jack Goldstone argue that revolutions are incredibly diverse in their origins and unpredictable.[7]  Sometimes, elites play a large role in how they play out.  For example, divides among the elites that emerge due to changing international or domestic factors can play a role in fostering revolutions.   In certain cases, factions within the elite can lead revolutions from above as was the case with Mustafa Kamal in Turkey during the 1920’s or Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Young Officers in 1952.  In other cases, elites can make the strategic decision to defect when a revolution is already in process and join the opposition.  This was the case in Tunisia’s 2011 revolution when the military leaders made the decision to not fire on crowds of protestors, forcing President Zine al Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country.   Furthermore, elites can unwittingly cause a revolution through specific political choices like Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision to bring about gradual economic and political reforms through Perestroika and Glasnost in the middle of the 1980’s.  Gorbachev’s policies created structural changes in Russian society that played a major role in the revolutions that hit Eastern Europe from 1989 to 1991. 

The decisions of political leaders can also have repercussions for civil society and linkage institutions like political parties, interest groups and electoral systems.  President Boris Yeltsin’s decision during the writing of Russia’s 1993 constitution to allow many of the lower houses’ representatives to be decided by a proportional electoral system inadvertently led to the strengthening of political parities as this electoral system requires candidates to be a member of a political party, thus barring many independent candidates from taking office.  The result was the creation of a multi-party system.  In the case of the United States, the 1791 constitution created a first past the post electoral system for the House of Representatives, which has led to the formation of a two party system.  These electoral systems require candidates to obtain near a majority of the votes in their district, which means that they require a substantial percentage of voters.  Small third parties don’t fare well in these systems, so the tendency is for parties on the left and right to consolidate.  Different laws and regulations can affect the political behavior of the masses, often in unforeseen ways.

Although it is true that individual leaders and the state have a great affect on society, I do not want to promote the idea that the direction of influence is only top down.  Developments within society at large often influence the decisions of political leaders and lead to changes within institutions.  Social constructivists would argue that the individual leaders are products of the culture in which they were brought up in, so the decisions that they make aren’t autonomous from the rest of society.  For example, an individual politician in the United States might know that the rational thing to do is reform the Electoral College, which is the electoral system for electing the president.  However, Americans are so culturally attached to the provisions in the constitution that passing new amendments is nearly impossible unless something drastic happens.  Some politicians share this cultural affinity for the constitution; others don’t, but they are forced to pretend that they do to avoid political repercussions.  Although an individual politician’s decision might seem autonomous, he grew up within a particular culture and was influenced by the structures and institutions within the country.  This is true whether or not we are talking about Mikhail Gorbachev, Mostafa Kamal, Abdel Nasser, Thomas Jefferson, or Park Chung Hee.  Of course, we can also argue that these men altered the cultures that had shaped them, which in turn influenced future political leaders.  Therefore, political leaders and society influence each other.  It is important to recognize that political change comes from above and below simultaneously. 

Work Cited Page

1. Bellin, Eva.  "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," Comparative Politics, January, 2012: 127-49.

2. Evans, Peter, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds.  Bringing the State Back In.  Press Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1985.

3. Evans, Peter. “The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy and Adjustment,” in The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints,

Distributive Politics, and the State, ed. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.  

4. Goldstone, Jack A., 2001. “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 4, 139-187.

5. Goodwin, Jeff. "Towards a New Sociology of Revolutions," Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 6 (Dec. 1994): 731-66.

6. Kuran, Timur.  "Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," World Politics, Vol. 44, No.1, Oct. 1991: 7-48.

7. Kuran, Timur.  "Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution," Public Choice, Vol 61. No. 1 (Apr. 1989): pg 41-74.

8. Owen, Roger.  State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. Routledge: London, 2004.

9. Gregory, Paul, and Robert Stuart.  Comparing Economic Systems In the Twenty First Century.  Houghton Mifflin Company: New York, 2000.

10. Waldner, David.  State Building and Late Development.  Cornell University Press: New York, 1999.

11. Weber, Max.  The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.  Oxford University Press: New York, 1947.

12. Woo-Cumings, Meredith.  The Developmental State.  Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1999.

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[1] Gregory, Paul, and Robert Stuart.  Comparing Economic System in the Twenty First Century.  Houghton Mifflin Company: New York, 2000.

[2] Evans, Peter. “The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy and Adjustment,” in The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Politics, and the State, ed. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.    

[3] Gregory, Ibid.

[4] Woo-Cumings, Meredith.  The Developmental State.  Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1999.

[5] Waldner, David.  State Building and Late Development.  Cornell University Press: New York, 1999.

[6] Owen, Roger.  State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. Routledge: London, 2004.

[7] Goldstone, Jack A., 2001. “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 4, 139-187, Goodwin, Jeff. "Towards a New Sociology of Revolutions," Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 6 (Dec. 1994): 731-66, Kuran, Timur.  "Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," World Politics, Vol. 44, No.1, Oct. 1991: 7-48, and Kuran, Timur.  "Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution," Public Choice, Vol 61. No. 1 (Apr. 1989): pg 41-74.