Introduction
According to the political scientist Walt Whitman Rostow, the
scientific, industrial, and democratic revolutions in Western Europe paved the
way for the rise of modernity, transforming the lives of billions of human
beings across the globe over the last two centuries.[1]
There is strong evidence to support this
conclusion: life expectancy, literacy rates, and GDP per capita have grown at
an unprecedented rate. These general improvements
in the human condition fall under a general umbrella called development. Egypt is no exception to this trend. Its population has grown from approximately 4
million to 90 million since Napoleon’s invasion in 1798; literacy rates rose
from less than five percent of the population to over seventy percent; and GDP
per capita has risen from less than five hundred dollars to over three
thousand.[2] The importing of Western technology as well
as institutional structures associated with the state are major reasons for
these developments. Almost every other
human community on the globe was affected by this process as well.
However, as Samuel Huntington pointed out in Political Order and Changing Societies, development
is neither an even process nor is it inevitable.[3] Rostow’s simplistic and teleological
conception of development is contradicted by modernity’s convoluted history. The socio-economic changes created by the
rise of the modern world have also caused a great deal of conflict and sporadic
periods of economic stagnation that Huntington referred to as plateaus. Despite the positive statistical trends noted
above, Egypt has suffered from various periods of decline over the last two
centuries, and the country has fallen further behind not only the West but many
of its regional neighbors on many measures of development. The 2011 revolution was Egypt’s fourth in the
last 150 years, and each one failed to lead to the consolidation of democracy
or levels of economic development associated with Western countries.
There are a plethora of theories that could help explain Egypt’s
uneven relationship with modernity, including Marxism, post-colonialism,
dependency theory, rentierism, historical institutionalism, neo-liberalism, and
precocious Keynesianism to name a few.
The problem with adhering to any one of these theories and ignoring the
others is that none of them can explain the full complexity of Egypt’s uneven
economic and political development. It
is instead more beneficial to analyze the country’s convoluted history, which
shows that each of these theories only apply during specific periods of time
and that many crucial aspects of Egypt’s development cannot be easily
categorized under any particular theory at all.[4]
Mohamed Ali and Egypt’s Early Struggles
with Development: 1805-1848
When Mohamed Ali, an Ottoman Officer
of Albanian descent, solidified his control of the Nile River valley at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, he began a program of modernization with
the intent of thwarting the political ambitions of European powers and
solidifying his control over the country.[5] Although Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798
ended in disaster for the French, it was a wakeup call to the leaders of the
Ottoman Empire, who had previously failed to respond adequately to the
emergence of modernity in Western Europe.
Mohamed Ali’s reform program focused
on the following three areas: agriculture, industry, and the military. In order to avoid losing his newly won prize
to rapacious European powers and make these reforms, he needed access to
capital, new technology, and Western expertise, and he had to convince Egypt’s
landed elite, the Mamluk aristocracy, to sacrifice resources for the sake of
long term development. Over the
following two decades, Mohamed Ali was able to successfully transform the
country’s agriculture by importing new technology and European engineers,
tripling Egypt’s agricultural production in the process. The city of Alexandria, which had previously
declined into a fishing village following the Arab invasion of the country in
the seventh century, was revived as Mohamed Ali had a modern port constructed
on the Mediterranean Sea. Cash crops
such as cotton and sugar were grown and exported to Western Europe, raising
capital for industrial and military projects.
As a result, Egypt’s first factories, which mass produced textiles and
weapons, were established in Bulaq, Cairo’s port on the Nile River. In addition, many Egyptians were sent abroad
to European universities, and Western teachers and military officers were
imported to train bureaucrats and soldiers.
By the end of the 1820’s, Mohamed Ali was able to conscript tens of
thousands of Egyptian villagers into a national army and challenge the Ottoman
Empire for supremacy over the Middle East.
However, from the very beginning,
Mohamed Ali’s reform efforts faced a diversity of internal and external
problems. For one, most of the Mamluk
aristocracy, the class of slave soldiers that owned most of Egypt’s land, were
reluctant to sacrifice their wealth and power to engage in long term
reforms. Frustrated by his attempt to
centralize control and reign in his conservative political opponents, Mohamed
Ali had most of the landed elite hunted down and executed in 1811 in what was a
very bloody battle for control of the country’s future. Furthermore, to engage in his industrial and
military reforms, he conscripted, by force, tens of thousands of villagers to
work on irrigation projects and in factories.
While his agricultural reforms were very successful, leading to the
beginning of the country’s population explosion, his industrial reforms
suffered due to the shortage of capital and experienced workers. Egypt’s fledgling industrial sector was
highly dependent on tariffs to prevent cheaper Western goods from flooding the
country’s markets. Lastly, although
Mohamed Ali was initially successful in defeating the Ottoman Empire’s military
on the battlefield and taking territory in the Arabian Peninsula and Greater
Syria, his rapid advances drew the ire of Great Britain, who feared that the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire could create a political vacuum that would be
filled by the Russians or the French. To
prevent the collapse of the empire, the British stepped in to assist them
military. By 1838, Great Britain forced
Mohamed Ali to demilitarize and open up his economy to free trade with the West,
thus ending his dream of turning Egypt into a regional powerhouse. His successor Abbas Helmy led a conservative
backlash against the Westernization of the Egyptian economy and society,
reversing many of Mohamed Ali’s educational and industrial reforms during the
early 1850’s.
Cotton Dependency and the Debt Crisis,
1848-1881
Without the option of developing the
country’s industry or military, Mohamed Ali’s successors were forced to use other
means to raise capital and engage in developmental reforms.[6] His first three successors—Abbas Helmy,
Mohamed Said, and Ismail Pasha—depended on the export of cotton to raise
revenue. At first, dependency on the
cash crop proved fortuitous. During the
1850’s and 1860’s, Egypt was able to dominate the international cotton market
as exports from the American South dropped due to the country’s civil war. Furthermore, Great Britain was in the middle
of an economic boom, so demand for the cash crop in English textile factories was
high. Abbas Helmy used the revenue
generated by the cash crop to build the country’s first rail ways, which
connected Cairo with the Mediterranean and Red Seas, enabling the faster
transport of natural resources to the coasts.
The increase in revenue encouraged his two successors to borrow money
from Europe to pay for other developmental reforms. Mohamed Said and his successor Ismail Pasha,
with the help of European investments and bank loans, constructed the Suez
Canal, a waterway that connected the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea. To honor the inauguration of the project,
Ismail Pasha borrowed extraordinary sums of money to build a Parisian style
downtown for Cairo, which included posh cafes, restaurants, parks, palaces, and
even an opera house.[7] It was a new façade for a city whose medieval
neighborhoods were beginning to crumble.
Ismail, who received his education in Paris, sought to turn Egypt into a
European country by importing Western art, architecture, music, clothing, and
customs. By the 1870’s, both Cairo and
Alexandria became cosmopolitan cities where various peoples from all over
Europe mixed with Egyptians, creating a hybrid culture.
However, dependency on a single crop
has a very obvious drawback: if the price of the good suddenly declines, so
does the entire economy. The American
civil war ended in 1865, which led to Southern cotton reentering the
international market. Furthermore, a depression
began in Europe in 1873, leading to a significant decline in demand for
textiles and thus the price of the cash crop.
Facing a shortage of capital, the Egyptian government was forced to
borrow even more money, which made the government ever more dependent on Western
banks. The debt crisis came to a head in
the late 1870’s, when Ismail Pasha was pressured to replace his cabinet with
Western advisors, who decided to cut the salaries of Egyptian bureaucrats to
pay back Egypt’s debt. The country’s burgeoning
middle class of white collar civil servants, engineers, doctors, lawyers,
teachers, and military officers—who came into being during Mohamed Ali’s
reign—objected to the European influence on the government and the pay
cuts. In 1879, massive protests by this
new middle class forced Ismail to concede to their demands, disbanding the
European cabinet and re-raising salaries.
In turn, this led the Europeans to replace Ismail by force with his son
Mohamed Tawfiq, who became a puppet of the British. What started as peaceful protests quickly
turned into revolutionary activity when an Egyptian officer named Ahmed ‘Urabi
led a revolt against the British backed government, briefly taking over the
entire country. ‘Urabi was in the
process of creating a parliamentary political system when the British invaded
in 1882 to protect their interests in the Suez Canal, the private property of
British citizens, and the money owed to European banks.
British Colonialism: 1882-1952
Like most of the third world, Egypt became a
victim of Western imperialism. European
powers, in their pursuit of natural resources, power, and the spread of their
culture, dominated the world politically and economically throughout the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. This
is not say that colonialism did not bring its fair share of benefits. Under direct British rule from 1882 to 1923,
Egypt’s population growth rates increased significantly thanks to further
improvements in agriculture and the importing of Western medicine. Advances were made to the communication and
transportation infrastructure in part due to the positive influence of the
British civil service, which was known for its high levels of professionalism
and low levels of corruption. However,
the British invested very little in education or industrial development. Egypt’s literacy remained at approximately
ten percent throughout this time period and the economy stayed dependent on
cash crops. Colonial powers were
largely concerned with securing their territorial possessions and turning their
colonies into primary resource exporters.
The end result was that Egypt’s population grew and urban areas began to
swell as villages could no longer absorb the surplus agricultural labor. Without an adequate industrial sector, the
country’s cities struggled to manage the influx of people from the country
side, creating enormous problems with urban development and a growing wealth
gap between rich and poor. In the
process, foreigners flaunted their wealth in European style social clubs and in
newly Westernized areas of Cairo such as Ma’adi, Heliopolis, and Zamalek.
These demographic problems and the humiliation
of colonialism created the foundations for Egypt’s nationalist movement, which was
led by members of the upper-middle class.
A new generation of journalists, lawyers, civil servants, mid-level army
officers, and academics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
sought to bridge the gap between traditional aspects of Egyptian culture and
modernity with the intent of pushing the country towards independence. One of these intellectuals was a lawyer named
Sa’ad Zaghlool, who founded one of Egypt’s first political parties. It was a political movement based on liberal,
democratic principles that began as a peaceful attempt to lead the nation
towards independence. However, the
British declaration of emergency laws during World War I and their refusal to
allow the Egyptians to send a delegation to the Versailles conference at the
end of the conflict turned Zaghlool’s party into a revolutionary movement. Renamed the Waqf, which means delegation in
Arabic, this movement helped lead Egypt’s 1919 revolution. The British responded to the protests with divide
and conquer tactics, making concessions to the revolutionaries by giving the
country formal independence but still maintaining control over foreign policy
and the Suez Canal. In 1923, Egypt’s
first truly democratic constitution was drafted, creating a constitutional
monarchy with a parliamentary system of government.
However, continued British influence over the country over
the next two decades and the poor performance of the new government delegitimized
the democratization process, pushing many Egyptians away from liberalism. The Wafd party gradually lost its popularity
as it struggled to govern due to the obstruction of the British, the monarchy,
and corrupt officials within their own party.
Attempts to redirect capital towards long term development, education,
and industrialization were consistently thwarted. When the Great Depression hit in 1929, the end
result was a political crisis, and many Egyptians began turning towards
anti-democratic ideologies. One of these
movements was Hasan al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that rejected
the Westernization of the country and saw Islam as the answer to Egypt’s
political, social, and economic problems. Through their charity networks that provided
support for the unemployed and the poor, they were able to gain a substantial
amount of supporters. Others turned towards fascist movements such
as the Young Egyptians, who drew much of their inspiration from Hitler’s Nazi
Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. On the other hand, many saw inspiration in communism
and the Stalinist model. Out of all of
the anti-democratic fronts, the one that eventually became the most popular by
the middle of the twentieth century was Arab-Nationalism, an ideology that saw
socialism and Arab political unity as the answer to ending Western dominance
and fostering economic development in the Middle East.
These anti-democratic movements and the economic depression
of the 1930’s led to a long period of political instability and violence. Throughout the 1930’s and 1940’s, Egypt’s
political system wavered back and forth between periods of martial law imposed
by the king and his British backers, and ineffective coalition governments in
parliament. The final straw was the
humiliating defeat suffered by the Egyptian military against Israel in the
1947-48 war, which created a groundswell of opposition against the British, the
king, and the Wafd party. In the summer
of 1952, this tension exploded into another revolution, which was used as an
excuse by a group of mid-level officers in the Egyptian military to stage a
coup d’état, putting an end to Egypt’s first democratic experiment and ending
the monarchy in the process. The
British, weakened significantly by World War II and facing a plethora of
independence movements in their colonial possessions, were no longer able to
maintain control of their empire.
Abdel
Nasser and Arab Nationalism: 1952-1970
Although Egyptian’s ruling military
junta initially consisted of a diversity of personalities with different
visions for the country’s future, it was the Arab nationalist vision of the
charismatic Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser that would win out in the political and
ideological struggle over control of the state.[8] By 1954, most of Nasser’s opposition,
including leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, were in prison. His decision to nationalize the Suez Canal two
years later and the subsequent failure of the British, French, and Israelis to
retake control of the Canal Zone due to the intervention of the Soviet Union
and the United States increased his popularity throughout the country, enabling
the Nasser regime to engage in a series of Arab Nationalist reforms.
Many of these reforms were inspired by the policies of
socialist governments in Eastern Europe.
In several phases, land was taken from wealthy Egyptians and
redistributed to small landowners throughout the 1950’s. Furthermore, the businesses and property of
most foreigners were nationalized, and the capital gained from these seizures
were invested into state owned factories producing cement, bricks, textiles, heavy
machinery, and packaged food stuffs with the intent of making the country
self-sufficient economically. The size
of the Egyptian bureaucracy was also greatly expanded to improve the infrastructure,
centralize control the national economy, expand public education, and create a
welfare state. In the process, the
Soviet Union helped the Egyptian government construct the Aswan Dam in the far
south, which today produces approximately fifteen percent of the country’s
electricity. Also, new neighborhoods
inspired by communist architecture were built in Cairo and Giza such as
Muqqatam, Mohandiseen, and Doqi to deal with the country’s rapid population
growth. Lastly, Nasser attempted to
create political unions between Syria and Yemen to foster Arab nationalism
throughout the entire Middle East in opposition to the Israeli state and
Western influence.
However, Abdel Nasser’s reforms
created numerous political, social, and economic problems that had negative
repercussions for the Egyptian state over the following half century. For one, his policies of confiscating the lands
and businesses of the upper class, foreigners, and Jewish Egyptians created a
brain drain, driving some of the most educated and talented bureaucrats and intellectuals
out of the country. The military
regime’s extensive use of coercion to stifle opposition also contributed to
this decline in cultural diversity and political pluralism. To make matters worse, the new state industries
that were created suffered from severe inefficiency as a result of
overemployment, a lack of accountability, cronyism, and no market
competition. Nasser did solve the
country’s problems with overdependence on cash crops by diversifying the economy,
but the country’s industrial sector was inefficient and struggled to export
goods. Furthermore, land distribution
created a new class of a small and medium sized land owners that lacked sufficient
capital to invest in modern agricultural technology. As Egypt’s population exploded in the 1950’s
and 1960’s, the agricultural sector struggled to keep up. Consequently, the country now imports
approximately half of its food stuffs. On
top of this, continued population growth and disappointing levels of economic development
strained Egypt’s welfare state. This
created a phenomenon that the political scientist Peter Evans called precocious
Keynesianism, which is when a welfare state is created before a country has an
adequate industrial sector to pay for it.[9] Since the state promised universal
employment, Nasser’s government politicized the employment of state officials,
artificially creating new jobs with low wages.
As a result, Egypt’s bloated bureaucracies today suffer from high levels
of corruption and inefficiency. The
state struggles to enforce laws; educate its citizens; and allocate capital
towards long term development. Furthermore,
the government now spends over twenty percent of its budget on bread and fuel
subsidies. Lastly, the centralization of
the economy and the political system around Cairo has led to the neglect of
other areas of the country and the swelling of the capital’s population.
To make matters worse, Nasser’s
foreign policy initiatives also failed to materialize. His attempted unions with Syria (1958-61) and
Yemen (1962-76) ended in complete disasters.
Egypt’s occupation of Yemen for five years, which was resisted militarily
by northern forces with ties to Saudi Arabia, has been referred to by several
historians as Nasser’s Vietnam. The
state’s struggle against Israel also ended in humiliation with the defeat of
the Egyptian state in the Six Day War of 1967, which led to Israel’s occupation
of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai
Peninsula. Several years of warfare in
the 1960’s forced the government to borrow substantial amounts of loans from
foreign banks, and the Egyptian government halted several development projects,
including the building of desperately needed urban infrastructure. Following the Six Day War, protests broke
out in Egypt for the first time since 1952, and Nasser spent the last three
years of his life struggling to deal with the country’s enormous political,
social, and economic problems.
The Neoliberal Era: 1970-2011
When Nasser’s presidential successor
Anwar Sadat came to power in 1970, he sought to reverse the country’s domestic
and foreign policy by realigning the country with the United States and
liberalizing the economy in what he dubbed the corrective revolution.[10] The failures of the Nasser regime combined
with the gradual decline of the Soviet Union pushed Sadat towards
neo-liberalism throughout the 1970’s.
However, due to his lack of social capital and Israel’s occupation of
the Sinai, Sadat would not have been able to engineer this political shift
legitimately without a strategic victory that he could promote to the
public. The opportunity was provided for
him in 1973 during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. Having rebuilt the military over the previous
three years with the help of Russian weapons, Sadat chose the Jewish holy day to
attack Israeli forces in the Sinai as many Israeli soldiers were on a short
leave. Although the Egyptian military
only gained a modest amount of territory over the course of a week before the
Israeli state struck back with the help of American military aid, the
intervention of the Soviet Union and the significant death toll among the
Israeli soldiers forced both sides to sue for peace and begin a long period of
negotiations that ended with the Camp David Accords in 1979 and the return of
the Sinai. The Egyptian government,
rightfully or wrongfully, portrayed it as a great victory for their military in
the state media outlets, and Sadat used his brief rise in popularity to engage
in the corrective revolution.
The neo-liberal reforms, as promoted
by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other Western
international institutions, were pursued by Sadat and his successor Hosni
Mubarak (1981-2011) over the next three decades with mixed results. The philosophy behind these reforms was to
cut the size of the country’s bureaucracies and the welfare state to free up
capital for long term development.
Furthermore, privatization of the economy would encourage competition
and maximize the efficiency of production.
Lastly, opening up the political system to free elections and more
tolerance for oppositional groups would increase political transparency and
accountability. During the 1970’s, Sadat
released many political prisoners from jail; particularly Islamists, who served
as a counterweight to decrease the power of the left wing, leading to the
growing religious conservativism of the Egyptian population.
However, the Egyptian state only partially engaged in the
neo-liberal reforms. Attempts to cut the
welfare state and subsidies, fire bureaucrats, or downsize public companies
were often met with bread riots, strikes, and protests, which the regime
usually responded to with a mix of coercion and back peddling. Although some parts of the economy were
privatized, what rose in its place was a new class of crony capitalists, many
of whom made their fortune off the oil boom in the Gulf and whose businesses
survived because of their connections with the government. Furthermore, although both Sadat and Mubarak
held elections for the parliament, the results were always preordained as the
ruling National Democratic Party won through a mix of media manipulation,
electoral fraud, vote-buying, and intimidation of oppositional groups. Some Islamist and liberal opposition groups
participated in the fake elections in the hopes of gradually pushing the regime
towards reforms; however, others chose protest and insurrection. The Egyptian state fought a five year war
with radical Islamist terror cells from 1992 to 1997, and they suppressed a
serious of increasingly volatile protests by liberal groups such as Kifayya and
the Sixth of April movement throughout the 2000’s.
Part of the reason why the Egyptian
state was able to delay the implementation of neo-liberal reforms was due to
the state’s access to substantial amount of rents, which has been a peculiar
aspect of Middle East politics in the last few decades.[11] The oil boom of the 1970’s not only provided
the state with extensive amounts of capital from the export of oil, which today
consists of ten percent of the country’s GDP, they were also able to encourage
individuals to migrate to the Gulf and the West for work. Egyptian emigrants now send over sixteen
billion dollars a year in remittances back to their home country, and many of their
family members have been able to use this money to purchase property and
consumer goods as well as gain access to satellite television, mobile phones,
and eventually the internet by the 2000’s.
Furthermore, due to Egypt’s control of the Suez Canal and their shared
border with Israel, both Western countries and the Gulf have provided the state
with an extensive amount of foreign aid and foreign direct investment. Egypt is the second largest recipient of
American aid, which averaged approximately two billion dollars a year from 1981
to 2011. The country has also received
favorable treatment from the IMF and international banks, at one point having
half its debt forgiven in the early nineties in exchange for supporting America
in the Gulf War. International aid
agencies have also helped Egypt deal with many of its urban development
programs, including building a metro line and modern sewage system in Cairo in
the 1980’s. Moreover, the emergence of
international air travel and Egypt’s reconciliation with the West led to a
dramatic increase in tourism to the country as visitors flocked to see the
country’s ancient monuments and Red Sea beach resorts. Tourism now accounts for ten percent of GDP
and employs thirty percent of the work force in the formal economy.
Although access to rents modestly improved the standard of
living of the average Egyptian and kept the government from going bankrupt, it
also discouraged the government from making long term reforms to improve the
educational system, promote a competitive industrial sector, and open up the
political system to competitive elections.
The government was able to use rents to secure their own power while
buying off part of the opposition. This reliance
on rents was also problematic since Egypt’s population continued to grow over
the last few decades while rents from oil shrunk due to dwindling
reserves. While oil made up thirty
percent of Egypt’s GDP in 1980, by 2008 it only made up ten percent. In 2004,
the Egyptian government, under the influence of Hosni Mubarak’s son Gamal,
began making more serious neo-liberal reforms, which gradually increased
opposition towards the regime due to the cutting of state services, growing
unemployment, and the increase in the price of goods due to inflation. Furthermore, greater access to satellite
television and the internet increased the expectations for a better life among
the average Egyptian, and the government’s bloated and poorly guided
bureaucracies were unable to respond adequately to growing calls for
reform. Increasing tensions between the
government and the opposition culminated in the 2011 revolution.[12]
Conclusion
This analysis of Egypt’s history
shows that each theory on development only tells part of the story. The state’s modern history is a complicated
mix of periods of growth and decline, and the country has been influenced by a plethora
of political, social, economic, and environmental factors along the way. Many
events that would have been considered trivial or minor paved the way
unexpectedly for massive political, economic, and social changes later in
history. While Egypt’s trajectory of
development shares a lot in common with many other developing countries, its
differences are equally striking. Furthermore, this history also shows that development is not inevitable. The collapse of Egypt's democratic experiment following the 2011 revolution, the return of the military to power, and the country's endemic problems with poor economic growth rates and weak state institutions indicate that nation is currently stuck in a developmental plateau and may not escape from it in the near future.
Work Cited Page
1. Almond, Gabriel
and James Coleman. The Politics of Developing Areas.
Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1960.
2. Apter,
David. The Politics of Modernization.
The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1965.
3. Burns, E.
Bradford. "The Modernization of
Underdevelopment: El Salvador, 1858-1931,” The
Journal of Developing Areas, 18(2), 1984: 293-316.
4. Cook,
Steven. The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square.
Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012.
5. Frank, Andre
Gunder. "The Development of
Underdevelopment,” Monthly Review Press,
18(4), 1966: 99-108.
6. Huntington,
Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press: New Haven, 1968.
7. Korany, Bahgat,
ed. Arab Human Development in the Twenty-First Century: The Primacy of
Empowerment. The American University in Cairo Press: Egypt, 2014.
8. Mansfield,
Peter. A History of the Middle East, 4th edition.
Penguin Books: New York, 2013.
9. Raymond,
Andre. Cairo: City of History. The
American University in Cairo Press: Cairo, 2000.
10. Ross, Michael.
"Does oil hinder democracy?" World Politics, 53(3), 2001:
325-361.
11. Rostow, W.
W. The Stages of Economic Growth: A
Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 1967.
12. Tschirgi, Dan,
ed. Development
in the Age of Liberalization: Egypt and Mexico. The American University in Cairo Press: Egypt,
1996.
13. Waldner,
David. State Building and Late Development. Cornell
University Press: New York, 1999.
14. Waterbury,
John. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two
Regimes. Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1983.
15. Wilber, Charles
and Kenneth P. Jameson. Political
Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, Sixth Edition. McGraw-Hill Publications: New York, 1996.
16. Woo-Cumings,
Meredith, ed. The Developmental State. Cornell University
Press: Ithaca, 1999.
[1]
Rostow, W. W. The Stages of Economic
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1967.
[2]
For information on statistics for Egypt in the last decade, see the United
Nation’s Developmental Report at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/egypt-human-development-report-0. For information on statistics on Egypt at the
end of the eighteenth century, see Raymond, Andre. Cairo:
City of History. The American
University in Cairo Press: Cairo, 2000.
[3]
Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press: New Haven, 1968.
[4]
For information on convoluted history, see Wilber, Charles and Kenneth P.
Jameson. Political Economy of
Development and Underdevelopment, Sixth Edition. McGraw-Hill Publications: New York, 1996.
[5]
Mansfield, Peter. A History of the Middle East, 4th edition.
Penguin Books: New York, 2013. For
information on Egyptian history in the nineteenth and twentieth century, see
Peter Mansfield.
[6]
For information on dependency theory, see Almond, Gabriel and James
Coleman. The Politics of Developing Areas.
Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1960; and Burns, E.
Bradford. "The Modernization of
Underdevelopment: El Salvador, 1858-1931,” The
Journal of Developing Areas, 18(2), 1984: 293-316.
[7]
For information on Greater Cairo’s history, see Raymond, Andre. Cairo:
City of History. The American
University in Cairo Press: Cairo, 2000.
[8]
For information on problems with Egypt’s political development since the 1952
revolution, see Cook, Steven. The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to
Tahrir Square. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012.
[9]
Waldner, David. State Building and Late Development. Cornell
University Press: New York, 1999.
[10]
For information on problems with Egypt’s development during the neo-liberal
age, see Tschirgi, Dan, ed. Development in the Age of Liberalization:
Egypt and Mexico. The American
University in Cairo Press: Egypt, 1996.
[11]
For information on rentierism and rentier theory, see Ross, Michael. "Does
oil hinder democracy?" World Politics, 53(3), 2001: 325-361.
[12]
For information on problems with development in the Middle East in the last
decade, see Korany, Bahgat, ed. Arab Human Development in the
Twenty-First Century: The Primacy of Empowerment. The American
University in Cairo Press: Egypt, 2014.
