Why does clientelism play a prominent
role in the politics of the Middle East?
Introduction
Cliental networks have played a
prominent role in shaping the relationship between Middle Eastern states and their
societies throughout the last half century.
Although these informal networks of top-down patronage and reciprocal
loyalty have provided relative stability for authoritarian regimes in the region,
they have also become obstacles to economic and political development.[1] This leads us to the following questions: why
was clientelism prevalent in almost every Middle Eastern country during their early
period of state formation a half century ago, and why has clientelism continued
to persist in the region when it has declined in other parts of the developing
world like Latin America in recent decades?
Although it is tempting to blame
certain aspects of the region’s culture, like the influence of Bedouin tribal
traditions, for the persistence of clientelism in the region, the cliental
networks most commonly found in the Middle East today are not based on
traditional bonds that tie a peasant to his landowner or a nomad to his tribe.[2] Instead, the form of clientelism that has
become pervasive in the region is a modern and urban phenomenon connected with party
machine politics operating in the context of a modern state.[3] We
normally find these kinds of cliental networks in countries experiencing the
early stages of modernity where peasants have been forced off their land due to
the importation of modern agricultural technology but struggle to find work and
social stability in urban centers that are often overcrowded and underdeveloped. In
these unstable circumstances, many political parties, whether operating under
an authoritarian or democratic regime, have used the strategy of promising or
providing benefits like government services, jobs, subsidies, and cheap housing
to urban dwellers in exchange for votes or political loyalty. Some
clients—particularly those that share the same religion, ethnicity, and/or
tribal background of those in power—are purposely given better benefits than
others to weaken the potential for horizontal group formations like labor
unions that could potentially challenge the power of the political elites. These kinds of patron-client networks has
been found in places as diverse as mid-nineteenth century New York,
mid-twentieth century Mexico, and present day Venezuela, so the Middle East is
not unique in this respect.[4] Although culture has affected the nature of modern
cliental networks in the times and places that they developed, only rational
choice and structuralist theories can explain why these networks share so many
similarities despite the fact that they developed in separate parts of the
globe at different points in time.
Furthermore, culture does not
explain why this modern form of clientelism has remained pervasive throughout
the Middle East over the last half century.
One of the most important reasons why it has lasted in the region for so
long while it has begun to diminish in importance in other parts of the
developing world is that authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have had
greater access to rents.[5] This source of revenue does not only come
from fossil fuel extraction but location rents like oil pipelines and the Suez
Canal; migration rents through the remittances of emigrants working in the Gulf
and the West; and strategic rents like military aid and economic investment
from Western countries. Whereas other
authoritarian regimes in the developing world struggled to maintain the cost of
their cliental networks throughout the global economic crisis of the 1970’s and
the sharp rise in oil prices, most authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have
been able to use these extra rents to help maintain their base of power. Furthermore,
since access to rents creates less of an incentive to industrialize, there is also
less of need to invest in long term development.[6]
Cliental networks become harder to
maintain as economies diversify, educational institutions improve, and the
standard of living rises for the average person.
Of course, rents are not the only reason
why authoritarian regimes and their cliental networks have persisted in the
Middle East. Regimes in the region have
relied as well on a variety of other strategies to control their populations
and protect their power base, including state coercion; media manipulation;
faux liberal institutional reforms; and outsourcing welfare programs to Islamic
charity networks with ties to the regime.[7] Whereas states in the Gulf have far more
substantial access to oil rents due to small populations and enormous deposits
of fossil fuels, regimes in North Africa and the Levant had to show a greater
degree of political creativity to keep their respective regimes from collapsing
or giving in to pressures to liberalize the political system.
The Dependent Variable: Clientelism in the Middle
East
During
the 1970’s and 1980’s, scholars such as S.N. Eisenstadt, Rene Lemarchand, John
Waterbury, and Robert Putnam began to study the effect of cliental networks on
political economies with a particular focus on the developing world.[8] Following several decades of independence
from European hegemony, third world countries did not perform as expected in
terms of political and economic development.[9] Many experienced disappointing growth rates
and failed transitions to democracy. Countries
that theoretically had liberal constitutions were being ruled by single party
regimes, military juntas, and personalized dictatorships, and laws were
subjectively interpreted to benefit business owners with connections to the
regime. To understand these struggles
with political and economic development, it was not enough to study formal
institutions like constitutions, parliaments, or bureaucracies because politics
in the third world was dominated by unwritten rules and informal political
hierarchies. Clientelism, which was a
concept that was formulated in the field of anthropology, was adopted by
political scientists to understand some of the informal aspects of many of
these regimes. Specialists in the Middle
East, who often call the concept by its informal Arabic title “Wusta,” have
taken a great interest in patron-client networks as they help explain why
authoritarian regimes in the region have lasted so long yet are also terrible
at governance.
Scholars
focusing on the subject generally define cliental networks as informal,
voluntary, personal, and hierarchical relationships between patrons and clients
where services, favors, and financial benefits are given to those below in
exchange for loyalty.[10] These vertical networks are distinguished
from horizontal groups where members interact with each other on an equal basis
like labor unions and civil society organizations. Furthermore, cliental networks need to be
distinguished from merit-based bureaucracies and competitive businesses where
workers are hired and given promotions based on performance and not
connections. Bureaucrats only become
part of a cliental network when there are high rates of corruption in the
government, allowing workers to use their political office for personal gain. Also, cliental networks are supposed to be voluntary;
groups where members are forced to participate technically do not qualify. A totalitarian regime that has absolute
control of society through coercion and ideological domination does not use
clientelism to gain support for the government.
Regimes that want to control
parts of the population without resorting to force can use clientelism as a way
to buy off support.
Although
this definition is pretty straight forward, applying it to reality is far more convoluted. For
example, many patron-client networks often involve some forms of coercion. Mafia syndicates in Southern Italy will give
protection to businesses in exchange for money, but those same organizations
will often use violence against businesses that refuse the protection.[11] Therefore, would mafia syndicates qualify as
patron-client networks? Also, ideology
often plays a role in reinforcing the bonds between patrons and clients. Islamist organizations in the Middle East
like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Justice and Development Party in
Morocco, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and the Nahda party in
Tunisia use a mixture of charity, services, and Islamist ideology to win over
supporters.[12] Like any other cliental network, their
charity networks are the backbone of their support, but Islamist ideology gives
them added legitimacy and allows them to collect more donations from wealthy patrons.
Many of their supporters are motivated not
by the services they receive but the ideals of the organization itself. In conclusion, patron client networks can
emerge in a diversity of situations and take on many different forms. Over time, these organizations can
evolve. For example, Hezbollah, which
began as a Shi’a militia in Southern Lebanon to fight the Israelis, has evolved
into a political party with an extensive patron-client network that cuts across
many different confessional groups. This
is why it is important not to make overt generalizations about clientelism in
the Middle East.
For example, although clientelism is
most often associated with authoritarian regimes in the region, it has emerged
in underdeveloped democracies as well.[13] In
Turkey in 1950, following several years of internal political pressure, the
ruling Republican People’s Party in Turkey, which was a developmental party, decided
to allow relatively free and fair elections for the first time.[14] Their main opposition, the Democratic Party
(DP), was able to win that election by promising to enact populist welfare policies
and provide extensive benefits for loyal clients in exchange for votes. Populist parties like the DP consistently
won elections from the 1950’s to the 1970’s in Turkey, and once in power, they
drove up the country’s debt, politicized the bureaucracy, and took money away
from long term developmental programs.
The debt problems caused cyclical political crises that led to coup
d’états in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Only in
the 1980’s did Turkish political parties begin to pursue more fiscally
responsible policies due to pressure from international banks and their own
military. To describe this situation, Peter
Evans uses the term precocious Keynesianism, which is when states spend heavily
on populist welfare policies before they have a vibrant industrial sector to
pay for it. It is a great for winning
popular support in the short term but awful for long term development.
We
also find competitive cliental networks in democratic Lebanon, but they
developed under very different circumstances.
Whereas Turkish cliental networks were relatively homogenous in terms of
ethnicity, Lebanese parties tend to cater more to specific religious and ethnic
minorities due to the unique demographic and geopolitical nature of the nation,
which consists of eighteen different ethnic groups. For example, sectarian parties like Hezbollah
tend to provide benefits to clients from a Shi’a background in exchange for
political support and votes.[15] This does not mean that political parties
only cater to specific religious groups.
For example, the Harriri family’s Future Movement, whose main base of
support is Sunni, also provides goods and services to other confessional
groups. Even Hezbollah has a Christian
wing within its militia, and some of its charities serve the other religious
denominations. However, in comparison
with Turkey, Lebanese clientelism takes on a sectarian, and therefore more
violent, nature. Due to the weakness of
the state, many of these cliental networks have created their own personal
fiefdoms within the country.
On
the other hand, in the rest of the Arab Middle East, it is more common to find
cliental networks existing within an authoritarian context. Syria is one of the most extreme
examples. Following two decades of coup d’états
and political instability in the 1950’s and 1960’s, Hafez al-Assad, with the
support of the minority Alawite community and the Ba’ath party, was able to create
stability by repressing the opposition with violence and using state resources
to build a relatively small but very loyal base of clients.[16] Unlike Turkey or Lebanon, participation in
these cliental networks was less voluntary and was much more limited in terms
of who could participate. Only patron-client
networks connected with the ruling regime were tolerated. Due to ethnic divisions in the state, several
decades of political instability, and less access to rents than other countries
in the region, the Syrian regime has had to rely on coercion far more than most
other governments in the regime. It helps explain why the revolution that began
there in 2011 was the most violent of all the uprisings.
Egypt
during the Mubarak era (1981-2011) represents an intermediate case study as its
regime was not democratic but was also not as authoritarian as Syria. In response to internal and external
pressures for political liberalization in the 1970’s and 1980’s, Egypt’s
government allowed very limited competition in legislative elections in 1986.[17] Although access to the media was restricted
and certain parties were banned from participating, the regime allowed limited
competition among candidates under the condition that they did not challenge
the legitimacy of the regime in power.
Candidates won elections by making and fulfilling as many promises as
possible to potential clients. As in many
other states in the Middle East, voters in these illiberal elections were far
more likely to choose candidates based on the personal services they could
provide rather than their ideology or long term plans for the country. Once elected, legislators would than use
their political offices to obtain state rents for their loyal clients in the
form of jobs, access to licenses, public contracts, tax breaks, housing, and
other benefits. The system allowed new
clients to be co-opted into the system as long they did not challenge the
legitimacy of the regime. This created a
very limited form of pluralism.
The
Gulf presents us with another scenario.
Unlike the “republics” in the region, the monarchies tend to distribute
state rents through the royal family, whose members control most of the major
government bureaucracies. Only recently have parliaments and political
parties become an aspect of political life in the Gulf, and only in Kuwait do
they have any significant effect on the regime.[18] Due to the excessive amounts of oil rents and
relatively small populations, governments like Qatar can deal with political opposition
by simply throwing money at the problem.
For example, governments in the region responded to the Arab Spring in
2011 by increasing state salaries and social welfare; this was not an option
available to Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, or Yemen.[19] The
only monarchy in the Gulf that could not use this strategy in 2011 was Bahrain,
which has less oil rents than its neighbors and a small minority of Sunni
Muslims ruling over a majority of Shi’a.
One only wonders why the Kaddafi regime in Libya didn’t pursue a similar
strategy as the other rentier states. Although
Gulf regimes are autocratic like the regime in Syria, they are able to more
easily contain opposition to their regimes without violence due to their excessive
oil wealth.
Not
only are cliental networks in the region diverse, but they are also difficult
to quantify and analyze with precision. This
is necessary if we seek to compare and contrast the phenomenon across different
countries and regions. Scholars like
Robert Cunningham and Samer Shehata have chosen micro approaches, analyzing
individual cases of patron client relations in detail.[20] Although these kinds of anecdotal studies are
valuable in terms of understanding how individual patron client relationships
work, we can’t use them to make larger conclusions about clientelism in the
Middle East. Other scholars like Peter
Evans, John Waterbury, and Robert Putnam chose instead to look at public
expenditures, measuring how much is spent on populist policies versus
developmental programs.[21] Institutions like Transparency International
and the International Country Risk Guide use multiple surveys to measure
perceptions of corruption, the rule of law, the quality of a bureaucracy,
government transparency, and other factors to indirectly measure the effects of
clientelism and corruption in each country.
Although it is impossible to fully quantify this variable, it is quite
clear from the statistics and the individual case studies that the Middle East
has had significant problems with clientelism over the last sixty years with
little improvement in governance over that time period in spite of significant economic
growth. On the other hand, regimes in Latin America
have made greater improvements in terms of political development in the same period
of time.
The Dependent Variables: Explaining the Resilience
of Clientelism in the Middle East
Why
than did clientelism become entrenched in the politics of the Middle East? Much of it has to do with the initial period
of state formation in the 1950’s and 1960’s when Arab regimes became
independent from European powers. During
this time, there were extensive economic, social, and political changes brought
about by the influence of modernity that were causing violent social cleavages
in society.[22] Upon gaining independence, the puppets
regimes of the region that were loyal to the West were having problems dealing
with increasing urban poverty, growing gaps in wealth, the rise of political
Islamism, the influence of communist states, and the xenophobic attitudes of
fascist parties. To make matters worse,
the creation of the Israeli state inflamed attitudes against the West during
this time period. The Gulf regimes,
backed very strongly by the West, were able to survive the politically
tumultuous period, but the monarchies in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya
collapsed following massive protests and coups d’état throughout the 1950’s and
1960’s. Although the new military
dictators of the regime preached the need to industrialize and invest in long
term development, they spent enormous resources expanding the size of the state
to provide welfare and services to loyal clients.[23]
Access to these cliental networks were
based on connections and loyalty; not hard work or qualifications. These regime leaders were more interested in
political stability than long term development. Although these regimes did use coercion and
ideology to win support, clientelism played a large role in stabilizing many
Arab regimes.
Although
the creation of a vast welfare state and a large cliental of loyal supporters
created short term stability, it was also expensive to maintain.[24] State industries were bogged down by
inefficiency due to the lack of competition and the lack of qualified
workers. Furthermore, state bureaucracies
suffered from corruption and inefficiency.
As a result, the rates of growth, which averaged about 4 percent a year
for Arab countries, were disappointing. Rapid
population growth only made matters worse.[25] By the late 1960’s and 1970’s, many Arab countries
found themselves in massive debt with populations that were losing interest in
Arab nationalist ideology.
Many
other states in the developing world experienced similar problems by the 1970’s. In the ensuing decades, debt ridden countries
were often forced to take loans from the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank in exchange for making structural reforms. This would often mean cutting government
spending, which in turn would reduce the government’s ability to win the
support of clients in society. The end
result in Latin America and Sub-Saharan was the decline of many authoritarian
regimes and the rise of more pluralistic and democratic systems.[26] Along with the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the spread of democracy into Eastern Europe, scholars call this movement
the third wave of democratization. Patron-client
networks with connections to the state either collapsed or went into decline as
labor unions, civic organizations, and chambers of commerce began to compete
for access to power.
However, this third wave did not
have the same affect on the Middle East.
Although several regimes, like Egypt and Tunisia, did make several
attempts at economic restructuring programs to obtain foreign aid and
investments, authoritarian regimes throughout the region never transitioned to
democracies or pluralistic societies over the ensuing decades.[27] Part
of the reason is the surge of oil prices in the 1970’s, which brought enormous
benefits to the Gulf, allowed many regimes to maintain their client bases. Furthermore, even countries without extensive
amounts of oil, like Egypt, had other sources of rent they could use that were
unique to the region.[28] Several countries in the Levant have oil
pipelines that run through their country, giving them access to transport
rents. Egypt’s Suez Canal provides
another source of transport rent as well.
Furthermore, since the United States and the Soviet Union were keenly
interested in maintaining stability in a very volatile region with two thirds
of the world’s oil wealth, they gave substantial amounts of foreign aid to
allied countries. Lastly, many Arabs
who migrated to the Gulf looking for work in the country’s booming oil industry
sent their money home to their families.
States were able to tax these remittances. These rents continue to provide Middle
Eastern states with sources of revenue than enable them to maintain their
patron client networks without having to invest in economic development.
However, the long term future of
many authoritarian regimes and their loyal cliental networks are by no means
certain as witnessed by the 2011 revolutions.
For one, a lot of these rents are dependent on a single resource: fossil
fuels. If the supply one day runs out or
demand decreases, access to rents will significantly diminish. It is probably not a coincidence that Middle
Eastern countries that have far less access to rents like Tunisia and Turkey
have made greater strides with economic and political development in comparison
with their neighbors.[29] Furthermore, as access to educational
institutions and modern media improves throughout the Middle East, it will
become harder for patrons to retain the loyalty of their clients. Citizens that are well educated are more
likely to demand better governance and accountability from state institutions
than their illiterate counterparts.
Work Cited Page
1. Angrist, Michele. “Party Systems and Regime Formation in the
Modern Middle East: Explaining Turkish Exceptionalism," Comparative
Politics, 36 (2), Jan, 2004: 229-249.
2. Bellin, Eva Rana. "Contingent Democrats: Industrialists,
Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries," World Politics,
52 (2), Jan, 2000: 175-205.
3. Brumberg, Daniel. 2002 “The
Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,” Journal of Democracy Vol.13, No. 4: 56-68.
4. Cammett, Melanie and Sukriti
Issar. “Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: The Political Geography of Welfare in
Lebanon,” World Politics 62 (3), 2010: 381-421.
5. Cunningham, Robert and Yasin
Sarayrah. “Taming Wasta to Achieve Development,” Arab Studies Quarterly,
16 (3), 1995: 29-41.
6. Eisenstadt, S.N. and Rene
Lemarchand, eds. Political
Clientelism, Patronage, and Development.
Sage Publications: London, 1981.
7. Haddad, Bassam. “Syria’s State
Bourgeoisie: An Organic Backbone for the Regime,” Middle East Critique,
21 (3), 2012: 231-257.
8. Herb, Michael. 2004. “Princes
and Parliaments in the Arab World,” Middle East Journal, 58 (3):
367-384.
9. Hinnebush, Raymond. “Toward a Historical Sociology of State
Formation in the Middle East,” Middle
East Critique, 19 (3), Fall 2010: 201-16.
10. Korany, Bahgat, ed. Arab Human Development in the Twenty-First
Century: The Primacy of Empowerment.
The American University in Cairo Press: Egypt, 2014.
11. Leenders, Reinoud and
Lust-Ellen. “Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East,” Journal of
Democracy, 20 (3), 2008: 122-135.
12. Lynch, Marc, ed. The Arab Uprising
Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East. Columbia University Press: New York, 2014.
13. Owen, Roger. State, Power, and Politics in the Making
of the Modern Middle East. Rutledge: London, 2004.
14. Putnam, Robert. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in
Modern Italy. Princeton University
Press: New Jersey, 1993.
15. Richards, Alan, John Waterbury,
Melani Cammett, and Ishac Diwan. A
Political Economy of the Middle East, third edition. West View Press: United States, 2014.
16. Ross, Michael. "Does oil
hinder democracy?" World Politics, 53 (3): 325-361.
17. Schlumberger, Oliver. Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics
and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes.
Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2007.
18. Waldner, David. State Building and Late Development. Cornell University Press: New York, 1999.
19. Weiner, Myron and Samuel Huntington. Understanding Political Development.
Little, Brown and Co.: Boston, 1987.
[1]
See Waldner, David. State building
and Late Development, and Korany, Bahgat. Arab Human Development in the
Twenty-First Century: The Primacy of Empowerment.
[2]
For resources that have culture as the independent variable to explain cliental
networks, see works by Robert Putnam, Robert Cunningham, and Yasin
Sarayrah.
[3]
Lemarchand, Rene. "Comparative
Political Clientelism: Structure, Process, and Optic," in Political
Clientelism, Patronage, and Development. Eisenstadt, S.N. and Rene
Lemarchand, eds.: pg 7-32.
[4]
S.N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand’s book on clientelism goes into numerous case
studies that include Southern Italy, Poland, Peru, Turkey, and other developing
countries throughout the globe.
[5]
Heydemann, Steven. "Social Pacts
and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East," pg 21-38, and
Richter, Thomas. "The Political
Economy of Regime Maintenance in Egypt: Linking External Resources and Domestic
Legitimation," pg 177-193. Both
articles are found in Schlumberger’s book.
[6] Ross, Michael. "Does oil hinder democracy?"
World Politics, 53 (3): 325-361.
[7]
Oliver Schlumberger’s edited book Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics
and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes has numerous articles by political
scientists that discuss the different reasons why authoritarianism in the
Middle East has survived in the region for the last five decades.
[8]
Richards, Alan, John Waterbury, Melani Cammett, and Ishac Diwan. A Political Economy of the Middle East,
third edition. West View Press: United
States, 2014, Putnam, Robert. Making
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1993,
and Eisenstadt, S.N. and Rene Lemarchand, eds.
Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development. Sage Publications: London, 1981.
[9] Weiner,
Myron and Samuel Huntington.
Understanding Political Development. Little, Brown and Co.: Boston,
1987.
[10] Eisenstadt,
S.N. and Rene Lemarchand, Ibid.
[11]
Putnam, Robert. Ibid.
[12] Pioppi, Daniela.
"Privatization of Social Services as a Regime Strategy: The Revival
of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf) in Egypt," in Schlumberger, Oliver. Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics
and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes.
Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2007, pg 129-142.
[13]
By underdeveloped democracy, I mean a democratic system that is not full
consolidated and country that is still developing economically.
[14]
Angrist, Michele. “Party Systems and
Regime Formation in the Modern Middle East: Explaining Turkish
Exceptionalism," and Evans, Peter.
Ibid.
[15]
Cammett, Melanie and Sukriti Issar. “Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: The Political
Geography of Welfare in Lebanon,” World Politics 62 (3), 2010: 381-421
[16]
Haddad, Bassam. “Syria’s State Bourgeoisie: An Organic Backbone for the
Regime,” Middle East Critique, 21 (3), 2012: 231-257.
[17]
Leenders, Reinoud and Lust-Ellen. “Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East,”
Journal of Democracy, 20 (3), 2008: 122-135.
[18]
Herb, Michael. 2004. “Princes and Parliaments in the Arab World,” Middle
East Journal, 58 (3): 367-384.
[19]
Lynch, Marc, ed. The Arab Uprising Explained: New Contentious Politics in the
Middle East. Columbia University
Press: New York, 2014.
[20]
Cunningham, Ibid, and Shehata, Ibid.
[21]
Evans, Ibid, Waterbury, Ibid, and Putnam, Ibid.
[22]
Evans, Ibid.
[23]
Owen, Roger. State, Power, and
Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. Rutledge: London, 2004.
[24]
Richards, Alan, John Waterbury, Melani Cammett, and Ishac Diwan, Ibid.
[25]
Richards, Alan, John Waterbury, Melani Cammett, and Ishac Diwan. A Political Economy of the Middle East,
third edition. West View Press: United
States, 2014.
[26]
Bellin, Eva Rana. "Contingent
Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing
Countries," World Politics, 52 (2), Jan, 2000: 175-205.
[27]
Schlumberger, Ibid.
[28] Richter,
Ibid.
[29]
Brumberg, Daniel. 2002 “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,” Journal of
Democracy Vol.13, No. 4: 56-68.
