Explaining Divergent
Political Outcomes in Post-Colonial Central America:
A Comparative Analysis of Democratization in El Salvador and Costa Rica
Introduction
Following
independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century, Latin American
countries struggled with democratization.
Today, only three states in the region have consolidated democracies:
Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Chile.[1] Furthermore, only Costa Rica reached this political
status prior to the beginning of the third wave of democratization in the
1970’s. The other states in the region
are either authoritarian or hybrid regimes.
Why did authoritarianism and praetorian politics become the dominant
trends in Latin America following independence, and why is Costa Rica an
exception to the rule? Furthermore, why did
Central American countries that were very similar to Costa Rica historically,
culturally, economically, and geographically not follow the same path of political
development? To answer this question, I
will compare and contrast the post-colonial histories of Costa Rica and El Salvador
to understand why one country followed a gradual path to democracy and the
other did not.
While
discussing the possible answers to these questions, it is important to avoid
oversimplifying the nature of Spanish colonial rule, the influence of the
Catholic Church, and the nature of the region’s political culture after
independence. Political scientists such
as Max Weber, Seymour Lipset, Samuel Huntington, and Francis Fukuyama made this
mistake by claiming that Latin America struggled with democratization due to
the conservative influence of the Catholic Church and the authoritarian,
corporatist nature of Spanish rule.[2] This cultural-determinist explanation, which
is laden with cultural bias and a lack of scholarly rigor, cannot explain the
great diversity of colonial political experiences throughout the Spanish empire
nor can it account for the divergence in post-colonial outcomes. Furthermore, this generalization wrongfully
portrays the Catholic Church and the Spanish monarchy as monolithic and static
institutions. The claim here is not to dismiss
the role of colonial history and religious institutions in the post-colonial
development of Latin American countries but to recognize that colonial
histories differed from one country to another depending on a plethora of different
variables. Both Costa Rica and El Salvador
were Spanish colonial possessions on the eve of independence, and the great
majority of their inhabitants were Catholic; however, the two countries diverged
in their political trajectories throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.
Furthermore,
we should also avoid oversimplifying this analysis by focusing only on the negative
ramifications of the economic and political influences of Western Europe and
the United States following independence.
Post-colonial and dependency theorists such as E. Bradford Burns and
Andre Gunder Frank have blamed problems with political and economic development
in Latin America mainly on cash crop dependency and Western economic
competition.[3] Although it is true that both Costa Rica and El
Salvador suffered from these problems, these variables had a more negative
effect on Salvadorian politics and did not prevent Costa Rica from
democratizing. Each country in Latin America has had a unique
relationship with Western Europe and the United States, so we should avoid
oversimplifying the international influence on the region.
To
explain Latin America’s struggles with democratization and the existence of
outliers, I will rely instead on a model of collective action developed by the
political scientist Charles Tilly, whose conception of collective action found a
balance between structural materialism and cultural determinism while leaving
some room for individual agency.[4] According to Tilly, democratic consensus
becomes more difficult when one group has extensively more power or the ability
to mobilize resources than others and possess a different ethnic identity than
those they rule over. However, the more economic equality and social
homogeneity that is found in a country, the more the conditions are conducive
for democratization. It is this
framework that can best explain the differences in political development
between Costa Rica and El Salvador.
Using Tilly’s model, there are three
independent variables that can potentially explain the different political
outcomes following independence in Costa Rica and El Salvador: the nature of ethnic
cleavages; the distribution of land; and foreign conflicts. To prove the connection between the
independent variables and the dependent variable, it is necessary to define and
operationalize each them.
The Dependent
Variable: Democratization
In
order to compare and contrast Costa Rica and El Salvador’s political
development, we first need to define and measure democratization. There are several methods for doing this. On the one hand, we can use Robert Dahl’s
minimalist definition of democracy, which views a democratic polity as an
oligopoly where elite factions compete peacefully for control of the state
through free and fair elections.[5] As long as citizens have full voting rights,
access to competitive media outlets, civil liberties, and relatively equal
treatment under the law, they can pressure elite factions to respond to their
interests through vertical accountability.
However, this minimalist view of democracy ignores socio-economic
factors that could strengthen the substance of the democratic polity such as
the degree of economic development and social inclusion.[6] Charles Tilly’s model of collective action
shows that higher levels of socio-economic development will enable more actors
to become involved in the political process; foster greater interaction between
members of the polity; and enable more opportunities for consensus between
competing factions within the state.[7] The minimalist definition also ignores the
issue of democratic consolidation, which Phillip Schmitter and Carsten
Schneider define as the degree to which the actors in the political system see democracy
as the only viable political system.[8] They use a twelve part definition of
democratic consolidation, which involves analyzing such factors as the
existence of consecutive free and fair elections; the historical longevity of
the democratic system; the population’s general satisfaction with the
performance of the government; the degree of violence between political
factions; and respect for the electoral results among the groups competing for
power. Consolidation is affected by the
degree to which democratic norms are embedded historically in the political
system and the culture. According to
Charles Tilly, political culture matters as it subconsciously influences how
different organizations choose different types of collective action during
moments of crisis.
No matter which definition we use,
Costa Rica scores better than El Salvador on almost every measure of political development
over the last two centuries. For the minimalist
definition of democracy, we can measure this variable using Freedom House’s
reports, which evaluates the level of democratization in a country on a scale
of one to seven, and uses a combination of seven different variables that closely
match Robert Dahl’s conception of democracy.
In 2015, both Costa Rica and Salvador scored as follows:
Freedom House Rankings[9]
|
Costa Rica
|
El Salvador
|
Overall
Score (one being the most democratic)
|
1/7
|
2.5/7
|
The
Electoral process (twelve is the highest score)
|
12/12
|
12/12
|
Political
Pluralism and Participation (sixteen is the highest score)
|
15/16
|
14/16
|
Functioning
of Government (twelve is the highest score)
|
10/12
|
9/12
|
Freedom
of Expression and Belief (twelve is the highest score)
|
16/16
|
15/16
|
Associational
and Organizational Rights
|
11/12
|
8/12
|
Rule of
Law (sixteen is the highest score)
|
13/16
|
8/16
|
Personal
Autonomy and Individual rights (sixteen is the highest score)
|
13/16
|
9/16
|
Measurements were similar throughout the late 1990’s
and 2000’s. As the 2015 results show, both
Costa Rica and El Salvador recently had democratic elections that involved a
plurality of different parties competing with each other for control of the
legislature and the presidency.
Furthermore, individuals within each system have basic freedom of
expression, including access to a free media and the internet. However, El Salvador struggles with the rule
of law. According to the reports, the
country has extensive problems with corruption, drug trafficking, judicial
autonomy, and gang violence, making Salvador one of the most violent countries
in the world. Salvador also experienced
a devastating civil war from 1979 to 1992, and the reconciliation process
between the country’s left wing party Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN) and the right wing land owning oligarchy, now represented by the
Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), has had mixed results as tensions
remain between both sides. The rights of
unions are still suppressed as are the rights of indigenous minorities despite
efforts at reform since the civil war.
The FMLN won peaceful elections in 2014, but it remains to be seen
whether they can solve the country’s enormous problems with the rule of law and
governance. On the other hand, Costa
Rica scores much better on these variables although like any other democracy reality
is far from the ideal. There are
problems with government corruption, gang violence, and bias against ethnic
minorities. However, Costa Rica has far
less problems with political violence and the rule of law than El
Salvador. The country does not even have
a national army, which was disbanded in 1949 following a very brief civil war. While we can label Costa Rica as a liberal
democracy, El Salvador is a hybrid regime.
However,
this measurement of democracy neglects the socio-economic variables that make a
democratic polity more substantive. To
measure these factors, we will use the World Bank’s and the United Nation’s
Human Development Report’s statistics on development as well as the Global
Competiveness Report’s rankings, which take into account factors such as
economic efficiency and the quality of education:
Measurements
of Socio-Economic Development
|
Costa
Rica
|
Salvador
|
World Bank: GNI per
capita (2015)[10]
|
$10,120
|
$3,900
|
World Bank: Life
Expectancy (2015)
|
80
|
72
|
World Bank: Ratio
below poverty line of two dollars a day (2013)
|
20.7%
|
29.6%
|
Global
Competiveness Report World Ranking (2014-15)[11]
|
51
|
84
|
World Bank: GINI
Index (2013)
|
49.2
|
43.5
|
World Bank: Economic
Growth Rate (2015)
|
4%/year
|
2%/year
|
Human Development
Index (2015)[12]
|
.763
|
.662
|
World Bank:
Internet Users per 100 people (2014)
|
49.4%
|
29.7%
|
The measurements indicate that Costa Rica has
approximately two and a half times the average income of El Salvador; greater
levels of human development in terms of life expectancy, education, and average
earnings; and greater access to consumer goods such as computers and the
internet. The only variable Costa Rica scores
worse on in comparison with El Salvador is the wealth gap between rich and
poor. Although Costa Rica historically scored
better on this statistic prior to the 1980’s, in the last thirty years the
wealth gap has risen drastically in both countries in part due to globalization. Both states historically have suffered from
overdependence on cash crops and have had difficulties with industrialization
in the face of Western competition, which is why Costa Rica’s GNI per capita is
much lower than the Western average.
However, Costa Rica has been able to diversity its economy in the last
half century through eco-tourism and the production of software technology
while El Salvador still remains highly dependent on its export-based agricultural
sector. Overall, Costa Rica has higher
levels of socio-economic development, enabling the masses a greater capacity to
engage in the political process. It is
probably not a coincidence that statistical indicators for socio-economic and
political development in Uruguay and Chile are similar to Costa Rica whereas
the statistical indicators in the other Central American republics are similar
to El Salvador.
The
last factor in democratization to consider is consolidation. Over the last two centuries, Costa Rica has
had a very gradual transition towards democracy with only a few brief
interludes of political violence, most of which ended in the strengthening of
the democratic system.[13] They have had two republics, the first of
which was established in 1871.[14] It was founded following the collapse of the
Central American government in the 1830’s and several decades of soft
authoritarian rule by a land owning oligarchy.
The first constitution limited participation to male adults who owned
land. During this time period, liberal
reforms, including the creation of a more centralized state and a national
infrastructure, took place in a relatively peaceful political environment. A national road system, railways, modern
ports, a public school system, and banks were created to take advantage of
greater global demand for cash crops that require more capital investment such
as coffee and bananas. Although
conservative land owners, or what Charles Tilly would call misers, resisted
these reforms, they avoided conflicts with liberals, agreeing to compromise on
gradual reforms. Of course, this system
did not give a voice to poor farmers who did not own their own land nor did
most of Costa Rica’s growing urban population have a say in the political
system. This changed with the country’s
second constitution, which was written in 1949 following a two month civil war
and the rise of populist left wing movement over the previous two decades. This constitution expanded participation to
the masses and gave voting rights to women.
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, the state expanded its welfare and educational
systems to accommodate demands from its growing urban population, which has
become more literate and politically activate.
They have had peaceful transitions of power through democratic elections
since this time period.
El Salvador has had a far more violent and
turbulent history. The country has had
fifteen different constitutions since achieving independence from Spain.[15] These constitutions were often proceeded by
coup d’états, domestic conflict, and wars with foreign countries. Most elections throughout El Salvador’s
history involved significant electoral fraud by authoritarian leaders, many of
whom came from the military. Although
the state eventually made liberal reforms by the late nineteenth century to
construct a modern infrastructure and export capital intensive cash crops such
as coffee in response to the changing conditions of the international economy,
they did so following a long period of extensive violence. Conservative land owners who opposed the
creation of a stronger state, church leaders who opposed a modern educational
system, and Mestizo peasants who tried to protect their traditional communal
landholdings responded often with violent resistance to reforms. Liberal proponents of a modern state won this
political conflict not through the ballot box but through physically
suppressing their opponents. Moreover, throughout
the twentieth century, the state has responded to left wing populist and
communist movements with suppression and violence. The Great Depression of the 1930’s and the
oil crisis of the 1970’s caused the outbreak of wars and the overthrowing of
governments as the elites found their power to coerce weaken. The country’s latest constitution was written
in 1983 in the midst of a civil war, and it remains to be seen whether El Salvador’s
political system will fully consolidate into a democracy or whether the
polarized political parties can cooperate to foster economic and political development.
Historically, the differences in
political development between Costa Rica and El Salvador have affected the
quality of governance, which in turn have affected attitudes towards democracy
in the population. Citizens in Costa Rica
have relatively higher preferences for democratic governance whereas preferences
for this political system in El Salvador are much lower.[16]
While
one has consolidated its democracy, the other has not. Why is it that Costa Rica underwent a gradual
process of democratization? To answer
this question, it will be necessary to define and operationalize each of the
independent variables and show how they are interconnected with each country’s
political development.
The First
Independent Variable: Ethnicity
To understand deviations in our first
independent variable ethnicity, it is necessary to discuss some important
aspects of Spanish colonialism in Latin America. When Spain conquered South and Central
America following Columbus’ “discovery”
of the New World in 1492, the Spanish elite of royal bureaucrats,
conquistadors, priests, and merchants encountered a diversity of indigenous
peoples. Some regions were sparsely populated with
hunter gatherers and semi-agriculturalists; other areas were densely populated
and ruled by empires with complex political systems such as the Aztecs in
Mexico and the Incas in Peru.[17] Aided by what the historian Jared Diamond referred
to as “Guns, Germs, and Steel,” the Spanish conquistadors were able to conquer
the coastal regions of the continent quickly, but the manner in which they
interacted with the native population differed depending on the region.[18] In areas densely settled by indigenous
peoples, diseases and warfare did not wipe out most of the population. As a result, many Spanish male colonists
intermarried with the natives, forming a new class of people called the Mestizo. This created a racial hierarchy where those
who had a pure Spanish ancestry, the Creoles, were usually on top; the Mestizos
were in the middle; and the indigenous population were on the bottom. In some instances where labor was scarce,
slaves from West Africa and the Caribbean were imported although the Spanish
outlawed slavery far earlier than other European governments. In regions only thinly populated by the indigenous,
the region was settled by European migrants, creating greater ethnic
homogeneity in certain areas of Latin America.
The
Spanish interest in Latin America extended beyond mining and cash crops; many
of the elite wanted to “civilize” the indigenous population by converting them
to Christianity and instilling in them European values.[19] Although the Spanish succeeded in spreading
Catholicism and the Spanish language to most of their colonies over the
following centuries, they did not completely wipe out the great variety of traditions
of the indigenous peoples of South and Central America. Among the Mestizo, what took place was a
blending of Spanish and indigenous traditions.
While the Creole elite clung to what they saw as civility, the lower
classes developed a culture of their own that further entrenched social class
distinctions in certain parts of Latin America.
The elites were divided throughout the continent on how to deal with the
lower classes throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While conservatives wanted to maintain their
hegemonic and economic dominance over the indigenous by not investing in
education or economic development, liberals were interested in assimilating the
Mestizo and the indigenous into a single nation. In turn, the lower classes often resisted,
through peaceful and violent means, the elite’s attempts to suppress or change
their culture.
Following independence, wherever
these ethnic cleavages existed throughout Latin America, they intensified
conflicts amongst the elite and between different social classes.[20] The issues of racism and cultural
assimilation made it far more difficult for conservatives to compromise with
liberals during the nineteenth century on creating a stronger state and investing
into economic development as it would involve spreading power, wealth, and
knowledge to suppressed racial groups.
Furthermore, throughout the twentieth century, many conflicts between
communist guerillas and the capitalist elite were not only fought over the
distribution of wealth or the rights of peasants to maintain collective
ownership of their land; it was a battle over the cultural values of the
nation. Left wing movements over the
last half century such as the FMLN in Salvador, the Sandinista in Nicaragua,
and the Zapatista in southern Mexico have sought to preserve their culture as
well as fight for a more equitable distribution of wealth. These cultural variables strengthened the
ties between members of labor unions and peasant collectives while
simultaneously increasing their opposition to the state. Interestingly enough, actors within the
Catholic Church have been divided over this conflict historically. During the Cold War, bishops have tended to
support the conservative elites while many priests have supported liberation
theology, which gave religious justification to the struggle of left wing
guerillas against the government.
Costa Rica and Salvador had very
different ethnic makeups following independence and this affected political
development in both countries. Today, approximately
ninety percent of Costa Rica’s population consists of Creoles.[21] The rest of the population is a mix of Mestizo,
Indigenous, Chinese, and African peoples. The reason for this is that Costa Rica was
only sparingly populated by indigenous peoples in 1492. In Salvador on the other hand, approximately
ten percent of the population is Creole while the rest is mostly Mestizo as the
country was more densely populated by indigenous peoples at the beginning of
Spanish colonialization. The problem in
Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras is that the Creole minority has
historically controlled most of the land, wealth, and political power. Although Costa Rica’s minorities have
experienced discrimination, their diversity and small numbers have prevented significant
problems with ethnic-based violence. The
country has a stronger sense of national unity as a result.
The Second
Independent Variable: Land Distribution
Problems
with ethnic conflict in Latin America often have been interconnected with the
problems of economic inequality and unequal land distribution, creating
coinciding social cleavages that have intensified political conflict throughout
the continent. When the Spanish
conquered the Americas, the colonists and their Creole descendants monopolized
control of the region’s mines and valuable land, exploiting indigenous labor
wherever they were found in an economic system known as encomienda. In most parts of Latin America, gaining
access to land and capital required connections with the ruling elite, leading
to the creation of political systems dominated by clientelism and economic
inequality. However, the degree of
economic inequality and centralization of power was affected by numerous variables,
including geography, the crops grown, the availability of indigenous labor, the
nature in which each colony was settled, and the conditions of the
international economy.
El
Salvador represents an extreme example of how wealth and political power were
concentrated in the hands of a small minority of Creole in the post-colonial
period. During the colonial era, El Salvador
was the most densely populated part of Central America and contained some of
the region’s best land.[22] While approximately two thirds of the land
was organized around peasant communes where staple crowns were grown, the elites
used some of the best territory to grow the cash crop indigo, which required
little capital investment to cultivate or transport. The Mestizo and indigenous peoples were used
as seasonal wage labor. The elites
monopolized the best land and maintained their political power from the wealth
earned off the export of the cash crop.
Through the protection of the Spanish empire, the Salvadorian elite were
able to secure this trade and maintain their control of the population for two
centuries.
However, the collapse of Spanish
control over Latin America in the early nineteenth century following Napoleon’s
invasion of Spain and the decline in importance of Indigo in the international
economy led to the loss of Spanish protection and a decrease in cash crop
revenue.[23] This led to conflict throughout Central
America and a realignment of the region’s economy. Liberals in El Salvador wanted to switch to
the production of coffee in the highlands and bananas in the lowlands to meet
growing demand for these crops in Europe and America, but these cash
crops—especially bananas—required extensive investments into new agricultural
methods, roads, rail roads, and modern ports.[24] Raising capital for these projects required raising
taxes, borrowing money, establishing banks, and creating a more intrusive
state. Furthermore, it required
destroying many peasant communes and modernizing the structure of the country’s
labor system. From the 1820’s to the
1870’s, liberals and conservatives fought over control of the state and the
future of the economy. The fast pace of
technological development and a growing movement towards globalization
eventually favored the liberals, who by the 1880’s succeeded in creating an
economy that was highly dependent on coffee exports. From the 1880’s to the 1920’s, El Salvador
experienced a long period of relative political stability and economic growth
as these new cash crops provided the government with extensive revenue, which
they used to modernize the capital city with an electrical grid and paved
roads. The importing of modern medicine
also led to a demographic boom.
However, the modernization of El Salvadorian
agriculture led to many peasants losing their land, creating extensive problems
with unemployment and a growing wealth gap between rich and poor. Approximately 350 families controlled over ninety
percent of the country’s land by the beginning of the 1920’s.[25] Since El Salvador struggled to industrialize
in the face of Western competition, the country’s cities struggled to absorb
the growing population.[26] The great depression of the 1930’s led to a sudden
drop in revenue from cash crops, which caused instability in Salvador’s economy
and the rise of a communist movement in the country. The government used force to suppress
uprisings throughout against the state, but the loss of cash crop revenue meant
political elites struggled to maintain control.
Although a new period of economic growth following the post-WWII boom in
the 1950’s and the diversification of the country’s agricultural sector temporarily
solved some of these problems, stagflation and the global oil crisis in the 1970’s
led to another period of conflict in El Salvador that did not subside until
1992 following the end of the Cold War. Although
reforms have been passed in the last couple of decades to increase social
welfare and expand the educational system, the country continues to have
problems with over dependency on cash crops and an uneven divide in wealth
between rich and poor.
Costa
Rica also suffered from problems related to an overdependence on their
agriculture sector, but their colonial and post-colonial economic history was
very different. Unlike Salvador, Costa
Rica was scarcely populated upon colonization by the Spanish and most of Costa
Rica’s land was relatively poor in quality.[27] Due to its geographical remoteness in Central
America’s far south, few wealthy Spaniards were willing to risk moving into the
region. Instead, lower and middle class
Spaniards who were desperate for land gradually populated the country,
cultivating their own plots where they grew staple crops. In Costa Rica during the colonial era, a
class of small and medium sized land owners with few political connections to
the Spanish monarchy dominated the economy.
Unlike El Salvador, a political culture of clientelism was not
prevalent. Ignored by the Spanish political
elites due to the poor quality of the land, Costa Rica had a considerable
amount of autonomy from the Spanish viceroy in Guatemala. In the Costa Rican capital San Jose, a
tradition of compromise developed among different oligarchic factions as no
group of landowners had the power to monopolize control of the government.
Upon
independence, Costa Rica did suffer from problems with political stability as a
result of the collapse of the Central American government, but its economy was
not dependent on indigo so it did not suffer economically from the decline of
the crop.[28] Furthermore, a culture of political consensus
prevented the outbreak of internal conflict in the country between liberals and
conservatives. Liberal reforms to invest
in the production of coffee and the building of a modern infrastructure took
place peacefully and gradually, and the country was always several steps ahead
of its Central American neighbors to the north in terms of economic progress. Infrastructure, education, and agriculture
reforms took place without the violent conflict that its neighbors
experienced. Furthermore, the expansion
of coffee and banana production did not involve the same type of massive
displacement of indigenous labor as in El Salvador. Costa Rica’s geographical remoteness meant
that there was still a lot of uncultivated land available for capitalist
farmers who sought to grow cash crops.
Furthermore, we don’t see the same type of wealth gap emerge between
rich and poor as coffee was grown on medium sized land holdings and access to
capital from private banks was available to a wider segment of the
population. Although the country did
suffer from problems with political instability as a result of the 1930’s
depression and the 1970’s oil crisis, the country suffered from far less
political violence than Salvador and relied on legislative reforms to deal with
socio-economic changes.
The Third
Independent Variable: Foreign Conflict
There
is one large factor that has been left out of this model: the influence of
international actors. Since Central
American states are very small in relation to the regional and global
superpowers, they have had great difficulties defending their sovereignty
against the interests of the United States, Great Britain, and Mexico in the
past.[29] Although the West has provided the region
with modern technology and capital investment, the flooding of their markets
with Western goods has weakened the reform efforts of liberals who have tried
to promote industrialization. This
stalled the development of a larger middle class in both countries that could
have created more equity in the political system, and it also created a
dangerous dependency on the export of cash crops. Furthermore, outside actors have frequently
resorted to the use of political violence through direct or indirect means to
influence Central American politics.
In the case of El Salvador, the
influence of foreign actors was far worse.
Frequent domestic conflict made it far easier for foreign powers to
engage in proxy wars in the country, supporting one side in a civil war to gain
influence. During the middle of the
nineteenth century, Great Britain and the United States engaged in proxy wars
throughout Mexico and Central America, supporting political allies that would
give them favorable trade deals.[30] Britain’s Central American colony Belize had
the region’s only significant port until the late nineteenth century, and the
British were interested in trading finished goods for cash crops. This meant that it was in Great Britain’s
best interest to prevent liberals from coming to power in Central American
states. Threated by growing British
influence, America tended to support liberal politicians in the region,
including in El Salvador, with arms and capital. One of the United States’ biggest fears was
that a Western European country would gain control of a canal that would
connect the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.
In 1903, the United States encouraged the wealthy families in Columbia’s
Central American province Panama to rebel against the government and form their
own state when the Columbian government refused to cooperate with America in
constructing a canal.[31] Furthermore, the United States invaded
Nicaragua in 1912 and occupied the country for over twenty years to prevent
Europeans from building a canal of their own in Central America. Throughout the twentieth century, the United
States also kept bases in neighboring Honduras, which they used to train
pro-capitalist right wing movements like the Contra to fight left wing
guerillas in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. These Cold War proxy wars were particularly
violent during the 1970’s and 1980’s.
However, Costa Rica was not affected
as much by foreign conflict. The country
has benefited from its relative geographic isolation in relation to the four
other states in Central America.[32] As a result, Costa Rica was able to distance
itself from the disputes over borders and sovereignty that ripped apart Central
America in the middle of the nineteenth century following the collapse of the
Spanish American government. Furthermore,
Costa Rica’s relative political stability and its less valuable geopolitical
location meant foreign actors had less opportunities and less of a willingness
to interfere in the country’s affairs. Moreover,
since Costa Rica’s communist party was never a serious threat to take over the
state in the twentieth century, the United States showed less interest in
getting involved in its affairs during the Cold War. Therefore, foreign actors had a more negative
effect on El Salvador’s political stability historically, increasing economic
inequality and animosity between political actors.
Conclusion
There
are several weaknesses with this study that need to be addressed. Although this
paper has attempted to use Charles Tilly’s model of collective action to show
that ethnicity, land distribution, and foreign conflict led to the divergence
of political outcomes in Salvador and Costa Rica after independence from Spain,
more comparative studies of Latin American countries are needed to test whether
there is a connection between the independent and dependent variables. Unfortunately, due to the dearth of case
studies in Latin America and the plethora of variables, this is easier said
than done. Costa Rica was the only
country to become a consolidated democracy before the third wave in the 1970’s,
which means we can’t compare the country’s experience with any other. However, what this study does show clearly is
that Latin American countries have diverse political, economic, and social
histories that cannot easily be generalized by cultural determinist arguments. Although Latin America was affected by common
trends that prevented the consolidation of democracy in most of the region
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, each country has a unique
history. Costa Rica had a gradual
transition to democracy that began in the nineteenth century despite the
influence of Spanish colonization and Catholicism.
Work Cited Page
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America since Independence.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991.
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Bounded Generalizations," Comparative
Political Studies, 33(6-7), 2000: 703-34.
3. Burns, E. Bradford. "The Modernization of Underdevelopment:
El Salvador, 1858-1931,” The Journal of
Developing Areas, 18(2), 1984: 293-316.
4. Collier, David and Steve
Lavitsky. “Democracy with Adjectives:
Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” World Politics, 49, April, 1997: 430-51.
5. Diamond, Jared. Guns,
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Holmes, and Orlando J. Perez. Latin American Democracy. Routledge: New York, 2009.
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18. Schneider, Carsten and
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11(5), December, 2004: 59-90.
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Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1997.
[1]
Holmes, Jennifer. "Democratic
Consolidation in Latin America?" in Richard Millet, Jennifer S. Holmes,
and Orlando J. Perez. Latin American Democracy. Routledge: New York, 2009, 5-20.
[2]
Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order.
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: New York, 2011; Huntington, Samuel. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, 72 (3), Summer, 1993: 22-49;
and Lipset, Seymour M. “The Social
Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address,” American Sociological Review, 59, 1994:
1-22.
[3]
Burns, E. Bradford. "The
Modernization of Underdevelopment: El Salvador, 1858-1931,” The Journal of Developing Areas, 18(2),
1984: 293-316; and Frank, Andre Gunder.
"The Development of Underdevelopment,” Monthly Review Press, 18(4), 1966:
99-108.
[4]
For Tilly’s views on democratization, see Tilly, Charles. "Processes and Mechanisms of
Democratization," Sociological
Theory, 18(1), 2000: 1-16; and for his views on mobilization, see Tilly,
Charles.
From Mobilization to Revolution.
Addison-Wesley: Great Britain, 1978.
[5]
Collier, David and Steve Lavitsky.
“Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative
Research,” World Politics, 49, April,
1997: 430-51.
[6]
Merkel, Wolfgang and Aurel Croissant. “Conclusions:
Good and Defective Democracies,” Democratization,
11(5), 2004: 199-213.
[7]
Tilly, Ibid.
[8]
Schneider, Carsten and Phillipe C. Schmitter.
"Liberalization, Transition, and Consolidation: Measuring the
Components of Democratization," Democratization,
11(5), December, 2004: 59-90.
[9]
“Freedom House: El Salvador,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/el-salvador,
2015 and “Freedom House: Costa Rica,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/costa-rica,
2015.
[10]
“World Bank: El Salvador” http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/elsalvador,
2015; and “World Bank: Costa Rica,” http://data.worldbank.org/country/costa-rica,
2015.
[11]
“World Economic Forum: Competiveness Rankings,” http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/rankings/,
2015.
[13]
Carballo, Jose Luis Vega.
"Political Parties, Party Systems, and Democracy in Costa
Rica," in Political Parties and Democracy
in Central America, edited by Louis W. Goodman, William M. LeoGrande, and
Johanna Mendelson Forman. Westview
Press: Boulder, 1990, 203-212.
[14]
Yashar, Deborah J. Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala. Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1997.
[15]
Cruz, Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz.
"Colonial Heritage, External Domination, and Political Systems in
Central America," in Political
Parties and Democracy in Central America, edited by Louis W. Goodman,
William M. LeoGrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman. Westview Press: Boulder, 1990, 17-31.
[16]
Holmes, Jennifer. "Democratic
Consolidation in Latin America?" in Millet, Richard, Jennifer S. Holmes,
and Orlando J. Perez. Latin American Democracy. Routledge: New York, 2009, 5-20.
[17]
Cruz, Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz.
"Colonial Heritage, External Domination, and Political Systems in
Central America," in Political Parties and Democracy in Central
America, edited by Louis W. Goodman, William M. LeoGrande, and Johanna
Mendelson Forman. Westview Press:
Boulder, 1990, 17-31.
[18]
Diamond, Jared. Guns, Germs, and Steel. W.W.
Norton: Great Britain, 1997.
[19]
Cruz, Ibid.
[20]
Woodward, R.L. "The Aftermath of
Independence, 1821-1870," in Bethell, Leslie. Central
America Since Independence.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991, 1-36.
[21]
Woodward, Ibid.
[22]
Woodward, Ibid.
[23]
Cardaso, Ciro. "The Liberal Era,
1870-1930," in Bethell, Leslie. Central America Since Independence. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991,
37-68
[24]
Cardaso, Ibid.
[25]
Burns, Ibid.
[26]
Rivas, Edelberto Torres. "Crisis
and Conflict, 1930 to the present," in Bethell, Leslie. Central
America since Independence.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991, 69-118.
[27]
Woodward, Ibid.
[28]
Cardaso, Ibid.
[29]
Erfani, Julie. The Paradox of the Mexican State: Rereading Sovereignty from
Independence to Nafta. Lynne Rienner
Publishers: Boulder, 1995.
[30]
Cardaso, Ibid.
[31]
Riveras, Ibid.
[32]
Riveras, Ibid.
